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European security and defence cooperation has experienced some potentially significant 
advances since the release of the European Union Global Strategy in 2016. Furthermore, 
due to recent developments such as more aggressive behaviour from Russia, a drastic influx 
of irregular migrants to Europe and the impact of the Trump administration on international 
affairs, the EU’s attempts to deal with security and defence issues have once more become 
a focal point for many Europeans. Yet, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
while somewhat ambitious, is often criticised for its inefficient implementation. This thesis 
assessed the extent to which security practitioners ‘buy into’ the idea of integrating security 
and defence within the EU and develop a sense of European integration identity. It 
hypothesised that while common training may have an impact on individuals’ notions of 
identity, national interests would continue to shape practitioners’ views on security and 
defence integration.  
The concept of strategic narratives as developed by Roselle et al. (2012) was used to 
investigate the impact that CSDP-related training courses coordinated by the European 
Security and Defence College have on practitioners’ concepts of European identity. A 
content analysis of the EU’s two security strategies was complimented by expert interviews 
to assess the formation and projection of security-related strategic narratives. The reception 
of narratives was examined through an online survey prior to participation in EU-level 
training courses and semi-structured interviews after completing the course.  
The data collected provides a rare empirical application of the concept of strategic narrative 
and makes a novel contribution to the study of European identity by focusing on 
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practitioners’ understandings of European identity. It shows that despite CSDP training 
courses being a useful platform for the projection of strategic narratives, the EU struggles to 
communicate coherent and convincing strategic narratives that are able to build a European 
security culture and contribute to the emergence of a European integration identity. 
Instead, findings indicate that national interests remain the key factor in shaping 
practitioners’ views on security and defence and support for further European cooperation 
and integration is dependent on being beneficial to national foreign policy agendas rather 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
The 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) states in its opening lines that “the 
purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned […]. Our wider region has 
become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are 
affecting directly our citizens’ lives” (2016, p. 3). Research also indicates that security, and 
terrorism in particular, has become the most important concerns for many Europeans 
(Stokes, et al., for Pew Research, 2016). The launch of the new Strategy has been 
accompanied by a renewed focus on the integration of European security and defence. 
Indeed, politicians (i.e. Juncker in 2015; Orban and Sobotka, 2016; Macron and Merkel in 
2018 and 2019) have repeatedly floated the idea of establishing a European army in order 
to best tackle increasingly complex security challenges. However, at the same time, 
developments such as Brexit and nationalistic as well as far-right and nativist movements in 
several European countries seem to question the very nature of the European project 
altogether.  
The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was launched two decades ago 
(originally as the European Security and Defence Policy) and the first EU mission was 
launched in 2002; Since then, 35 operations and missions have taken place, two-thirds of 
them being civilian. While at first glance this seems like a considerable number, these 
missions have varied significantly in size with the smallest involving only a handful of 
personnel (EUBAM Libya) and the bigger ones such as EULEX Kosovo deploying 
approximately 1500 staff (Tardy, 2015, p. 17). The frequency with which these are launched 
has also fluctuated significantly over the last two decades (with 65% being launched in the 
first seven years). Since the setting of the Helsinki Headline Goals in 1999, the 
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implementation of the CSDP has thus been a highly contested subject. As Tocci points out: 
“Traditionally, foreign policy in general, and security and defence in particular, were the 
most divisive and controversial dimensions of the European project” as Member States have 
always been reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over these matters (2017, p. 92).  
Since the launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, some key steps towards further 
integration were taken. The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was initiated 
in December 2017, enabling Member States to cooperate more closely on defence issues. 
The European Defence Fund was also introduced to facilitate greater interoperability 
between Member States. Yet, the EU is facing a significant internal crisis with the United 
Kingdom (one of the biggest security and defence actors in Europe) set to leave the Union in 
March 2019. Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that many Member States remain 
unenthusiastic about fully implementing the CSDP. The EU Battlegroups, the EU’s military 
rapid reaction capacity, remain unused and the EU continues to face criticism regarding its 
failure to act (in a timely fashion) when crises arise (such as in Libya in 2011). In fact, the EU 
is often disparaged for punching below its weight with regards to making use of its security 
and defence capabilities (e.g. Kantner, 2006, p. 504; Tocci, 2017, p. 74) despite a growing 
awareness that the complexity of today’s security threats requires European cooperation, 
especially at a time where relations with the EU’s biggest military partner, the United States, 
have become somewhat strained.  
The discrepancy between the EU’s vision of security and defence cooperation and 
integration and the Member States’ willingness to implement it is a key concern for policy-
makers and requires resolution if the EU is to fully establish itself as an international security 
and defence actor.  
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Considerable research has been carried out into what role the EU is to play in the 
international sphere, i.e. whether its foreign policy merely constitutes another tool to 
promote the interests of its most powerful Member States or if its unique structure allows 
the EU to make a “distinctive contribution to international politics” (Bickerton, 2011, p.  
186). This has led to many studies assessing the EU’s external identity and the efficiency of 
operational mechanisms put in place by EU decision-makers. Yet no supranational decision-
making body currently exists which means that whilst intergovernmental cooperation is 
sought, Member States retain sovereignty over security and defence matters. As the success 
of the CSDP heavily relies on Member States being committed to its full implementation as 
well as the integration of security and defence, it is therefore crucial to examine the views 
and attitudes of those involved in this process. This is underlined by Juncos and Gross’ view 
that while high-ranking politicians are in charge of executing the CSDP, “implementing 
agents” largely determine the outcomes (2011, p. 84). Focusing on how practitioners in an 
institutional context respond to the EU’s attempts at communicating its narratives will 
provide a novel approach to assessing the EU’s efforts at overcoming its knowledge and 
democratic deficit (McCormick, 2014). Furthermore, it will highlight how identity formation 
is reciprocal – often instigated by elites, but also shaped from the bottom-up.   
M. E. Smith contends that one of the main reasons for the EU’s underperformance in the 
security arena is its lack of a common security culture, or in other words, the insufficient 
development of a ‘shared value system’ (in Richardson, 2012, p. 7). His statement points to 
a key question which is rather more inward-looking than many other studies and deserves 
further attention: is a European integration identity emerging amongst security 
practitioners that would facilitate a common security culture and enable the EU to speak 
with ‘one voice’ regarding security and defence matters?  
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The importance of identity in the European integration process is further highlighted by A. 
Smith who believes that “until the great majority of Europeans, the great mass of the middle 
and lower classes, are ready to imbibe these European messages in a similar manner and to 
feel inspired by them to common action and community, the edifice of ‘Europe’ at the 
political level will remain shaky” (Smith, 1992, p. 73, see also Bruter, 2005; Hermann et al., 
2004; and Kumm, 2007).  
This shaky foundation referred to by Smith is reflected in the EU continuously being 
criticised for having a democratic deficit and its perceived lack of legitimacy (e.g. Lord and 
Beetham, 2001; Schmitter, 2003, p. 83; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007, Tocci, 2017, p. 
22). In fact, Sifft et al. agree with Smith and argue that in order to legitimise EU institutions, 
a “common European discourse and some sense of belonging to a common community” 
need to emerge (2007, p.  128). This is further supported by Kaina et al. who believe that a 
“sense of community” amongst Europeans has the potential to overcome the increasing 
polarisation of attitudes towards the EU (2013, p. 5).  
A substantial volume of research has been undertaken into how key decision-makers, such 
as senior national officials, deal with pooling some of their sovereignty in favour of 
intergovernmental and supranational processes. However, as Adler-Nissen points out, 
traditional approaches to studying European integration often neglect to consider the 
experiences of individuals whose daily lives are affected by European institutions. Yet their 
practices are “crucial for the performance of European integration” (2014). This is further 
supported by Bruter who argues that mass identities emerge through an “evolution of 




Research Objective   
This thesis seeks to examine notions of (European) identity amongst CSDP practitioners and 
evaluate the role of CSDP training courses as a platform for communicating a sense of 
European identity to security professionals. It uses the concept of ‘strategic narratives’ to 
assess the EU’s vision of security and defence projected through its Security Strategies and 
during standardised training courses and how this is received by CSDP practitioners. 
By applying this strategic narrative concept to the study of European identity, this thesis 
represents a theoretical innovation in two ways. Firstly, it employs the concept in an 
internal communication setting and at the level of the individual. Secondly, it contributes to 
the field of European identity theory by analysing the link between working for an EU 
institution and feeling a sense of ‘we-ness’ with fellow Europeans. Results will shed light on 
contemporary sentiments towards Europe and the EU amongst security practitioners and 
situate their notions of identity in a wider context.  
The key component of this thesis is the production of a relatively large set of empirical data 
which, combined with the analysis of the two strategic documents, will have the capacity to 
inform policy-making regarding potential ways to increase the efficiency of CSDP 
implementation and the structure and content of future training concepts. By giving an 
insight into whether a European (integration) identity is emerging amongst people involved 
in the European integration process and also establishing what this identity might look like, 
this thesis adds to our theoretical understanding of identity formation and evaluate its 
importance for (further) European integration.  
Firstly, it will do so through its focus on one specific group of practitioners rather than elites 
or indeed national governments as a whole. European security practitioners constitute an 
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especially interesting case study, as they work in a policy field in which “national interests 
are strongly felt and sovereignty is jealously guarded” (Tocci, 2017, p. 92). The majority of 
staff are drafted from national armed forces/civil services, rather than being employed 
directly by an EU institution. This means that although staff might be aware of the possibility 
of working on EU policies, the majority are unlikely to have chosen their profession due to 
this European dimension. Moreover, the EU has realised that the nature of cooperation in 
this policy area requires individuals to develop a more common approach. Thus, in 2005, the 
European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was founded, one of its main aims being the 
development of a ‘European security culture’ through increasingly integrated training. While 
the ESDC conducts its own internal research and evaluation of its training courses, prior to 
this thesis no research had been carried out into the impact of CSDP training on the 
emergence of a European identity amongst security practitioners or indeed the emergence 
of a common security culture.  
Secondly, the concept of ‘strategic narratives’ developed by Roselle, Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin (2012) and used to explain the ways in which actors attempt to influence one 
another in international affairs (ibid, 2014, p. 71) is used in a novel and innovative way. By 
applying it to the EU’s efforts to project its security and defence identity to European 
security practitioners, it is employed in an internal rather than external context. Roselle et 
al. distinguish between three different, yet closely entwined communication processes - the 
formation, projection and reception of strategic narratives (2012). These are assessed in a 
number of ways; the formation and projection of security and defence-related narratives 
are examined through a content analysis of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and 
the EUGS as well as through expert interviews and course observations. Their reception by 
practitioners is explored through an online survey prior to participation in training and a 
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semi-structured interview during or after the course. Additionally, this thesis suggests that 
when employing the strategic narrative concept to examine notions of identity amongst 
individuals, another analytical aspect, the impact of previous personal experiences, also 
needs to be factored in. This notion is also investigated through online surveys and 
interviews with CSDP practitioners.  
 
Hypotheses 
The research is based around the hypothesis that despite increasing efforts to integrate 
CSDP training to create cohesion and a sense of common identity amongst CSDP 
practitioners, notions of national identity and interests prevail.  While the EU attempts to 
foster a sense of European identity linked to the EU as an institution, a sense of European 
identity may be emerging amongst security practitioners which is non-pervasive and 
situation-specific. It is thought that rather than being reflected in a professional context, it is 
more apparent on a personal level amongst practitioners; whereas a certain ‘we-feeling’ 
might be developing as a result of working in a European environment, this is not reflected 
in attitudes towards a more joined-up approach to security and defence in the EU. It is 
contended that the resulting lack of support for a European security identity impedes the 
EU’s ambitions as a security provider. Furthermore, this thesis hypothesises that individuals’ 
existing notions of identity impact on attitudes towards CSDP implementation and that their 
personal experiences of ‘Europeanness’ through networking, exchanges, and so forth 
contribute just as much as, if not more, to their understanding of European identity as the 
official EU discourse they are exposed to.  
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In order to corroborate these hypotheses, the following research questions are explored in 
this thesis.  
1. In what way are CSDP training courses contributing to the creation of a common 
European identity amongst European security practitioners? To what extent is the 
EU an effective projector of strategic narratives on an intra-European level? 
2. In how far is a common security culture emerging amongst those implementing the 
CSDP?  
3. To what extent do security practitioners support greater cooperation/ further 
integration of European security and defence?  
 
Epistemological Approach to Research 
Due to the focus on individuals’ opinions and the centrality of human agency, this study 
employs a pragmatic constructivist approach. Adler defines constructivism as a “view that 
the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and 
interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material 
world” (2005, p. 90). However, taking a pragmatic stance on research means that the 
research question itself is paramount and considered more important than one’s world view 
and choice of research methods (Creswell et al., 2011, p. 44).  
Intersubjectivity is one of the key concepts in constructivism and refers to the “knowledge 
that persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and 
practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and 
workings” (Adler, 1997, p. 321). Referring to the international system in particular, Chernoff 
adds that it is socially constructed and “consists of the ways in which human beings think 
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and interact with one another” (2007, p. 68). This approach is particularly useful when 
investigating the construction of notions of European identity and their link to policy 
implementation as it focuses on social interaction as a two-way process rather than a top-
down phenomenon. Furthermore, this study is concerned with the role of the ESDC in 
bringing about a common European security culture and, as such, it is important to stress 
the dialectic relationship between structure and agency. Checkel believes that world politics 
are constructed through a “process of interaction between agents and the structures of 
their broader environment” (Checkel, 2009, p. 72). By adopting an outlook that incorporates 
individual agents as well as structures such as European institutions, one takes a holistic 
approach to analysing European identity. A realist worldview on the other hand is based on 
the centrality of the state, defining agents as institutions rather than individuals. These 
political actors pursue their interests, which evolve around increasing their power, in a 
rational manner (Barkin, 2003) and without being influenced by interactions with others. 
While this approach pays little attention to the role of individuals, it certainly offers one way 
of explaining state behaviour. 
While contemporary International Relations (IR) has become divided between ongoing 
constructivist-realist debates (Katzenstein et al., 1999; Ruggie, 1998; Fearon and Wendt 
2002; Little, 2003; Sleat, 2008; Guzzini, 2013), this study does not seek to add to this debate. 
Instead, it intends to utilise both approaches to gather and analyse empirical data and is 
informed by Barkin’s perspective that “constructivist research is as compatible with a realist 
worldview and the realist worldview in turn can benefit from constructivist research 
methods” (2003, p. 3). Applying this outlook to studying European identity amongst security 
practitioners means acknowledging that while individuals themselves may say they have a 
strategic (realist) purpose (Reus-Smit in Burchill et al., 2005, p. 193) for initiating 
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interactions with others (i.e. they are motivated only by their own/their state’s interests and 
potential material gains), a change of attitude/ the emergence of a European identity may 
also occur through interacting with fellow Europeans at CSDP training courses.  
 
Chapter Outline 
Investigating notions of identity amongst CSDP practitioners is a highly complex and 
ambitious undertaking. In order to be able to examine the concept of European identity, this 
thesis situates it within a wider identity context and uses the strategic narrative framework 
to examine the impact of working on the EU’s CSDP on notions of European identity 
amongst individual security practitioners. This thesis therefore comprises a theoretical 
section (Chapters 3 and 4) as well as an empirical section (Chapters 6 to 8) and reflects on 
the findings and what they mean for European identity theory and empirical application of 
the concept of strategic narrative in Chapter 9. A brief outline of each chapter is provided 
below.  
Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of the development of the CSDP. It traces how 
European security and defence cooperation has evolved since the Second World War, 
addresses the changes it has undergone since the creation of the ESDP and discusses its 
missions and operations. Furthermore, while a detailed analysis of the two Security 
Strategies subsequently follows, this chapter provides an overview of the EU’s vision of 
European security and defence cooperation and the changing role of security practitioners.     
Chapter 3 evaluates existing literature on different identity models that are closely linked to 
European identity, such as national identity, constitutional patriotism and ‘esprit de corps’.  
It then assesses different concepts of European identity by considering various theoretical 
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constructs of identity such as EU vs. European identity as well as strong and weak levels of 
European identity. Furthermore, it considers some European identity concepts such as 
Normative Power Europe and how the EU’s security and defence policy in particular shapes 
notions of an EU identity. Finally, these theoretical explorations culminate in defining a 
‘European integration identity’ which guides the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
Chapter 4 explores the concept of ‘strategic narratives’ and sets out how it is applied to an 
internal communication context in order to assess the emergence of a European integration 
identity amongst security practitioners. The three different levels of narrative are discussed 
and an explanation of international system, identity and issue-specific (or policy) narratives 
in the context of European security and defence are provided. While this thesis evaluates 
the role of the EU’s strategic narratives in shaping notions of European identity amongst 
practitioners, it also hypothesises that the experiences of individuals who receive these 
narratives contribute to the emergence of such an identity, hence concepts such as 
‘socialisation’ are also be addressed in this chapter.  
Chapter 5 presents the different research methods employed in this thesis. It explains how 
the empirical research was designed and why a mixed method approach was chosen. As this 
thesis focuses on CSDP training courses provided by the ESDC, it also assesses the impact of 
collaborating with this institution. The research methodology is made up of three main 
components – content analysis, online surveys and semi-structured interviews. The content 
analysis and expert interviews are used to explore the formation of narratives. An 
overarching coding framework - developed from the content analysis - is introduced and 
serves as a link between all research methods. This chapter also sets out why and how 
online surveys are used to explore practitioners’ views and opinions prior to participating in 
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training courses and semi-structured interviews are employed to investigate the reception 
of strategic narratives.  
Chapter 6 forms the first part of the analysis section of this thesis. While the main focus is on 
the projection and reception of strategic narratives, this chapter investigates the formation 
of narratives relating to security and defence. It consists of two parts – firstly it assesses the 
drafting process of the two Security Strategies in order to shed light on how policymakers 
have attempted to create a European identity in security and defence. An interview 
conducted with Nathalie Tocci, who as Special Advisor to HR/VP Mogherini oversaw the 
drafting process of the European Global Strategy (EUGS), compliments this part of the 
analysis. The second part of this chapter looks at how the work of the ESDC and the 
development of standardised training courses contributes to the formation of narratives 
thus also providing an insight into the EU’s internal communication efforts.  
Chapter 7 constitutes a significant part of the analysis as it evaluates the projection of 
strategic narratives. It does so in two ways: firstly, the main part of this chapter (Section a) 
is dedicated to analysing the two Security Strategies with regards to strategic narratives. The 
three different levels of narrative (international system, identity and policy) are discussed 
and attention is also paid to how narratives may have evolved or changed between the two 
strategies. Secondly, in Section b, the ESDC-coordinated courses are evaluated in terms of 
content. This is done through the researcher’s observations from six different training 
courses but also through feedback from participants provided during the interview stage. 
Hence, a detailed analysis of the EU’s projection of security and defence-related narratives 
(both internally and externally) is complemented by an investigation of how this translates 
on a practical level to an internal audience of practitioners.  
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Chapter 8 is made up of three separate sections which all deal with the reception of 
strategic narratives. Section a) The EU in the International System according to Security 
Professionals investigates security practitioners’ views of the international system both prior 
to participation in a CSDP course (through the online survey) and during/after the course in 
order to establish whether the EU’s narratives resonate with practitioners. Section b) 
Notions of European Identity amongst CSDP Staff is concerned with individuals’ notions of 
European identity and whether a European integration identity is emerging amongst 
practitioners as a result of their work and or through participation in CSDP training. Section 
c) Practitioners’ Views of the CSDP and the Future of European Security and Defence looks at 
individuals’ knowledge and understanding of CSDP and how they see it developing in the 
future. The reception chapter is rounded off by a short profiling section that illustrates three 
different types of practitioners which emerged from analysing the data.  
This thesis concludes with Chapter 9, which summarises the key findings and links them back 
to the original research questions and hypothesis. The chapter also highlights the 
significance of the findings from this thesis in relation to theory and existing research. 
Furthermore, it comments on the appropriateness of the chosen research methods and 
assesses whether the ‘strategic narrative’ concept was a useful framework for investigating 
emerging notions of European identity amongst CSDP practitioners. Lastly, it discusses the 
limitations of the research and makes suggestions for subsequent work.  
The topic of this thesis sits at the juncture of a number of disciplines, namely identity studies 
and International Relations, and focuses on the micro-level of policy implementation by 
investigating notions of identity amongst EU practitioners. Its empirical focus will not only 
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make a contribution these fields, it will also provide an insight into how practitioners view 




CHAPTER 2: The Development of the CSDP and the Changing 
Role of the European Union as a Security Provider 
 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU has been in place for nearly 
twenty years. This policy area was added to the European integration agenda through the 
Maastricht Treaty and since then it has experienced some major developments.  Attempts 
at putting security and defence on the European integration agenda were first made after 
the end of the Second World War, but it was not until the end of the Cold War and a more 
uncertain geostrategic environment (Freedman quoted in Kernic, et al., 2002), that security 
cooperation finally lost its taboo status and became a priority for the EU. As a result, one of 
the few remaining key roles of the nation-state has been opened up to EU integration, albeit 
on an intergovernmental rather than a supranational level, at least for the time being.  
In the first half of the 20th century, security and defence were closely linked to territorial 
integrity and the concept of national identity.  Indeed, it has been argued that individuals as 
well as groups identify with and attach authority to whoever is able to best provide and 
protect their security (Clarke, 1993 , p. xi, Garcia, 1993 , p. 13, see also Booth in Krause and 
Williams, 2002, p. 6). Being involved in providing security for one’s nation was associated 
with notions of duty, honour and pride (e.g. Wallace, 1991 ). A strong military culture was 
commonplace all across Europe. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, a “re-evaluation of the 
concept of security” has occurred (McDonagh, 2014, p. 2). This has led to Western 
governments increasingly becoming involved in protecting citizens residing outside their 
national borders, at times through the use of force. As Dalby notes, the “global security 
problematique […] now encompasses much more than the contest for political supremacy” 
as nowadays it also includes concepts such as economic and environmental security, 
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humanitarian welfare and cyber security to name but a few (in Krause et al., 1997, p. 4). 
Menon adds that, as a result, modern warfare has become increasingly expeditionary and 
multinational (2011 , p. 79). Moreover, while humanitarian justifications are not new, they 
rarely motivated military interventions and were not considered to be the responsibility of 
nation-states in the past (Finnemore in Katzenstein, 1996, p.  168), thus further highlighting 
the changing nature of the term ‘security’.  
In addition to the constant evolution of security and the resulting redefinition of the roles of 
those providing it, there is no doubt that the development of the CSDP has marked the start 
of a new chapter for the EU in international relations. Not only is foreign policy an “inside-
out process whereby values, norms and principles constituting a political community 
internally (the identity) are projected into the global system” as Campbell (1998, p. 32) 
points out, it also influences conceptions of the EU itself.  
But to what extent is the CSDP having an impact on notions of identity of those involved in 
its implementation? What kind of military cultures still exist in the 21st century and is it 
shared across the participating Member States? Do military and civilian staff develop an 
attachment to the EU as a result of their work or is it merely a tool to implement national 
security and defence policies?  
In order to assess these questions, it is important to understand the development of 
security provision in the EU and the development of the CSDP. This chapter seeks to 
highlight the process of European security integration since the end of the Cold War to 
arrive at the CSDP that we have today. The focus will be on tracing the changes that have 
occurred in this field and their impact on security practitioners, thus providing a vital 
background for the examination of notions of identity amongst staff working on the CSDP. 
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A detailed examination of the historical contexts and key developments promoting certain 
identities externally and internally is therefore crucial, not only to understand the complex 
interplay of identities amongst practitioners, but also to determine whether there is a 
reciprocal relationship between identity formation and policy implementation.   
While it would be most interesting to discuss the historical development of security 
provision, which has always been considered a central pillar of civilisation, in greater detail, 
this would vastly exceed the scope of this study. Thus, this chapter limits itself to assessing 
the evolution of security since the end of the Cold War and providing a brief overview of 
military culture since the emergence of the nation-state.  
 
The Beginnings of European Security and Defence Cooperation  
After the two World Wars of the first half of the 20th century, which saw unprecedented 
levels of mobilisation of European men and women, mass armies and conscription 
continued to be the norm amongst most European states throughout the Cold War. During 
this time, the role of the soldier changed minimally, and security threats remained mainly 
territorial in nature. One major change did however occur after the Second World War. 
Multilateral cooperation was increasingly sought – on the one hand to keep Germany in 
check and prevent it from rearming, on the other hand to unite against a common threat 
(Salmon and Nicoll, 1997, p31/2). Despite early attempts in the 1950s (the establishment of 
a European Defence Community) and 1960s (Fouchet Plan). However, with multilateral 
security cooperation taking place under NATO auspices and the United States (US) being the 
dominant force, it wasn’t until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of the 
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bipolar international system that considerations of more profound European security 
cooperation really gained momentum.  
Indeed, efforts to establish European security cooperation had been made on a number of 
occasions. Within a year of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) being formed in 
1951 through the Treaty of Paris, the founding six Member States had put together a plan to 
create a European Defence Community (EDC). Its aim was to establish a supranational 
European army that included West Germany, an idea that should serve as an alternative to 
US suggestions of Germany joining NATO and with the condition that any German army 
component would be governed centrally by the EDC rather than by Germany itself. 
However, the plan was never implemented as it was not ratified by the French Parliament 
which vehemently opposed German rearmament. For the 50 years following the Second 
World War, “Britain and France effectively stalemated any prospect of serious European 
cooperation on security issues by their contradictory interpretations of the likely impact in 
Washington of the advent of serious European military muscle” (Howorth, 2014 , p. 3). In 
relation to the failed “Fouchet Plan” Davis Cross states that plans were “too ambitious in 
some ways and flawed in others” (2011, p.  45).  
In 1981, a plan seeking to coordinate security policy and develop common European 
positions regarding security and defence by strengthening the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) process was rejected (Nuttall, 1992). Five years later national sovereignty 
in security matters was once more emphasised in the Single European Act. However, at the 
same time it called for Member States to contribute to “the development of a European 




The End of the Cold War – the Beginning of a New Era?  
The end of the Cold War represented a significant moment in international relations. The 
strong relationship between Europe and the US changed abruptly; the Eastern bloc no 
longer posed an imminent threat to Europe or the US, rendering Europe less strategically 
significant in America’s eyes (Howorth, 2014, p. 21) and Europe less reliant on support from 
its ‘superpower ally’. At the same time, the Gulf War as well as growing tensions and 
violence in the Balkans led to a “reflection on the geo-political responsibilities of Europe, 
particularly in view of the diminishing military role of the US on the continent” (Gariup, 
2009, p.  98). Security was no longer predominantly defined by considerations of territorial 
sovereignty. Indeed, security “drifted further and further away from the tasks and missions 
related to conflicts in the classical understanding” (Pirozzi and Sandawi , 2009, p.  3). Being a 
powerful security provider was no longer defined purely by large defence budgets, having 
“large numbers of boots on the ground” and sanctions (Davis Cross, 2011, p. 1). A new, 
multifaceted nature of security provision was highlighted by European Commission 
President Delors in 1990 when he stated that security could not be defined as a mere 
military concept, but rather representing a complex web of “ideology, values, socio-
economic systems and the environment” (quoted in Gariup, 2009, p.  182). As a result, 
militaries all across Europe underwent a process of demobilisation, resulting in significant 
restructuring and attempts at tailoring the armed forces to fit post-Cold War security 
requirements (Booth in Caforio, 2003, p.  321).  
While calls for the integration of security and defence had been raised regularly throughout 
the 1980s, they were once more highlighted by a policy document released by the Western 
European Union (WEU) in 1988. With the European unification process in full swing, it 
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claimed that successful integration would not be achieved until this policy area, too, was 
incorporated into European decision-making processes (Howorth, 2014, p. 4). Subsequently, 
the Maastricht Treaty, through its second pillar, formally established the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) enabling Member States to act jointly on an intergovernmental 
basis in foreign policy matters. However, the initial effectiveness of this new policy is often 
put into question, and Lindley-French argues that in its beginnings the ESDP functioned 
largely as an internal state-building tool rather than to provide security against external 
threats (2002, p. 809).  
As Gariup highlights, “the Gulf War and the emergence of new threats in the form of ethnic 
and civil wars in the Balkans prompted a reflection on the geo-political responsibilities of 
Europe” (2009, p. 98). With the US seemingly becoming a less prominent security provider 
in Europe, a further step towards closer security cooperation was thus taken by setting the 
Petersberg Tasks in June 1992, shortly after the Maastricht Treaty was signed. The 
Petersberg Tasks laid out that WEU Member States would provide “military units from the 
whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces” for the purpose of undertaking 
humanitarian, rescue, peace-keeping as well as peace-making and crisis management tasks 
(Petersberg Declaration, Part II). 
However, these significant changes were not met with the required commitment from the 
Member States. Instead, it was envisaged that these tasks would be carried out as part of 
the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. This implied that EU security 
provision was to occur solely under NATO auspices, thus preventing the EU from developing 
an autonomous security identity.  Furthermore, there is no doubt that the continuing 
reliance on the US and NATO significantly impeded the EU’s role in foreign policy (Smith in 
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Holland, 2004, p. 81). It comes as no surprise that in the years following the creation of the 
CFSP, it was regarded as little more than “a loose amalgam of the national foreign policies of 
the fifteen Member States” (Wyn Rees, quoted in Davis Cross, 2011, p. 46) culminating in a 
lack of sufficient and timely action in response to a number of crises, (i.e. the Balkan Wars 
and the situation in the Middle East).  
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 incorporated the Petersberg Tasks and transferred WEU 
assets over to the EU, thus rendering the WEU obsolete. It also created the post of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy tasked with overseeing the 
implementation of the ESDP and for the first time giving a face to EU foreign policy. After 
continued disinterest in the CFSP, the appointment of Javier Solana, a prominent figure in 
foreign policy, therefore indicated that the Member States were at last keen to boost the 
EU’s foreign policy capabilities (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 51).   
 
The Saint-Malo Declaration 
Major progress was however not made until 1998, when intense negotiations took place 
regarding integration efforts and ongoing transatlantic partnerships. The resulting signing of 
the Saint-Malo Declaration opened a new chapter for the EU’s foreign policy ambitions. 
After opposing the development of a security and defence policy for fifty years, Britain 
finally agreed to take concrete steps towards the integration of European security and 
defence. The declaration stipulated a number of key changes, including the development of 
the EU’s ability for autonomous action, the introduction of new structures and tools to 
implement such tasks and the pooling of EU military power necessary to back this policy. In 
1999, the EU released a statement reiterating its goal of being able to deal with 
31 
 
“international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO” through the implementation of 
the ESDP (European Council, 150/99) and the setting of the Helsinki Headline Goals. These 
were established to provide the tools and structures that would enable the implementation 
of the Petersberg Tasks defined some years earlier. One of the key goals was therefore to 
have the capacity to make available within 60 days up to 60,000 troops from all parts of the 
armed forces and to be able to sustain their activities for at least one year. 
 
The European Security Strategy 
Shortly after, progress on the EU’s security and defence policy was affected by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the successive bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). These 
caused a significant rift amongst Member States with regards to engaging militarily in the 
Middle East, thus once more highlighting some Member States’ preference of transatlantic 
allegiance over European integration (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 54). The newly 
increased threat from terrorism did however also invigorate efforts to implement the 
Headline Goals.  
In response to the National Security Strategy (NSS) published by the Bush administration in 
the United States, Solana compiled the EU’s first Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. Emphasis 
was placed on juxtaposing the EU’s approach to that of the US by stressing the EU’s view of 
military intervention being a last resort, only to be used in conjunction with other ‘peaceful’ 
means such as political, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic measures (Bailes, 2008, p. 
118). However, whereas the EU previously tried to avoid using the term ‘threat’, this new 
policy document specifically set out to respond to new security threats (Keukeleire and 
Delreux, 2014, p. 54).  
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The ESS called for the EU to “share the responsibility for global security” by dealing with a 
whole range of security threats. These new dangers, often causing the first line of defence 
to be abroad (ESS, 2003), included security in the EU’s neighbourhood, terrorism, weapons 
of mass destruction, failed states and the privatisation of force (European Commission, 
2003, p.  5). Asseburg and Kempsin point out that the ESS made a major contribution 
towards developing an international security strategy (2009, p. 10). However, despite 
several strategic reports and documents seeking to further clarify ways of implementing the 
ESS, it remained relatively vague in its aims and ways to achieve these. 
This was also reflected in the amount of criticism directed towards the implementation of 
the ESDP, which was declared operational in 2003 (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010, p. 3; 
Howorth, 2014, p.  80). Biscop and Coelmont argued that not only did the CSDP remain 
merely reactive, there also remained a significant gap between the goals set in the ESS and 
the way ESDP (and later CSDP) missions were conducted. Instead, they noted that 
implementing the EU’s security and defence policy up until that point had mainly been a 
“bottom-up undertaking” rather than guided by an overarching strategy (2010, p.  3). 
Coelmont further stresses that “honesty forces to admit that the [ESS] is but the first step 
towards a fully-fledged strategy” (2012, p. 3).  
In addition to producing a strategic vision for the EU’s role as a security provider through 
consensus from all 15 Member States, a number of structural changes were put in place at 
around the same time.  In 2004, the Helsinki Headline Goals were extended and revised, 
leading to the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in the same year. This 
presented the EU with its first real opportunity to adopt a more coherent approach to 
“defence planning, military capability objectives, and armaments coordination” and 
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provided a tool to monitor Member States’ compliance with their capability commitments 
(Howorth, 2014, p. 91). It was also tasked with “identifying, and, if necessary, implementing 
any useful measure...improving the effectiveness of military expenditure” (Menon, 2011, p. 
81). Some scholars have remarked on the success of the EDA’s role in facilitating the 
integration of the EU’s defence industry (De Neve, 2010). Yet, others have commented on 
the EDA’s intergovernmental decision-making process impeding the work of the agency 
which its first Chief Executive Officer (CEO) once believed was only “supranational in spirit” 
(Witney quoted in Howorth, 2014, p. 94) while some seemingly question whether the EDA 
had a future at all (Batora, 2009).  
In 2007, the EU’s autonomous rapid reaction force, in the form of 13 battlegroups, was 
finally ready to be deployed. Albeit somewhat less ambitious than the 60,000 troops 
originally aimed for, these consist of 1500 troops each, two of which are theoretically 
always available for a four-month deployment within 15 days. While these groups, which 
are made up of forces from a few EU countries working under the leadership of one 
‘framework nation’ exist on paper and do train together on occasion, they remain unused as 
of 2018.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon which came into force at the end of 2009, entailed several significant 
changes as well as the renaming of the ESDP to Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP).  One of the Treaty’s main goals was to enable the EU to become a more effective 
global actor (Menon, 2011, p. 75). As a result, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
was formally established in 2010. It was intended to combine expertise from within both the 
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Council and the Commission (ibid, p. 78), but was also introduced to facilitate a more joined-
up approach to foreign policy implementation, bringing together diplomacy, humanitarian 
resources and military capabilities. It was agreed that the Service would be made up of at 
least 60% EU officials and 30% officials from national diplomatic services; however, its initial 
launch was not without challenges. EEAS staff did not work in the same building until 2012 
(Juncos and Pomorksa, 2014, pp.  1335). The time-consuming negotiations that preceded it 
and the “nationalism displayed by Member States in setting up the service” (Avery quoted in 
Juncos and Pomorska, 2014, p. 1332) as well as the impact of the financial crisis and the 
‘Arab Spring’ did not make for a smooth start.  
The remit of the role of the High Representative was also increased by adding the role of 
Vice-President of the European Commission to it. This included taking over the steering of 
the CSDP, a task previously carried out as part of the six-month presidencies of the Member 
States. After 10 years in post, Solana was replaced with the considerably less well-known 
and the more inexperienced Baroness Ashton. While Brattberg infers that the post-Lisbon 
new High Representative (HR) did make somewhat of a strategic contribution by continuing 
to navigate the CSDP towards representing a civilian power (2011, Policy Brief), many 
politicians and scholars alike criticised her inexperience and lack of drive regarding the 
implementation of the CSDP (Howorth, 2014, p. xi), with some suggesting her appointment 
was a favour to the British Government (Barber, 2010) or indeed a way of keeping the role 
of HR from becoming too powerful – the German press called it “Selbstverzwergung” 
(turning yourself into a dwarf) (Graw quoted in Howorth, 2014, p.5).  
In addition to increasing the remit of the HR, the Treaty also extended the Petersberg Tasks. 
While the ESS had already mentioned the importance of being able to use preventative 
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action in 2003, the new treaty provided a legal basis for the EU to engage in conflict 
prevention.  
Moreover, the term ‘comprehensive approach’ became a buzzword. Despite the Treaty 
including a clause on mutual assistance, Member States did not consider the CSDP to be a 
tool for territorial defence (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 173). Rather, in line with an 
increased focus on human security through intervention (Wheeler, 2000), emphasis was 
placed on using the CSDP’s full range of tools to facilitate crisis management or crisis 
response operations’ rather than being a medium for pursuing combative security strategies 
(Dandeker and Gow in, 1999, Mattelaer 2013). Derblom, Egnell & Nilsson further 
characterised this approach as striving towards “multi-actor (civilian, military and police) 
planning and supporting cross-cutting interaction with focus on the desired outcomes of an 
operation” (quoted in Hanssen, 2010, p. 13). This vision was accompanied by a push for 
increased ‘pooling and sharing’ of military resources. While such sharing has certainly 
increased, especially in light of the decreasing defence budgets of many Member States, it 
more commonly occurs in clusters or through bilateral agreements rather than jointly at EU 
level (Howorth, 2014, p. xii).  
 
Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union 
Turbulent developments in international relations leading up to the drafting of the EUGS - 
including the emergence of the so-called Islamic State and the resulting refugee crisis as well 
as Russia’s invasion of Crimea - have no doubt shaped the EU’s strategic direction as well as 




That the security environment was drastically different 13 years later is clear from the EUGS’ 
opening sentences which refer to the EU’s external as well as internal crises. This stands in 
strong contrast to the opening statement of the ESS which read: “Europe has never been so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given 
way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history” (2003, p.  1). Not 
only has Europe’s security situation deteriorated, the EU’s very existence and raison d'être is 
contested. Tocci, who led the EUGS drafting process under Mogherini points out that at the 
time of drafting there were two competing security narratives in European defence. On the 
one hand, governments as well as the public had become more inward-looking when it 
came to protecting their borders, while on the other hand there was a growing realisation 
that little could be achieved through acting alone. It is therefore not surprising that the 
document puts a strong emphasis on the need for a ‘true’, ‘strong’ and coordinated EU 
approach to security and defence. Unlike the ESS, the Global Strategy is a cross-policy 
document spanning the whole spectrum of EU foreign policy. This vision of interlinking 
various internal and external policy areas more closely underlines a renewed push to make 
the EU’s approach truly comprehensive. While the previous strategy was vaguer in its goals, 
the EUGS lays out European interests (which it declares are congruous with national ones) 
and identifies five key security goals which encompass the security of the EU itself, that of 
its neighbourhood, dealing with (violent) crises, global governance and stabilising regional 
orders. Furthermore, it sets out a number of security priority areas including defence, 
counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security and strategic communications. This more 
concrete approach is complemented by a desire to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’ when it 
comes to decision-making, but also the ability to implement decisions independently 
(Coelmont, 2016, p. 10).  These strategic goals are accompanied by two core concepts which 
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are introduced in the EUGS. Firstly, the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ which is defined in 
the Strategy as the EU’s continuing pursuit of “idealistic aspirations” whilst employing a 
“more realistic” approach to implementing the CSDP (EUGS, 2016, p. 16). Tocci points out 
that it is important to depart from the “dangerous myth” of believing the West needs to ‘fix’ 
other regions (2016, p. 6) and Coelmont agrees that a more modest outlook will yield better 
results (2016, p. 9).  The EUGS pairs this approach with a vision of creating ‘resilience’ 
amongst people and society, especially within the EU’s neighbourhood. According to the 
EUGS, resilient states feature “democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable 
development” (2016, p. 23) and can only be achieved through employing a wide catalogue 
of foreign policy tools.   
 
Reception of the EUGS 
As Lehne points out, the reception of the Strategy was both weaker and stronger than that 
of the ESS. This is because on the one hand it was not adopted by the Member States 
instead Mogherini was “invited to take the work forward” (2016 ). Yet it is also more potent 
as this demands follow-up action. Thus far, two key developments have taken place. The EU 
has launched a European Defence Fund, which promotes further EU cooperation on defence 
research and development, seeking to support projects that involve at least three Member 
States. Furthermore, it has initiated what EC President Juncker called “the Sleeping Beauty 
of the Treaty of Lisbon” (2017) – the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - to 
deepen cooperation amongst the 25 Member States which have signed up to it. HR/VP 
Mogherini summarises “Member States have committed to join forces on a regular basis, to 
do things together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together” (in EEAS 
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Press Team, 2017). Novaky argues that PESCO has the potential to be a ‘game changer’ as it 
could enable the EU to “reach strategic autonomy” by advancing its capabilities (2018, p.  
98). Thus far, seventeen projects have been agreed and cover areas such as cyber security 
and defence, a European Medical Command and increased intra-European military mobility. 
2017 also saw the launch of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), a 
permanent operational headquarters at the military strategic level and counterpart to the 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). 
However, the extent to which these and the entire new Strategy are accepted and 
subsequently implemented by Member States and EU organisations remains to be seen, 
especially in a climate increasingly dominated by widespread anti-EU sentiments. A detailed 
discussion and analysis of the two strategies will take place in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
CSDP Missions and Operations- the Story So Far 
After a brief overview of the historical development of the EU’s security and defence policy, 
it is also crucial to look at its practical implementation so far in order to further establish the 
extent to which the EU’s vision of its security and defence has been put into action and how 
it has affected those implementing it.  
In practice, the CSDP missions and operations to date reflect, at least to a certain degree, 
the evolution of security since the end of the Cold War and the EU’s attempt to construct an 
EU security identity. Indeed, in 2001 Beck suggested that the Kosovo conflict could have 
served to shape a European security identity in the same way the single currency 
symbolised the integration of financial policies (quoted in Dale in Guttman, 2001, p.  41). 
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Yet, since the setting of the Helsinki Headline Goals in 1999, the deployment of CSDP 
missions has been a highly contested subject. The first EU operation was launched in 2003 in 
the shape of a monitoring mission in Former Yugoslavia. This was followed by two brief 
military operations later on that year, the first one being a follow-up from a NATO operation 
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which made use of the recent Berlin-Plus 
agreement granting the EU access to NATO assets and planning capabilities. The second 
military mission consisted of a deployment of 1800 troops to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and also represented the first operation completely autonomous from NATO. A full 
list of missions to date can be found in Table 1 – CSDP Missions and Operations to date. 
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TABLE 1 – CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS TO DATE 





To date, 35 CSDP missions and operations have taken place in an attempt to stabilise crisis 
areas. Of these, only nine were purely military, while the rest were civilian missions 
involving a wide range of personnel such as police, border guards, monitors, judges, and 
administrators. As a result, many previously predominantly domestic structures and tasks 
have taken on a European/international dimension. The table below provides a breakdown 
of the types of mission that have occurred. The tasks, often undertaken jointly between 
civilian and military staff, vary from fighting organised crime and piracy, supporting the 
reform of armies, monitoring border crossings, overseeing peace agreements, protecting 
refugees, providing technical aid and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid (Asseburg 
and Kempin, 2009, Keohane, 2011).  
A considerable number of missions have occurred in a rather short period of time, which 
highlights the quick development of the CSDP. Yet, these missions have also varied 
significantly in size with the smallest involving only a handful of personnel and the biggest 
deploying close to 7000 staff (EUFOR Althea). In 2009, only one in five operations had 
deployed more than 1000 staff and many civilian missions involved less than 100 staff 
(Asseburg and Kempin, 2009, p. 11). This trend towards smaller missions and operations 
seems to have continued. Furthermore, the intensity with which they have occurred has 
also varied considerably – a significant number of missions and operations were launched 
initially, with fourteen in place by 2005 under HR Solana. Between 2006 and 2010, nine 
more followed and while Ashton was HR (2010 to 2014) a further nine were initiated. Since 
Mogherini became HR/VP in 2014, only five missions and operations have been launched.  It 
seems a number of factors may be contributing to this shrinking of missions and operations 
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both in size and frequency. Early CSDP missions were criticised for lacking longer-term 
strategic plans. Since then ‘lessons learned’ processes have been put in place suggesting the 
EU is attempting to learn from previous experiences and be more selective regarding the 
conflicts it chooses to get involved in. Moreover, the latest EUGS promotes a more 
pragmatic and modest approach which is reflected in a further decline in the number of 
missions and operations under HR/VP Mogherini. These developments are paired with a 
continuing struggle to reach consensus among EU Member States regarding the launch of 
new missions and operations.  
While CSDP missions are often conducted by a small number of staff, these are made up of 
contributions from many different Member States (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009, p. 11). With 
regards to military crisis management operations, as of 2012, there hadn’t been a single one 
that all Member States participated in (Ginsberg and Penska, 2012, p. 147). The bigger 
Member States generally participate in both military and civilian missions more regularly 
than smaller ones. Unsurprisingly, France makes available the largest number of personnel 
for CSDP operations (ibid, p. 151). While the UK is one of the largest and most advanced 
military powers in the EU, in 2017 fewer than 100 military personnel were deployed on 
CSDP missions (out of over 13,000 deployed overseas) (Giegerich and Moelling, 2018, p. 8) 
Financial considerations, especially regarding the usually more expensive civilian missions, 
often determine the participation of smaller Member States. The reasons behind 
committing personnel and resources to missions also varies significantly among Member 
States. While bigger states often weigh up national versus European interests and take into 
consideration their relationships with other international actors, ‘politics of scale’ might be 
key for smaller Member States who might see their participation in CSDP missions as a 
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platform for gaining legitimacy and risk sharing, but perhaps most importantly, the sharing 
of costs (Ginsberg quoted in Holland, 2004, p.  86).  
Some scholars also point to the hidden agendas behind certain CSDP missions. Biscop and 
Coelmont argue that certain CSDP missions were seemingly conducted merely to test CSDP 
processes and capabilities (2010, p. 8), or to advance the foreign policy interests of Member 
States (Gariup, 2009, p. 114) while others were motivated by creating a certain ‘image’ of a 
CSDP mission and the EU as an international actor (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009).  
Furthermore, they are regularly overshadowed by claims of the EU’s failure to act 
(efficiently and timely). This is often due to Member States’ differing threat perceptions, 
attitudes towards the use of force and the role of multilateralism in the CSDP (Nuttall, 1992, 
Chappell, 2009, p. 417, Keohane, 2011, p. 212, Berg, 2011, p. 1). As a result, despite 
boasting a significant number of operations since its inception, the EU has frequently been 
criticised for punching below its weight with regards to making full use of its security and 
defence capabilities and mainly reacting to external requests rather than acting 
preventatively (e.g. Kantner, 2006, Asseburg and Kempin, 2009, Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009).  
At times, missions may have been deemed as having fulfilled their mandates, yet the extent 
to which they have contributed to achieving the EU’s long-term strategic goals for that 
particular region/crisis remains uncertain (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009, p. 148). The 
difficulty of measuring the success of a CSDP mission highlights the importance of 
establishing a comprehensive approach that does not only include civilian and military 
cooperation during a mission, but one that goes beyond the scope of the mandate and 
strengthens links with other EU policy tools in order to achieve long-term goals (Smith, 
2011, p. 22, Kirchner, 2013).  
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A good example of the convoluted nature of many missions is the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR. 
In addition to taking three months and five force generation conferences to achieve 
operating capability, the mission received a considerable amount of criticism for seeming to 
represent French rather than EU interests (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010, p. 7). It then took six 
months to source a sufficient number of planes and helicopters required for the 
humanitarian mission to go ahead. This delay in providing a timely response is further 
highlighted by the fact that, in 2009, only 20% of CSDP missions had been in place within 
four weeks (Asseburg and Kempin, 2009, p.  5). EU missions have also suffered from staffing 
issues as is illustrated by the Member States’ failing to supply the number of police staff 
authorised for the training mission in Afghanistan in 2010.  (Keohane, 2012, p. 208).  
Apart from one military training mission to Somalia, no other missions were launched 
between 2009 and 2012 despite a number of international security crises occurring (i.e., 
Libya, the Arab Spring, and Sudan). The way the EU has (not) dealt with the crisis in Libya is a 
further example of the “price of the absence of strategy”, as Coelmont argues that the 
Union was invisible, despite its weak efforts of launching a humanitarian operation (2012, p. 
4). Some EU representatives went further and declared the ‘EU’s security and defence policy 
is closed until further notice’, while another argued that the ‘CFSP died in Libya’ (quoted in 
Menon, 2011, p. 76). Howorth suggests this lack of action is, to a certain extent, due to 
“‘mission-fatigue’ on the part of the EU Member States” (2014, p. xi). Other explanations for 
the EU’s inaction include the number of significant structural changes that were 
implemented in this period including adjusting to the newly enlarged EU and, specifically 
related to the CSDP, the downsizing of many European armed forces, largely as a result of 
the financial crisis which put defence budgets under intense scrutiny.  
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There seemed to be a re-awakening of CSDP activity when in the first six months of 2012, 
five missions were launched in Africa. Howorth largely puts this down to intensifying 
cooperation efforts and closer coordination of defence planning and spending (2014, p. xii). 
However, instead of being established across the board, these often occur bilaterally or 
amongst clusters of EU Member States.  Since then, all but two operations have been 
civilian in nature, indicating that reaching consensus on ‘hard security’ matters remains an 
issue for the EU. Smith concludes that supranational CSDP decision-making is highly unlikely 
in the foreseeable future (2011, p. 21). However, some suggest that with the UK, one of the 
biggest but also most Eurosceptic military players in Europe, set to leave the EU and 
therefore taking “its foot of the brake, the rest could get on with business” (Tocci, 2017, p. 
94).  
 
The Practicalities of European Security and Defence Cooperation  
At the European level, CSDP missions are coordinated by a number of different agents; the 
main actors being the Council Secretariat, the High Representative of EU Foreign and 
Security Policy, as well as the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and 
the Military Staff. This means that CSDP implementation hinges on the efficient cooperation 
between the different stakeholders involved. This is a process that is frequently criticised 
internally and externally and especially complex across the different EU institutions such as 
the Council and the Commission. They are often seen to be working in competition rather 
than in collaboration with one another (Lurweg, 2011, p. 113), due to the fact that civilian 
crisis management tasks can be coordinated by both.  Adding another dimension to the 
process is the fact that often more than six different types of national government 
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ministries from participating EU Member States also engage in putting together a CSDP 
operation on top of the EU level institutions involved (Smith, 2011, p. 3).  
One example of the Member States’ incoherent approach to conducting CSDP missions is 
the way in which staff are recruited for deployment. Normally, national government 
institutions nominate staff for a centralised selection process after which they are seconded 
to a CSDP mission. In her evaluation of EUMM, Šetkić remarks that in a number of countries 
not much time and effort is put into recruitment, resulting in underqualified or ill-prepared 
staff (2008, pp. 7). This is a recurring criticism that CSDP missions have had to deal with. In 
2008, the European Council in conjunction with the Member States acknowledged that for 
coordination to improve, “dialogue, liaison, and common training” are key (Official Journal 
of the European Union, 2008/C 25 /01, 2008).  Moreover, as Smith points out, CSDP 
operations often involve passing on ‘European standards’ to locals which necessitate a 
“degree of self-reflection” in order to determine what these actually are (2011, p. 17). CSDP 
training at EU level thus plays a crucial role in fostering coherence and coordination as it 
provides an opportunity for the EU to convey its values in a consistent manner. 
While coordination amongst the different Member States and European institutions remains 
a key challenge, adopting a ‘comprehensive approach’ has also required increased civilian-
military cooperation. This has, at times, led to a blurring of lines between the two as 
evidenced by missions such as EUCAP Nestor, which is classified as a civilian mission 
supplemented by military expertise, or EUSEC Congo paid for out of a non-military budget, 
but carried out by military staff (Keukeleire, 2014, p.  188). While this certainly makes 
operations more complex, it also allows security practitioners to make better use of the full 
range of tools available to them and some have thus called for a push to create a “unified 
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crisis intervention force” (Keohane, 2011, p. 213). However, for now it seems those involved 
in CSDP implementation are often still “stuck in the mindset of separate and 
compartmented civilian and military operations” (Leakey quoted in ibid). 
 
The Changing Role of European Security Practitioners 
Kirchner summarises that in addition to arranging the logistics, establishing a CSDP mission 
“necessitates, at minimum, a fact-finding exercise concerning the aims and objectives of the 
proposed effort, an analysis of appropriate instruments and measures to conduct the 
mission, and a decision concerning the appropriate time frame in which the intervention is 
to be implemented” (Kirchner, 2013, p. 38/9). The fast pace with which missions are at 
times put together, as well as the prolonged indecision that shapes others, makes adequate 
pre-deployment training difficult. Yet, the EU has started to introduce structures to tackle 
this problem – one of them being EU-level training for security practitioners. As Gariup 
points out, “the processes of social learning in situ together with the impact of international 
experience” contribute to the convergence of perceptions and the “creation of a EU specific 
Organisational Culture” (2009, P.116).  
Those providing security to a community have historically held a special position in society. 
As the rise of the nation-state in Europe was accompanied by many violent clashes over 
territorial sovereignty, security was predominantly understood to evolve around the 
defence of a nation-state’s territory and as such the responsibility of a mass army. The 
concept of citizenship was closely linked to providing security (Aggestam and Hyde-Price, 
2000), through compulsory military service. While serving in the armed forces was generally 
obligatory throughout much of the 20th century, many young men were also eager to join 
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the armed forces, as fighting for one’s country had connotations of duty, pride and respect 
(i.e. Wallace, 1991, p. 74). This made the mobilisation of mass armies during the two world 
wars considerably easier. Compared to the modern soldier, members of these mass forces 
were often fairly unskilled, and their role evolved solely around fighting to deter aggression 
towards their nation or applying force to accomplish their country’s political goals 
(Dandeker and Gow, 1999, p. 61).  
However, while territorial defence continues to be the ultimate justification for having 
national militaries, it is no longer the most likely reason for deploying the armed forces 
(Manigart, 2001, p.  6). This has resulted in a move away from mass armies and conscription 
after the Cold War (and in some case even before then). The end of the East-West conflict 
meant that Europe had a “surplus of security” that it was now able to export (Bailes, 2008, 
p. 116). Subsequent rapid changes in the international security environment have required 
the military to undergo a considerable transformation, both in terms of role and capabilities. 
With territorial integrity no longer being a threat to most European countries and ever-
increasing multilateral cooperation on security matters, the role of the military has largely 
refocused on the prevention of war or peacekeeping. As the CDSP missions’ staffing 
problems and the frequent inability to source appropriate military equipment have shown, 
the armed forces in the EU are far from being adapted to fulfilling their new roles. In fact, it 
is estimated that only about one tenth of the European armed forces are deployable 
(Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 177). The change in the nature of security challenges has 
required the development of a very different skillset. As conscription has been phased out in 
almost all EU Member States, the subsequent ‘professionalisation’ of the soldier has led to 
many members of the armed forces starting to consider themselves as “soldier-statesmen 
rather than combat leaders or managers of violence” (Moskos and Burk quoted in Gariup, 
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2009). This shift in role perceptions can not only be noted amongst military personnel; it is 
also evident in society. While the military had traditionally been quite detached from society 
in terms of training/education, daily life and customs, they often developed a very distinct 
military culture. But involvement in the implementation of the CSDP, with its seeming focus 
on ‘soft power’ and non-coercive approach, is becoming more common, as evidenced by 
15,000 EU personnel having been involved in CSDP operations by 2012 (Ginsberg and 
Penska, 2012, p. 145). The changed nature of security provision also appears to diminish the 
centrality of the military. Since the end of the Second World War, the use of military force in 
the EU has increasingly been regulated by international institutions and conducted through 
multilateral channels such as NATO and the United Nations (UN), making the work of the 
military less about the protection of the nation-state and more about assisting the 
international community. The role of the military is no longer perceived to be crucial to the 
wellbeing of society. In fact, members of the armed forces are often faced with scepticism 
and apathy from the public (Manigart, 2001, p.  8). 
  
Non-Military Approaches to Security Provision 
In addition to changing role perceptions of the military, interacting and collaborating with 
civilians in crisis regions has become central to the work of the armed forces more recently. 
The EU’s adoption of a ‘comprehensive approach’ to dealing with security threats has not 
only led to an intensification of civilian-military cooperation, it has also continued to 
promote the EU’s preference for non-coercive conflict prevention. This rapprochement 
between military and civilian security provision is also reflected in the training and 
education of staff. While courses organised by the ESDC are aimed at bringing together both 
50 
 
groups of professionals, military education in EU Member States also increasingly includes 
components from civilian political science education. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter 2 
This chapter has highlighted the extent to which security has changed in Europe since the 
Cold War. Moreover, it has stressed how the roles of those tasked with providing security 
have been adapted to respond to the changed global security environment and there is no 
doubt that the EU has been trying to establish a more joined-up approach and a strategic 
culture amongst those implementing the CSDP. While there has been plenty of discussion 
regarding the EU’s external identity and its role as a global actor by evaluating CSDP 
missions, little research has been carried out into how the changing nature of security 
provision and increasing EU security cooperation has affected notions of identity amongst 
those involved on the ground. When assessing the EU’s attempts at facilitating the creation 
of a solid European strategic culture which arguably revolves around a shared 
understanding of values, norms and interest, it is therefore crucial to not only focus on elite 
socialisation, but to consider how security practitioners’ identities and role perceptions 
affect the security integration process. Are EU identity narratives absorbed by the 
practitioners or do they remain prevalent only amongst elite decision-makers? If they are, 
what do they look like and do they contribute to the ‘Europeanisation’ of security and 




CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Landscape 
 
Ever since its inception, the EU has had to confront legitimacy problems, and while pursuing 
a common security and defence policy is in theory supported by all Member States, its 
practical implementation is often considered to be lacking due to varying levels of 
commitment from national governments.  
From official documents and speeches, it is clear that the EU sees itself as becoming a 
significant international actor; a normative power which seeks to diffuse its liberal 
democratic values across the globe. Yet, to become an efficient global player, it needs to be 
perceived as such externally and at least as importantly, internally. While security and 
defence have become a lot more closely integrated in the last two decades, individual 
Member States retain sovereignty over all decision-making. This means that the EU needs to 
persuade those tasked with providing security to adopt a more ‘European approach’ that is 
not simply limited to benefitting from the pooling and sharing of resources but 
acknowledges that there are common European values and interests that are best protected 
and achieved through cooperation. It is therefore often argued that a sense of shared 
identity amongst Europeans is crucial for the future of the EU to “facilitate the ever-
increasing reach of European policy making” (Karolewski, 2006, p. 159). 
There are numerous interpretations of the concept of European identity from the EU’s 
identity as an international actor to individuals’ conceptions of what it means to be 
European. This chapter explores a number of notions of ‘European identity’, but as it is 
primarily focused on the link between individual practitioners and the EU as an institutional 
source of identification, it investigates the juncture between personal interpretations of 
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European identity and the EU’s attempts at narrating an EU identity with the aim to define a 
European integration identity which may be emerging amongst CSDP practitioners.  
Such a complex subject inevitably invites a multifaceted synergy of explanations involving 
multiple concepts. One of the key concepts is that of identity and the processes that 
contribute to its shaping. As such, theories dealing with the theorisation of identity form the 
macro-level explanations of this thesis. The meso-level of theorisation engages with the 
concept of “strategic narratives” and uses this as a framework to explore the much-debated 
concept of “European identity’ and how the EU is trying to shape it. The micro-level 
theorisation used in this thesis deals with theory of identity on an individual level.   
Both the macro and the micro-levels of theorisation dealing with the concepts of shared and 
individual identity will be discussed in this chapter while the concept of “strategic 
narratives” will be examined in the next chapter.  
Firstly, as many argue that the EU is becoming more and more state-like, the possibility of 
extrapolating the concept of national identity to the level of Europe and the EU, as well as 
the potential Europeanisation of national identities will be explored. This will be followed by 
an examination of the concept of constitutional patriotism and the idea of the EU being a 
projector of European (or universal?) norms and values internally, but also as an 
international actor. Lastly, this chapter will investigate how civic and cultural components 
from these interpretations of European identity may come together to forge a European 
(integration) identity amongst CSDP practitioners.  
European identity is a concept that has been widely discussed over the last few decades due 
to the increasing scope of the EU as well as the constant evolution of identification world-
wide. Yet, it is also one that is difficult to define due to its fluid nature. As Hardwick and 
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Mansfield point out, identities are “responsive to differing contexts” thus undergoing 
continuous construction and reconstruction through our relationships with others (2009, p. 
386). Processes such as globalisation, regional movements and an increase in multilateral 
cooperation through supranational organisations, such as the EU, lead to a 
“deterritorialization of social identity” (Hoerder in Haupt, 2009, p.257). This results in more 
“overlapping, permeable and multiple forms of identity (ibid.). Yet, whether or not these 
developments have the power to change the status quo, the nation-state as primary source 
of identification is a contested issue (e.g. Hall , 1993). After all, the extent to which the 
public identify with non-state but nevertheless state-like actors such as the EU very much 
depends on two factors: elites’ active efforts to create an identity for EU institutions, which 
Bruter believes is the most common way of constructing a sense of community (2005, p. 
26), as well as the level of engagement with the institutions by individuals in their daily lives 
(Fouberg, 2002).  
Furthermore, recent developments such as the UK’s decision to exit from the EU, the 
refugee crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis increasingly seem to have put into 
question the idea of a sense of solidarity or common identity within the EU and, if anything, 
have led to a re-emergence of “Eurosceptic populism” in many Member States (Tocci, 2018, 
p.  131).    
In 1870, Renan argued that for an institution to be legitimate there needs to be a common 
desire amongst the individuals it serves to be part of the same community.  Castells concurs 
and believes a collective identity would result in many Europeans feeling that “they belong 
to a distinctive European culture and institutional system that appeals to them as legitimate 
and worthwhile” (quoted in Gould and Messina, 2014, p. 3). With regards to the attitude of 
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practitioners towards European integration, in 1972, Stogdill hypothesised that strongly 
identifying with a group or organisation leads to individuals working harder (quoted in 
Juncos and Pomorska, 2014, p.  305). Furthermore, a number of academics have pointed to 
the reciprocal relationship between identity and European unification. Kaina and Karolewski 
state that as European integration increasingly affects the lives of ordinary Europeans, their 
support or lack thereof also becomes progressively more significant for successful European 
integration (Kaina and Karolewski, 2013). This reciprocal relationship is further underlined 
by McDonagh, who claims that while identities are constructed through political practices, 
they also define those very practices (2014, p. 3), thus making the people implementing 
political decisions into key figures in the integration process.  
 
Do We Need a EU(ropean) Identity in Security and Defence? 
With the creation of the ESDC in 2005, the EU set out to make the implementation of the 
CSDP more efficient by facilitating the emergence of a common strategic culture amongst 
European military and civilian personnel. The network college’s goal is to coordinate 
multinational training on CSDP matters, thus providing a platform for communicating the 
EU’s strategic vision regarding security and defence. This development indicates that 
decision-making elites recognise the importance of disseminating their vision for the future 
of the EU down to the practitioners, as they need them to ‘buy into’ these aspirations to 
gain legitimacy and to shape a common approach to European security and defence.  
Eurobarometer findings from 2018 suggest that Europeans are increasingly optimistic again 
about the future of the EU (61% are optimistic compared to 50% between 2015 and 2016) 
(Special Eurobarometer 479 – The future of Europe). Furthermore, fewer people indicate 
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they have a negative image of the EU (21% compared to 40% positive and 37% neutral) 
compared to 2015/16 (27% negative, 34% positive and 38% neutral), which is when primary 
data was collected for this thesis. These fluctuations may be linked to dissatisfaction at the 
height of the irregular migrant crisis and the run-up to and aftermath of the United Kingdom 
voting to leave the EU. Trust in the EU in 2018 is at its highest since 2010 (Standard 
Barometer 89, 2018) and many respondents seem to trust the EU more than their national 
governments. While these findings suggest that the general public feels more positive about 
the EU again, there has also been an increase in nationalist movements and anti-EU 
sentiments from national governments which appear to put into question the EU’s aim of an 
‘ever closer Union’. This is also attested by studies showing that recent crises “significantly 
intensified political conflicts on national sovereignty and solidarity” (Grande and Kriesi in 
Risse, 2014, p.  211). 
These developments underline the importance of examining the link between identity and 
European integration and the interplay between national and European levels of 
identification amongst security practitioners.  
 
Models for a European Identity 
European Identity and National Identity  
The EU has undergone a significant process of expansion and transformation since its 
inception as a Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to develop into the EU that it is today. Its 
ongoing growth has led some to argue that it is becoming more and more state-like in terms 
of its role and purpose (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 12). Indeed, the EU has now developed 
security and defence capacities which are often considered one of the defining 
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characteristics of the nation-state and closely linked to national identity as Hill and Wallace 
point out: “Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a 
nation-state’s ‘place in the world’, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations” 
(Hill, 1996, p. 8). While it is not argued here that the EU is clearly aiming to become the 
‘United States of Europe’, these developments mean that comparisons with the concept of 
national identity are frequently drawn (Moes, 2012) and therefore require discussion in 
order to grasp the complex idea of European identity. 
National identity is a term that is used in many different contexts and defined in numerous 
ways. However, “on a general level, the term national identity describes the basically 
positive, subjectively important emotional bond with a nation” (Tajfel and Turner quoted in 
Blank and Schmidt, 2003, p.  290). Furthermore, this bond requires individuals to imagine a 
sense of community with a large number of people, most of which they will never meet 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 6). More specifically, Deutsch and subsequently Smith define national 
identity as a certain “territorial boundedness, a shared nature of myths of origin and 
historical memories, a common bond of mass, standardised culture [and language], a 
common territorial division of labour and mobility and a unified system of common legal 
rights and duties” (Deutsch, 1953, Smith, 1992, p.  60). This bond is not merely a passive 
identification, many argue that it requires individuals to actively participate in the nation –
(state). Johnston et al. thus define nations as communities “of people whose members are 
bound together by a sense of solidarity rooted in an historic attachment to a homeland and 
common culture and often language and religion” (2000, p. 532). Aggestam  further notes 
that it was the emergence of nationalism that evoked the idea that one’s identity and 
loyalty lies with a nation, which subsequently requires the creation of a state (2000, p. 90).  
It can thus be deduced that while national identity has cultural components, it also invokes 
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support for and loyalty to the institutions that help to protect and promote the values and 
interests of the group.  Indeed, Aggestam et al. argue that the ability to protect from 
external threats is a key factor in ensuring one’s identification with a political community 
(1999).  
Just as nation-states only emerged over the last few centuries, national identities are a 
modern construct. Scholars believe that there are numerous nation-building structures that 
aid the construction of national identities. A key pillar of national identity is the feeling of 
sharing a common past, often created through national myths and the reinterpretation of 
historical events. Anderson, amongst others, therefore emphasises the importance of a 
centralised education system and common language, as well as national mass media in 
creating shared cultural values (2006, p. 7, see also Billig, 1995, p. 6) and a belief in a 
common destiny.  National identities provide a cultural framework, which enables citizens 
to make sense of their lives (Pennycook, 1995) at the same time as facilitating another key 
process, that of othering, or uniting the citizens of one nation against outsiders (Colley, 
1992, p. 311) and thereby reinforcing a sense of belonging.  
All these identity-creating mechanisms can however also be used to turn a sense of national 
identity and feelings of patriotism into extreme nationalism, one of the prime examples 
being Nazi Germany. While such extreme cases of imagining collective identity are rare, 
Anderson argues, it is the sense of belonging to a national community ”regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail” which is not only conceived as a “deep, 
horizontal comradeship”, but “ultimately […] makes it possible, over the past two centuries, 
for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings” (Anderson, 2006, p.  5). While these factors have contributed to the creation of 
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national identities in Europe, “nations are merely one of the many ways humans have 
devised [...] to endow large numbers of people with certain collective identities” (Fulbrook, 
1999, p. 232) and they are not fixed, but constantly evolving. Furthermore, there is little 
disagreement that (national) identity is essentially multifaceted (e.g. Smith, 1991, p. 14, 
Varsori and Petricioli in Frank (eds.), 2004, p. 90), consisting of many layers which may at 
times be contesting.  
The emergence of nation-states created an identity that, it can be argued, attempted to 
usurp smaller regional identities, which had existed long before the concept of the modern 
nation state became the norm. It is thus not surprising that the idea of regionalism and 
regional identities still make up an important component of many Europeans’ identities. 
One’s region provides a vital marker and is often highlighted by different dialects and 
accents, different cultural customs, histories and memory. As a result, strong regional 
movements continue to be a phenomenon in Europe, such as Catalunya in Spain and Tirol in 
Italy. Indeed, it is often argued that the continued existence of regional identities is the 
essence of European identity.  
Brubaker and Cooper make an important point in highlighting the contextual and situational 
nature of identification (2000, p. 14). Moreover, Guisan stresses that citizens are very much 
capable of having a number of different identities and attachments and that “national and 
EU identities need not conflict” (2012, p. 9). Yet previous studies have shown that if an 
allegiance to the EU emerges, this tends to be secondary to pre-existing, primarily national, 
identifications. This raises the question of whether the seemingly continuing supremacy of 
national identities in Europe renders the creation of a European identity pervasive enough 
to conjure up similar feelings and support impossible. Kosher argues that the interplay of 
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many competing national identities in Europe leads to an active suppression of “non-
national identities” (quoted in Gillis, 1994, p. 220). While recent independence movements 
within states such as Spain and the United Kingdom indicate that non-national identities are 
far from supressed, there is no doubt that competing national identities result in competing 
interpretations of ‘European identity’. 
The concept of national identity seems to provide a basis for understanding emerging ideas 
of European identity. Yet, while it is possible to apply some of these institution-linked 
attributes to the EU, it is clear that others are problematic in a European context. As 
Duchesne claims, while the EU increasingly behaves like a full-fledged polity similar to a 
nation-state, it is evident that attempts at creating a European cultural identity similar to 
national identity through symbols such as the European flag, Europe Day and a European 
anthem have thus far largely failed as these clash with national identities (2008, p. 405).   
 
The Europeanisation of National Identities  
A slightly different view of an (evolving) European identity is that we are in fact not 
witnessing the emergence of a distinct European identity, but that national identities are 
undergoing a process of “Europeanisation” (Risse, 2010, p. 5). This development, Risse 
claims, resembles a “marble cake”, where identities intersect and blend with one another 
and a sense of “Europeanness” is incorporated into national identities (2006, p. 305). This 
idea of a Europeanisation of national identities is shared by a significant number of scholars 
(Ladrech, 1994; and Breuer, 2011; Gariup, 2009; Milzow, 2012; Waever, 2005; and Larsen, 
2013), who also apply it to a foreign policy context. Indeed, while it is often argued that 
especially the CSDP has been “nationalised” by certain Member States (see Gariup, 2009) 
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and become a tool to pursue national security and defence interests (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 
226/7), others also believe that a Europeanisation of national policy-making is taking place. 
They argue that cooperation at EU level leads to the Europeanisation of national policies in 
so far that the EU’s norms and values promoted in the CSDP become part of the 
“organisational logic of national politics and policy making” (Breuer, 2011, p. 118 and 
Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). Their supposition is based on the institutional socialisation of elites.  
Furthermore, Risse also alleges that more frequent discussions of European matters in 
national media may lead to the creation of a “European public sphere” (quoted in Kaina and 
Karolewski, 2013, p. 12). This would seemingly facilitate the proliferation of shared 
European values and thus contribute to the construction of an ‘imagined [European] 
community’ (Anderson, 1991) in the same way that national identities are created and 
maintained. This notion of a European public sphere however must be considered with 
caution as mainstream news largely continue to be framed at a national level. While 
national media often reach global audiences and might raise awareness of the European 
integration process, they do so from a distinctly national point of view, which means 
European issues are likely to be interpreted differently with the interests of the various 
states in mind rather than a coherent supranational manner. Rather than creating a truly 
European public sphere, this potentially reinforces the status quo of supporting EU decision-
making only when it clearly benefits a nation-state’s interests rather than leading to 
recognition of shared values and norms amongst Europeans.  However, social media are 
continuously gaining importance as sources of information for a large number of Europeans. 
The EU started using social media in 2004 by launching blogs written by high officials, 
cabinet members and MEPs (Koskinen, 2013, p. 84), and since the implementation of “Plan 
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D”, has been “particularly active in ‘new’ and social media forms” (Badouard and Monnoyer-
Smith quoted in Bain and Chaban, 2016, p. 139), thus providing an online platform for 
directly interacting with European citizens. It has since added a YouTube channel, various 
Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, etc. Koskinen argues that through its use of social media, 
the EU is trying to create a shared European public sphere that has failed to emerge through 
national media (2013, pp. 89-90). Bain and Chaban observe that the EU’s attempts at 
directly communicating with individuals there “go far beyond parallel activities by Member 
States” (2016, p. 140). Social media have the potential to foster a Europe-wide public sphere 
less influenced by national media, but as a relatively new medium and especially in the age 
of ‘fake news’, its actual impact on citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes towards the EU 
require further examination.  
 
European Identity = Constitutional Patriotism?  
Does this mean that transposing the idea of national identity to the European level is not 
possible? Habermas believes that a shared European identity is certainly possible, but also 
claims that it cannot share the same characteristics as national identity. He believes that 
“the divisive force of divergent national histories and historical experiences that traverse 
the European territory like geographic fault lines remains potent” (quoted in Gould, A. and 
Messina, A, 2014, p. 13). If Europe cannot define itself along the lines of a nation-state, what 
sort of identity should it seek to create for itself? After all, it is not a nation-state but a 
unique international polity with unique characteristics. Some scholars have suggested that a 
way of overcoming the problem of opposing national identities is by building a European 
identity on the very diversity that Habermas refers to as problematic. For instance, Bottici 
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contends that while experiences and memories of the two World Wars vary significantly 
between Member States, they have resulted in a unanimous desire for peace that has the 
potential to unite member-states (in Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008, p.  50). Kohli therefore 
suggests that rather than using a potentially disputed “external other” or enemy to create a 
sense of solidarity and belonging, the EU faces a common internal enemy – its nationalistic 
past (2000, p. 128).  
Trying to construct a European identity using similar means to those used to create national 
identities is however very problematic. While scholars such as Kohli are right in suggesting 
that the wars of the 20th century serve to unite Europeans in their efforts to safeguard 
peace on the continent, recent history is far from a common or shared European history. 
Garton-Ash points out that any attempts at modelling the construction of European identity 
on national identities should be avoided as it would require the re-telling of “European 
history as the kind of teleological mythology characteristic of 19th-century nation-building” 
(2007, p.  1). Furthermore, he alludes to the nation described by Renan as a community of 
shared memory and shared forgetting; also pointing out that what one nation wishes to 
forget, another wishes to remember. He concludes that “our new European story will never 
generate the kind of fiery allegiances that were characteristic of the pre-1914 nation state. 
[…] Europeanness remains a secondary, cooler identity. Europeans today are not called 
upon to die for Europe. […] All that is required is that we should let Europe live.” (ibid). 
Other advocates of a post-national conception of European identity concur and argue that 
membership of a “particular cultural and historical community no longer constitutes a 
sufficient base for citizenship” (Ferry and Thibaud 1992, quoted in Lacroix 2002). According 
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to them, a collective identity can only function at a European level if it is built on Universalist 
values shared by all Europeans.  
This interpretation of European identity is closely linked to Habermas’ and Sternberger’s 
concept of constitutional patriotism (1979) which suggests that a sense of solidarity 
amongst citizens is created through a constitutive document shared and celebrated by all. 
Scholars favouring an identity based constitutional patriotism refer to the United States of 
America as a successful example of identity construction based on a constitution rather than 
notions of a shared past and culture. They advise that it will not be until Europeans decide 
to vote for a constitution that they will feel truly unified (Habermas, 2001). Having failed to 
ratify a European Constitution in 2005, the idea of establishing such a treaty seems unlikely 
in the near future.  
Perhaps it is not surprising though, that such an identity centred on constitutional 
patriotism focusing on universal values seems to be promoted by European institutions 
themselves (Risse, 2006, p.  7). Many scholars (such as Follesdal 2002; Berdun 2007; Pinxten, 
Cornelis, and Rubinstein 2007, all quoted in Gould, A. and Messina, A. 2014) point to the 
preamble of the Lisbon Treaty as a foundation upon which a European identity may be 
constructed. It comprises the universal values which the EU is founded on, namely “the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Indeed, 
Checkel and Katzenstein are of the opinion that Europeans “support the EU because they 
largely agree with the goals and principles that it embodies” (2009, p. 86). Moreover, while 
Europe-wide surveys such as Eurobarometer seem to attest a considerable amount of public 
support for integration in matters such as the economy and foreign policy (Smith, M., 2011, 
p. 626), there is little awareness of the EU being a security provider. Despite some 
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awareness of the various EU institutions, knowledge of the many intergovernmental and 
supranational political processes amongst the public often remains limited (Kantner, 2006, 
p. 511). Kaina argues that one of the main factors impeding the emergence of anything 
more than basic public support is the EU’s ever-evolving nature which means citizens 
struggle to come to terms with its size, scope and purpose. Even polities that were created 
decades ago, such as the European Parliament and Commission, are thus often criticised for 
lacking transparency and legitimacy as well as efficient mechanisms for input from EU 
citizens (Kaina, 2013, p.  8). Regardless of the potential benefits of decision-making at EU 
level, Europeans often feel detached from the political processes and European institutions 
are frequently accused of suffering from a democratic deficit – for being too complex to be 
fully understood by many EU citizens and too distant from their everyday lives. 
This often means “their [European citizens’] sense of who they are remains anchored at the 
national or local levels” (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009, p. 86). Citizens united by a shared 
belief in these values should subsequently also want to “participate in legitimating activities 
of their common fairs” (Lacroix, 2002, p. 955). However, scholars point out that there is little 
evidence that these values have a truly uniting effect and without the interpretation of 
these values as distinctly European, Kumm argues, EU citizens will continue to fluctuate 
between “fickle support and a lack of interest in European political life” (2007, p. 119). A 
variation on this theory comes from Risse, who states that while Europeans may behave like 
“constitutional patriots”, they only do so selectively (quoted in Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008, p. 
8), e.g. they voted against a constitution, but did not seem to have any significant objections 
to a move towards a common security and defence policy (Eurobarometer quoted in Cerutti 
and Lucarelli 2008, p. 9). The level and nature of support for the integration of, or increased 
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cooperation on, security and defence at EU level amongst CSDP practitioners will be 
investigated in the empirical section of this study.   
 
Current Notions of European Identity: One Phrase – Many 
Interpretations  
Attempts to measure European identity are frequently undertaken, but usually prove to be 
problematic and complex due to the abstract nature of the term. Depending on who you 
talk to, you will receive very different responses to the question: What is European identity? 
Notions of European identity lie at the juncture of a number of different disciplines and 
extensive research has been undertaken into theories of collective identity in Europe. While 
many definitions of collective identity evolve around an acknowledgement of sharing certain 
features or values, as well as a “recognition of shared opportunities and constraints 
afforded by those features” (Owens et al., 2010, p. 490), interpretations vary considerably. 
Some scholars focus on the identity the EU is trying to project externally, others look 
inwards at how European citizens identify as individuals. It is therefore important to 
consider different interpretations of European identity and how they relate to each other.  
Meri points out that “when we speak of Europe, we all presume that we know what Europe 
is. Yet every European nation has a different view of Europe (in Moes, 2009, p.  107). By 
adopting the motto “Unity through Diversity”, the EU has recognised this ambiguity and 
attempted to incorporate it into its identity. In addition, it is obvious that the public 
frequently refer to Europe and the EU interchangeably, thus adding a further dimension to 
this vague concept. While the EU has clear borders, the borders of ‘Europe’ are much more 
open to interpretation, making it problematic to pin down exactly what people refer to 
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when discussing their notions of European identity. Rumelili and Cebeci therefore suggest 
avoiding a narrow definition in empirical research, but instead to “leave it up to the 
respective individual to associate whatever comes to mind” (quoted in Kaina et al., 2015, p. 
73). The relationship between Europe and the EU in relation to notions of identity is 
examined more closely in Chapter 8b.  
In order to better understand the notion of European identity amongst EU practitioners, this 
study investigates the interplay of different concepts of European identity that shape 
individuals’ understandings of the term. On the one hand, there is the official rhetoric used 
to describe the EU’s role as an international actor. While the EU’s international or external 
identity promoted by EU officials could be classed as a top-down undertaking, there are also 
civic and cultural notions of European identity which focus more on identifications with 
Europe on a personal level. All however shape security practitioners’ notions of European 
identity and thus require detailed discussion and analysis.  
 
Civic and Cultural Pillars of European Identity  
While individuals often do not differentiate between civic and cultural aspects of (European) 
identity, scholars point to the necessity to examine them separately, conceptually as well as 
empirically (Bruter, 2008, p. 280). Civic identity often refers to allegiance to and support of 
the EU as an institution, which seemingly represents European norms and values. Bruter 
adds that this involves acknowledging that “this political system defines some of her/his 
rights and duties as a political being” (ibid, p. 279).  Cultural identity on the other hand is the 
recognition of fellow Europeans as members of the same group (Gvozden in Hanshew, 2008, 
p. 9). This perspective may be achieved through different means such as cultural similarities, 
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perceived common “Christian” values and norms, a sense of having a shared past or even 
ethnicity (Bruter in Herrmann et al., 2004, p. 190).  
This breakdown of political identity is similar to that of Easton, who, in 1965, delineated 
“political regime support” and feeling part of the same community as two separate 
concepts. He further argued that while a sense of solidarity is desirable and advantageous 
for the continued existence of a political entity, it is not actually vital for its survival, as 
support can develop merely through participation in its political processes (p. 186, also see 
Fuss and Grosser in Kaina et al., 2015). With particular reference to Europe, Bruter believes 
that support for European institutions presents an integral step towards a collective 
European identity. This leads him to conclude that while a cultural European identity might 
not currently exist, the public’s support for EU policy-making may, over time, lead to the 
socialisation of European citizens and bring about a collective European identity which 
includes a cultural perspective (2005).  This argument however seems to downplay the 
‘democratic deficit’ often associated with the EU. Many scholars argue that the complexity 
of EU policy-making accompanied by substantial bureaucracy present a major obstacle to 
fostering widespread public support for policy-making at EU level. This leads many 
integration theorists to argue that support for EU policy-making will only flourish once a 
cultural community exists (Gould and Messina, 2014, p. 2).  
Not dissimilar to Bruter in terms of different aspects of European identity, but more focused 
on different levels of identification, Kantner proposes a three-level model of European 
identity that is built around the two pillars mentioned above: the basic level refers to 
everyone who is capable of interacting with others (2005, p. 507), thus forming the 
universal ‘we₁ community’ – but it is the two following levels, weak and strong identity, that 
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are of relevance to this research. She supposes that weak collective identities are present in 
a so-called ‘we₂ commercium’ group where “everyone follows their own idiosyncratic 
desires and purposes” and sees the group as “a club or neighbourhood” rather than “a 
family” (2006, p. 8). She states that a “weak” collective identity already exists amongst 
Europeans and is reflected in the public’s general support for decisions being taken at EU 
level. It is characterised by individuals’ recognition of cooperation with other group 
members being conducive to achieving personal goals (2005, pp. 507, 512) thus reflecting 
neo-realist thinking on the value of European cooperation. Yet, any feelings of sharing 
common values and goals with fellow Europeans are absent at this level. This type of 
identification also implies that other pre-existing identities prevail over the European one. 
While Kantner also maintains that a weak European identity is “sufficient for the 
democratisation of the EU” (ibid, p. 512), she concedes that such a generalisation requires 
validation by testing it against individual policy issues (ibid, p. 516) and that certain 
situations, such as the deployment of European soldiers into war zones, might indeed 
necessitate greater public support than that created through a weak collective identity (ibid, 
p.  513).  
In Kantner’s model, a strong collective identity is present in we₂ communio groups. 
Members of these groups share certain values and an understanding of what is considered a 
“good life” (2006, p. 9). Furthermore, these groups are characterised by a shared ethical 
self-understanding which underpins the pursuit of common interests and collective projects 
and thus defines a common vision of the future (2006, p. 512). Other scholars define such a 
collective identity as “the idea that a group of people accept a fundamental and 
consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves” (Therborn, 
1995, Brubaker and Cooper, 2000 quoted in Fligstein et al., 2012, p. 107). Such collective 
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identities, Kantner argues, are reproduced through members being born into these 
communities and subsequently being “socialised into their basic ethical convictions” but 
also by people coming together and establishing new groups to “pursue a common ethical 
project” (2006, p. 10). However, she also argues that strong collective identities are 
uncommon in today’s society and only emerge as a result of major crises which are 
experienced collectively (ibid, p. 513, see also Berger in Katzenstein et al., 1996). However, 
she does not define the magnitude needed for a crisis to trigger such a strong collective 
identity.  
According to Eurobarometer, the number of people identifying primarily with Europe has 
not increased since the first time a question about self-identification was asked in 1992. In 
fact, the last time this question was asked (Eurobarometer 89, 2018), it had decreased to 2% 
(from 4% in 1992). Recent developments such as the Euro debt crisis, the increased 
occurrence of terrorism across Europe and the refugee influx could all be interpreted as 
major crises affecting the majority of EU citizens. Yet, if anything, they seem to have had the 
opposite effect in that nationalistic and anti-EU sentiments have spiked across the EU. 
Eurobarometer polls indicate that in 2015 at the time of primary data collection for this 
thesis, only 32% of European respondents trusted in the EU (the lowest having been 31% in 
2012/13), whereas in 2007 this figure peaked at 53% and most recently stood at 42% 
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(2018). Delibasic points out that instead of developing a stronger European identity through 
the realisation of “sitting in the same boat” and hence sharing the same goals, the crisis  
seemingly stressed (pre-existing) distrust of EU institutions and fellow Europeans (2013, p. 
305).  
FIGURE 1 EUROBAROMETER SURVEY RESULTS - TRUST IN EU 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm  
More recent data on trust in the EU as shown in Figure 1 above supports this finding. This 
thesis seeks to determine whether the implementation of the CSDP might have the 
potential to activate a ‘strong European identity’ amongst those involved. In addition, one 
also has to evaluate whether Kantner’s proposed progression from weak to strong identity 
can also develop over a long period of time and through the common training and education 
of CSDP practitioners rather than merely through substantial crises.  
However, there are a group of people in Europe, those working directly for the EU or on 
issues related to European integration, who are confronted with the elites’ vision for the EU 
and complexities of EU integration, on a daily basis. A specific group of practitioners, those 
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working on implementing the CSDP, are the subjects of this study, thus making it important 
to also consider institutional identity building processes.  
Juncos and Pomorska, who investigated the emergence of an esprit de corps amongst EEAS 
staff argue that for such a sentiment to emerge amongst practitioners, a certain number of 
conditions need to exist. These are “leadership, communication, public image, mutual trust 
and training” (2014, p. 302). The importance of training for establishing this esprit de corps, 
which is the focus of this study, has also been underlined by other scholars such as Cross 
(2011), and Lloveras Soler (2011). Previous studies have shown that, in the context of 
foreign policy implementation, national individuals develop a certain esprit de corps due to 
being “exposed to a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding” (Beyers, 2002, in 
Juncos and Pomorska, 2014, p. 305). Bicchi’s study of the CORespondance EUropéenne 
(COREU) network concerned the emergence of a “community of practice” amongst foreign 
policy workers. She defined the concept as “a group of people who routinely share a 
practice of communication and collective learning” (2011, p. 1119).  Like Kantner, Bicchi 
argues that members of these communities develop a sense of “shared enterprise” mainly 
through communication, but also training (ibid.). She concludes that “the gap between self-
contained national polities can be and has been bridged by officials who in their daily 
activities support the weaving together of a common cognitive framework” (2011, p. 1128). 
While her concept helps understand the processes of communication amongst foreign 
policy workers using the COREU network which, for many, have become routine, collective 




The concept of esprit de corps is often used in different ways, referring to “the collegial 
atmosphere within a group, an identification with the goals and values of an organization, or 
the emergence of supranational identities among EU and national officials” (Juncos and 
Pomorska, 2014, p.  305). However, Juncos and Pomorska extend this definition as “the 
emergence of shared beliefs and values among the individuals within a group and a desire 
among those individuals (in this case, EEAS officials) to achieve a common goal” (ibid). 
Nuttall points out that this sentiment goes beyond Kantner’s we₂ commercium as it is 
“rarely the product of a cold calculation of reciprocal interest. It stemmed rather from the 
process of socialization, the feeling of belonging to a club” (2000, p. 272). It is obvious that 
despite not using the term identity, the concept of esprit de corps is very closely related to 
notions of European identity.  
Yet Trondal ’s study of identification amongst EU committee members highlights that 
whereas national identifications may remain dominant, other identifications also emerge 
from supranational collaboration. He remarks that if feelings of European identity emerge 
amongst staff, these often refer only to a specific institution rather than the EU as a whole 
(2002, p. 476). As security practitioners (both military and civilian) often work for 
institutions with strong organisational cultures, (Payan, 2006, p.  105) it is worth 
investigating the extent to which these institutional cultures are perceived to transcend 
national boundaries and may shape notions of a European security culture. When 
conducting research, one therefore needs to extrapolate whether notions of European 
identity amongst individuals encompass the whole of the EU or are 
institutional/professional identities.  
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While differentiations between weak and strong identities and cultural and civic pillars are 
very useful for analysing identification amongst those involved in implementing the CSDP, it 
is also crucial to consider the notions of European identity CSDP practitioners are 
confronted with through their work - the narratives used by the EU to project itself 
externally as well as internally. 
 
The EU as an International Actor – Normative Power Europe?  
In a time where internal criticism and a degree of uncertainty about the EU’s future 
direction are a common occurrence, the views and opinions of those tasked with 
implementing its policies with regards to European integration are more important than 
ever. Especially security and defence have increasingly shifted to the forefront of many 
people’s minds as recent developments such as the conflict in eastern Ukraine, numerous 
terrorist attacks and the irregular migration crisis seem to have increased people’s safety 
concerns. Furthermore, the US has been criticising other NATO members for their lack of 
financial commitment to NATO resulting in a somewhat strained relationship (Clementi et 
al., 2017, p. 524), thus shifting focus further onto EU security and defence. This begs the 
question of how CSDP staff perceive the EU’s role as a security actor and whether they 
themselves accept the identity that the EU, as a security actor, is trying to project in order to 
strengthen its efforts to implement the CSDP.  
When considering if and how security practitioners identify with and support the EU, it is 
important to consider what kind of international actor and, more specifically, security 
provider the EU is aiming to be and the kind of identity it is projecting externally. The 
development of the EU’s own military capabilities led to renewed debates on the shape of 
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the EU’s international identity. It put into question whether the CSDP was merely a response 
to changes in the international system, or whether this new policy represented a 
concentrated effort to develop a distinctly different international identity. Did the 
development of a military element mark a departure from ‘civilian power Europe’ and a 
move towards resembling a more traditional military (super) power? Or does the EU remain 
a normative power as suggested by Manners in 2002?  
The idea of the EU as a civilian power emerged not long after the Second World War (Smith 
in Holland, ed., 2005, p.  79). The European Community’s (EC) interactions with other states 
remained largely confined to the use of diplomacy, mainly in economic form, and without 
the use of high diplomacy over the following decades (Smith, 2003, p.  559). Duchêne 
defined the EC as a civilian power “whose strength lies in its ability to promote and 
encourage stability through economic and political means” (quoted in Whitman, 2013, p. 
174).  It is often argued that despite the EC/EU lacking concrete material means to interfere 
in international affairs, its universal values and norms enabled it to employ “soft security” as 
a way to establish itself as a prominent international player (Therborn quoted in Youngs, 
2004, p. 416). The end of the Cold War and the creation of the CSDP in the early 2000s led 
to renewed debates about the EU as an international actor. Manners developed an 
alternative to traditional concepts with regards to the EU’s power – one that favours 
spreading norms and values over relying only on military or economic measures (Diez and 
Manners in Berenskoetter et al., 2007, p. 175). Furthermore, he defined a normative power 
as one that strives to “judge or direct human conduct”, thus shaping “conceptions of 
‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002, 239). Focusing on the power of norms 
and values represented a shift away from employing a state-centred approach to European 
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Studies (Whitman, 2013, p. 172) and while it was built on the work of Duchêne (in 
Kohnstamm et al., 1973), it was also distinctly different. Whitman argues that Duchêne’s 
‘civilian power' inherently acknowledges the importance of material power, whereas 
normative power focuses on “non-material exemplification found in the contagion of 
norms” (2013, p. 174).  
There is little doubt that the EU sees itself as having a normative role as evidenced by a 
statement from former European Commission President Barroso who indicated that the EU 
is one of the world’s key normative powers that sets standards for other countries (quoted 
in Peterson , 2012, p. 5). Furthermore, while it can be inferred from EU policy documents 
that the EU tries to project itself as a “peacebuilder in the world” (Diez in Manners, 2002, p. 
213, Aggestam, 2008, p. 25), Manners makes it clear that his interpretation of the concept 
of normative power Europe is far from any (neo-)colonial civilising practices.  Instead some 
scholars argue that the EU is a normative power because it binds itself to cosmopolitan law 
(Diez and Sjursen quoted in Whitman, 2013, p. 176) and thus represents a unique and novel 
type of global actor which has the potential to be seen as a model worth emulating or 
seeking membership of by others. Lucarelli and Manners conclude that the discourse 
around Normative Power Europe  
provides the most important input for the construction of a European identity, as it 
ascribes to the EU a specific role based on its representation and promotion of ‘the 
prime value of peace’ and ‘the core values of human dignity/rights, freedom/liberty, 




However, the uniqueness of these so-called ‘European values’ and the EU’s normative role 
in constructing a distinctive external identity as a security provider remains contested and 
many argue that while the above-mentioned values have been internalised by the EU, they 
are universal rather than distinctly European (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, p.  202).  
Some realist scholars have concluded that the acquisition of defence capabilities was the 
first step towards an international identity defined by the EU’s or its Member States’ self-
interests rather than the spreading of universal norms (Hyde-Price, 2006, Noutcheva, 2009).  
Indeed, a reduced emphasis on the EU’s normative role is evident in one of the latest 
strategic documents, the EUGS. As Grevi points out, the new Global Strategy is more 
pragmatic and interest-driven (2016, p. 3). Former High Representative Solana argued that 
due to the EU being built around non-coercive, humanitarian and legalistic values, the 
acquisition of military capabilities was not pursued “for our own sake, but in support of the 
values and principles for which the EU is respected world-wide” (2000). Manners added that 
the nature of European integration and a more critical European public would result in a 
“tendency to remain within peaceful, non-coercive confines” (2006, p.  407). The ratio 
between civilian and military CSDP operations to date seems to underline this trend.  
However, it also seems the EU has somewhat belatedly realised that its model may be less 
appealing to the rest of the world than previously thought (Tocci, 2016), thus emphasising 
the importance of external perceptions regarding the idea of the EU being an exporter of 
norms. Indeed, Chaban and Holland point out that “changing international perceptions can 
have a pervasive and contagious effect across the full spectrum of EU external activities and 
policies” (2014, p. 250) and therefore play a significant role in shaping EU narratives.  
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However, when trying to draw conclusions about the EU’s behaviour as an international 
actor, it is important to move beyond the realist-constructivist dichotomy that seems to 
dominate IR (Noutcheva et al., 2013, p. 9). Especially when considering the missions that 
could have taken place but have not, such as the EU’s inaction in the 2011 Libya crisis 
(EUFOR Libya was never launched), it becomes clear that CSDP implementation is based on 
a complex interplay, or even struggle, between the EU’s emerging international identity 
based on normative values and Member States’ own interests. Here, it is once more crucial 
to acknowledge that the EU is still in the process of developing a clear international identity: 
while the EU is much more than a mere alliance that serves a specific purpose such as 
NATO, it is also far from constituting a traditional nation-state. Consequently, despite the 
CSDP being embedded in a framework of universal values and norms endorsed by all EU 
members, national interests largely remain the key driver for engagement in the CSDP for 
the time being (Tocci, 2016, p. 92; Gariup, 2009, pp. 100-1). While ‘normative power 
Europe’ is an independent concept that serves as a bridge between civilian and military 
power, it is important to acknowledge that a combination of all three determine the 
implementation of the CSDP. Rather than interpreting the EU’s behaviour as a civilian, hard 
or normative power, McDonagh thus concludes that three distinct external identity 
narratives have emerged which define the EU as a “provider of peace” internally and in its 
neighbourhood, as a “risk manager” that prevents external security threats from 
materialising and as a “military power” protecting its interests (2014, p. 7). Such a 
multidimensional model of the EU’s identity is useful in as far as it acknowledges the various 
drivers behind the EU’s behaviour and also seems to reflect recent strategic developments. 
Whether it is perceived as either of these is explored in the next chapters.  
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Furthermore, any European identity narratives projected by the EU have to compete with 
the often long-established ones of nation-states. Not having any supranational decision-
making structures means that most staff working to implement the CSDP do this as 
nationals of their countries, not EU employees. Furthermore, despite having increased its 
presence abroad through EU Delegations, CSDP missions and so forth, research has shown 
that the EU’s efforts to present itself as a ‘force for good’ are not necessarily validated by 
external perceptions (Chaban and Holland, 2008), thus adding another obstacle to 
overcome in its quest to become a convincing global actor. This discrepancy between how 
the EU wants to be seen abroad and how it is actually perceived highlights the importance 
of security practitioners. As Benson-Rea states, “the coherence of the EU as an international 
actor […] is in many respects embodied in its employees” (2012, p.  483). Many individuals 
involved in implementing the CSDP thus find themselves in a challenging position where 
they inadvertently represent the EU’s external identity through their work, while at the 
same time being employed to secure the interests of individual Member States. They not 
only have to bridge the different institutional contexts, i.e. the “domestically generated 
drive for national independence” and […] the explicit political commitments made by EU 
members to speak and act in unison in international affairs (Aggestam and Hyde-Price, 
2000, p.  95), but they are also tasked with being the faces of EU foreign policy abroad and 
thus have the power to generate external legitimacy (Benson-Rea and Shore, 2012, p. 481).   
 
European Integration Identity 
There is no doubt that these differentiations between weak and strong identities (Kantner), 
cultural and civic components (Bruter), the concept of a European esprit de corps and 
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indeed the EU’s international identity are very useful for analysing identification amongst 
those involved in implementing the CSDP. However, as this thesis investigates if a sense of 
European identity is emerging amongst practitioners working on European integration, a 
more specific definition of the concept of European identity is needed. Such a specific 
approach is supported by Kantner, who suggests that analysing the processes of political 
identity formation should be carried out policy-issue by policy-issue rather than by drawing 
conclusions in an undifferentiated manner about a group’s “collective identity” (2006, p. 
12).  
Therefore, this study seeks to establish whether CSDP practitioners develop a sense of 
‘European integration identity’. This term is defined in this study as individuals’ recognition 
not only of being part of an EU we₂ commercium, a community that facilitates the pursuit of 
individual nation’s desires and purposes but accompanied by a sense of belonging to a 
group of citizens who share values and a vision of the future and believe that the EU is the 
best tool for achieving the group’s goals. This definition is very closely related to Juncos and 
Pomorska’s understanding of esprit de corps which they define as “the emergence of shared 
beliefs and values among the individuals within a group and a desire among those 
individuals (in this case, EEAS officials) to achieve a common goal” (2014, p. 305).  However, 
this study suggests that the use of the term European integration identity is more 
appropriate in this context as it not only focuses on individuals’ developing support for the 
EU as an institution but presupposes that a sense of ‘we-ness’ may emerge amongst 
practitioners which goes beyond the institutional level and could be based on cultural as 
well as civic identity components.  
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The study explores whether such an identity exists or develops through working on CSDP 
implementation. Furthermore, it examines whether there are certain processes, mainly 
strategic narratives, which are capable of contributing to the emergence of a ‘European 
integration identity’. Mann agreed with other scholars such as Anderson and Gellner when 
he pointed out that education and language play a pivotal role in developing individuals’ 
consciousness, awareness and sense of identity (1992).  By offering CSDP training at EU 
level, the ESDC brings together all strands of European identity: the EU’s official identity 
discourse is directly narrated to CSDP practitioners, who at the same time participate in 
networking, collaborate in crisis situations and experience the cultural aspects of 
‘Europeanness’ through the residential nature of courses. This makes ESDC-coordinated 
training courses an excellent setting for investigating the formation of a European 
integration identity.  
 
Previous Studies on Identity Formation amongst EU Workers 
As this thesis is concerned with the impact that working for EU institutions has on people’s 
understandings of and identifications with the EU, it seeks to investigate whether those who 
work for the EU are more likely or quicker to develop a sense of European identity. It makes 
a new contribution to research on European identity because it focuses on a specific group 
of practitioners, those involved in security and defence, a field that has always been closely 
linked to notions of national identity.  
Previous research underlines the rationalist-constructivist dichotomy that divides opinions 
regarding European integration on the whole, but also the extent to which identity 
modification occurs amongst staff working for EU institutions. After examining attitudes 
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amongst EU permanent representatives, Lewis points out that while secondary allegiances 
to the EU seem to develop, they do not equate to a transfer of loyalties or the emergence of 
a ‘European’ identity (2000, p. 274, also see Fehige and Wessels, 1998). Many however 
oppose this view and conclude that a change in identification does occur. For example, in 
2004 Meyer carried out interviews with a number of Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
ambassadors and high-ranking civil servants who indicated that an esprit de corps had been 
established, giving the committee a sense of identity and a shared understanding of CSDP 
matters (2005, p. 537, for further studies, see also Laffan, 1998, Trondal, 2002). However, at 
the same time, many stress that any shift in allegiance is in addition to, rather than in place 
of, existing loyalties (Beyers in Goldmann and Gilland, Schaefer et al., 2001). While some 
studies seem to focus on personal collaboration with fellow Europeans as well as prolonged 
service as being key aspects in generating an allegiance to the EU (Hooghe, 1999, Egeberg, 
1999), there are other factors that influence the emergence of support amongst EU 
employees. Trondal argues that the intensity of collaboration is a key determinant for 
allegiance to the EU (2002, p. 481-2, see also Meyer, 2005, p. 535). The extent to which this 
is the case will be tested in the context of CSDP implementation, which, especially when 
conducting missions and operations, may constitute high pressure working environments 
requiring significant levels of collaboration.  
Many integration theorists conclude that it is through spill over and socialisation in the form 
of personal contact and frequent collaboration that EU employees eventually undergo a 
“permanent shift of attitude or ‘cognitive change’” (Haas, 1968; O’Neil, 1996, McDonald 
1998; Niemann 1998; Lewis 2000; all quoted in Trondal 2002). Furthermore, Meyer 
specifically refers to the power of supranational organisations to shape the norms held by 
national officials “through processes of social influence” (2005, p.534), which include both 
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normative and informational influence. He argues that CSDP structures not only have the 
ability to shape practitioners’ feelings and behaviour but also influence their strategic 
culture (ibid).  While there has been some research into the effects of ‘Europeanisation’ of 
Member States in relation to foreign policy (Risse, et al., 2011, p.  20), these studies have 
largely focused on the bigger picture, i.e. the extent to which national policy-making is 
affected. Empirical research into the socialisation and Europeanisation of individuals 
working on European foreign policy has been scarce, especially after 2005. Subsequent 
chapters therefore examine these processes at the individual level in order to establish 
whether such a shift in attitude does indeed take place amongst EU security practitioners.  
 
European Identity amongst CSDP Practitioners  
This study adds an interesting aspect to research on identity amongst EU staff not only 
because security and defence has always been closely linked to notions of identity, but also 
because it examines a large cross-section of people: civilian as well as military staff, from 
junior to senior level, and all EU nationalities at a crucial time (the launch of the EUGS). 
Furthermore, many previous studies focused on elites such as senior officials and diplomats 
(e.g. Laffan, 2004, Lepsius, 2004, Siapera, 2004, Wodak, 2004, quoted in Kantner, 2006). 
Europeans working on CSDP implementation present a slightly different scenario: many of 
them would not be considered elites, as they do not represent leaders of groups involved in 
public decision-making (Haas, 1968, p. 115) and their involvement in EU policy 
implementation may often only be temporary. In addition, the CSDP is based on 
intergovernmental rather than supranational cooperation. Some might argue that this very 
fact hinders the development of loyalty transfer (Kassim et al., 2000; Moravcsik, 1998), and 
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draw attention to the argument that national employees working for EU institutions cannot 
be expected to shift their loyalties significantly as they continue to represent their national 
agencies (Egeberg, 1999). While there is certainly weight behind this argument, it is also 
evident that the EU is making a concerted effort to create a European identity amongst 
CSDP staff by projecting certain narratives to military and civilian CSDP staff through an 
increasingly integrated training experience. This is achieved through the continuous 
expansion of CSDP training modules and introducing new initiatives such as a staff mobility 
scheme especially aimed at young officers similar to ERASMUS and a CSDP Olympiad, which 
is a CSDP-themed competition for officers in training. Extensive research on transnational 
communication (Deutsch 1953; Deutsch et al., 1957; Lijphart, 1964; Fligstein 2008 quoted in 
Kaina et al., 2015) as well as on the impact of exchanges and mobility schemes has attested 
that such an approach does indeed contribute to the formation of a European identity 
amongst participants from the bottom-up (Wallace, 1990, Green, 2007, Fligstein, 2008, 
2009, Favell, 2009 quoted in Udrea).  
Another concept which may be relevant to this research and which hasn’t been discussed 
sufficiently in previous studies is the role that confrontation with the ‘other’ plays in identity 
formation. Security and defence matters evolve around dealing with external parties which 
inevitably leads to differentiating between ‘us’ needing protection from ‘them’ and national 
security practitioners becoming EU representatives as a result. Many scholars argue that 
this process is a key tool to create a sense of group identity. While for many Europeans the 
“in-group/out-group antagonism is a latent phenomenon” (Kaina and Karolewski, 2013, p.  
23), it seems likely to be triggered amongst those deployed on a CSDP mission abroad or 
even those working in an environment where ‘the other’ is the focus of their work. In the 
case of European staff working on CSDP implementation, this might occur on a number of 
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different levels. On the one hand, being part of a European minority abroad might highlight 
similarities by juxtaposing them with ‘the exotic other’ (Said, 1978), thus creating a sense of 
European community. However, ‘othering’ could also occur internally, where a lack of cross-
cultural competency results in the formation/continuation of national divisions. The degree 
to which ‘othering’ is perceived to occur and whether it activates a recognition of the EU’s 
universal values as European amongst CSDP staff is investigated in this study.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 3 
 
This chapter considered a number of different concepts that are closely linked to notions of 
European identity, such as national identity, constitutional patriotism and the EU’s 
international identity. Furthermore, it examined a number of different theories regarding 
the components that contribute to an individual’s European identity and considered 
different levels of identification with Europe.  These theoretical explorations emphasised 
the need for developing a precise definition of European integration identity which is to be 
explored in this thesis and highlighted a gap in European identity theory – a lack of focus on 
identity formation. The thesis assesses notions of European identity amongst practitioners 
and focuses on identity-shaping processes by using the concept of strategic narratives, 





CHAPTER 4: Assessing the Construction of a European 
Integration Identity: Employing the Concept of ‘Strategic 
Narratives’ 
 
As discussed in the last chapter, identity is a concept that is not only difficult to define, but it 
is also very challenging to measure. How are individuals’ identities formed, maintained or 
indeed changed?  
To tackle these questions, the previous chapter outlined how European identity in particular 
is understood and interpreted in this study and how it is linked with other types of 
identities. It is now crucial to discuss the theoretical concepts employed in this thesis to 
make sense of the identity-shaping processes that take place amongst CSDP practitioners, in 
particular during CSDP training courses.  
This study employs the concept of strategic narratives developed by Roselle, Miskimmon 
and O’Loughlin in 2014 after Freedman had introduced the term “strategic narrative” to the 
study of International Relations in 2006, defining it as a deliberate construction providing a 
“compelling story line which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can 
be drawn” (p. 22). It is argued that such attempts to structure responses take place by 
expressing a “sense of identity and belonging and communicat[ing] a sense of cause, 
purpose and mission (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, quoted in Freedman, 2006, p. 22/23).   
Employing Kantner’s model of weak and strong European identities (2005), this study seeks 
to assess whether strategic narratives shape notions of European identity amongst civilian 
and military staff involved in CSDP implementation. It considers the EU’s role in European 
identity formation by examining mechanisms geared towards creating greater ‘political 
86 
 
regime support’ (Easton, 1965) as well as initiating a sense of “shared ethical self-
understanding” (Kantner, 2006, p. 509) amongst military and civilian staff.  
 
Using the Concept of Strategic Narratives to Explore the Internal 
Communication of the EU’s CSDP  
The concept of strategic narratives in International Relations is usually applied to external 
projections of identity between state actors and Roselle et al., developed the concept 
defining it as “soft power in the 21st century” (2014, p. 71). Furthermore, they applied it to 
an ever-changing “media ecology” (ibid) –  media landscapes in which actors with varying 
degrees of power over the information transmitted (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 30) try to 
influence “whose story wins” (Nye quoted in Roselle et al., 2014, p. 71). This study makes a 
novel contribution to the literature on strategic narratives by firstly employing it to analyse 
the shaping of identity in a European foreign policy context, and perhaps more importantly, 
by utilising it to assess the internal communication of narratives within the EU. As the EU is a 
complex actor defined by intergovernmental decision-making between 28 states, it 
constitutes a rather unique foreign policy actor. Its convoluted structure poses a significant 
challenge to creating and projecting a consolidated identity externally. Furthermore, it faces 
another challenge: to act with one voice it needs to create and maintain internal cohesion 
between the Member States.  
Garton-Ash’s remark highlights the importance of analysing the EU’s internal projection of 
narratives: “Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A shared political narrative 
sustained the post-war project of (west) European integration for three generations, but it 
has fallen apart since the end of the Cold War. Most Europeans now have little idea where 
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we're coming from; far less do we share a vision of where we want to go to. We don't know 
why we have an EU or what it's good for. So, we urgently need a new narrative.” (2007). 
This remark does not refer specifically to the EU’s foreign policy; however, it is also very 
relevant in such a foreign policy context, which has traditionally been dealt with at the 
national level and continues to struggle with legitimacy issues. Furthermore, it highlights the 
connection between a shared sense of identity and successful policy-making. It also 
supports the argument that the EU has the ability to affect individuals’ “preferences and 
very identity” (Haas, 1968, p. 7, 18-19 and Knill  and Lenschow, 2001, p. 194) and highlights 
the importance of strong narratives.  
Of course, it can be argued that using strategic narratives to investigate notions of an 
emergent European identity is problematic, mainly because the EU is not like a state actor 
but instead relies on intergovernmental decision-making. This inevitably means that forming 
and projecting coherent narratives internally (and externally) is a very complex undertaking 
as nation-states remain the key agents and main transmitters of narratives. Miskimmon et 
al. acknowledge that “the hybrid nature of the European Union […] complicates who 
narrates policy within the organization” (2017, p. 96). Furthermore, the reception and 
acceptance of EU strategic narratives is “complicated by an opaque institutional structure 
and organization that even EU citizens, much less non- Europeans, fail to grasp (Tonra 
quoted in Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 93). Subsequently, there is also no doubt that any EU 
narratives either must compete with or at least resonate with national ones in order to be 
accepted by Europeans. However, this is also a very good reason to employ this framework. 
While it is important to examine the EU’s efforts to shape notions of a European identity, it 
is also crucial to investigate how individuals respond to these efforts and how they 
themselves contribute to this process in return. Due to its cyclic nature (formation – 
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projection – reception), the concept of strategic narratives is especially useful as it highlights 
the multifaceted interplay between the different actors involved: it enables the analysis of 
the formation and projection of narratives by the EU, but also focuses on how individuals 
receive and shape them in return. As Nye points out “what the target thinks is particularly 
important, and the targets matter as much as the agents” (Nye Jr, 2011, p. 84).   
Investigating narratives in the European foreign policy field can easily be a vast undertaking 
due to the many different actors involved and the large and complex ‘media ecology’ that 
narratives are transmitted in across Europe and the different Member States. By choosing a 
different, more specific sphere (CSDP training courses), the subject becomes more 
assessable within the constraints of a thesis and also hones in on its target audience – those 
implementing the EU’s foreign policy – and the link between identity and integration.  
Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin suggest that three different levels of narratives are 
created and projected by actors and then received by target audiences. A distinction is 
made between international system, identity and policy or issue narratives which 
collectively construct a notion of European identity. This concept is especially useful in the 
context of identity and the EU’s CSDP as it attempts to explain the constantly evolving 
nature of both. As Todorov points out, narratives provide a “framework that allow[s] 
humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around some causal 
transformation” (1977, p.  45). More specifically, narratives connect elite discourses with a 
more widespread understanding of issues, interests and values, and contribute to a process 
of ‘sense-making’ which helps to circulate information among wider publics as well as 
narrow elites. In addition, they have the potential to establish and reinforce a sense of 
belonging amongst certain groups as well as create common values and norms (Ronfeld and 
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Arquilla, 2001). On the one hand, notions of identity discussed above are rooted in the 
understanding that it is socially constructed, both top-down and bottom-up, and undergoes 
continuous shaping and maintaining (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996). On the other hand, CSDP is a 
policy area that is still being developed and will continue to change due to the complex and 
ever-changing nature of the security environment. Furthermore, its successful 
implementation is heavily reliant on public support (Martin, 2007, p.  9- 10) and thus 
requires careful communication. By analysing both notions in relation to each other, the 
degree of their interconnectedness will be investigated. Narratives are an excellent means 
to make sense of these processes in relation to one’s environment as they assume that 
meaning is created through a dialogic process that thus moves beyond communicating static 
facts.  
 
Strategic Narratives of European Identity 
While there are many options for theorising the large number of identity-shaping processes 
and ways in which individuals’ opinions are shaped, this study employs the concept of 
strategic narratives in order to evaluate if and how the EU is able to communicate a 
European identity to its employees. As Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin point out, 
strategic narratives represent a way of creating a “shared meaning of the past, present, and 
future of international politics” (2014, p. 2) and thus play an essential role in legitimising all 
human societies (Hurrell, 2007, p. 17). They have the potential not only to influence 
people’s interests, but also their identity (ibid.). In other words, the narratives are future-
oriented as they tell a story about an initial situation which is disrupted by a problem and 
subsequently offer a resolution to this problem. Strategic narratives thus not only bind 
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together a range of diverse individuals in terms of ideology and strategy (Freedman, 2006), 
they also serve to project the values and interests of actors in the international system 
(Manners, 2002, Antoniades, et al., 2010).  
Employing the concept of strategic narratives to evaluate notions of European identity 
requires a holistic assessment of the processes involved as narratives are “dynamic products 
whose meaning changes as they move from tellers to listeners and back again. They create 
the world as much as they reflect it” (Zalman, 2011, online blog).  
In order to better understand their complexity, Roselle et al. differentiate between three 
different, yet mutually constitutive processes – strategic narrative formation, projection and 
reception. This distinction helps to highlight and understand the complexity of who’s 
shaping narratives and to what purpose, how and by whom they are communicated as well 
as how they are received by their target audiences. The formation of narratives occurs to 
facilitate the interpretation of events according to the agents’ worldview. O’Loughlin et al. 
argue that “actors and interactions of IR are deeply embedded within and structured by 
discourse” and that narratives are created using this discursive material (2017, p39). In the 
case of the EU, the formation of security-related narratives is particularly interesting 
because as well as being crafted from official discourse by the EU, they need to resonate 
with the many national discourses on security and defence. As this study uses the EU’s two 
security strategies and examines the work of the ESDC as tools for communicating strategic 
narratives, it is crucial to look closely at who is involved in drafting the content of the 
documents and training courses and the processes through which they are produced.  
The second component of the communication cycle is the projection of narratives.  Roselle 
et al. describe this as verbal and non-verbal communication (2014, p. 75) which aims to 
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allocate meaning and purpose to the EU as a key actor in the international system. With 
regards to this thesis this means it is not only important to assess the content of the two 
security strategies and the CSDP training courses, but it is also vital to take into 
consideration how they are projected non-verbally. How are security practitioners 
confronted with the EU’s security strategy and what is the impact of residential training 
courses hosted by the different Member State institutions?  
While an examination of the projection of narratives might reveal a clear intent, their 
success is determined by how they are received by their target audience. Indeed, it is at this 
point that “meaning is made and any attractiveness, engagement and scope for persuasion 
are located and experienced” (Skuse et al., 2011). It is here that EU strategic narratives 
come up against existing (national) ones and are interpreted according to individual 
identifications and belief systems. Furthermore, the reception of narratives forms the last 
part of the communication cycle and the extent to which they are accepted and how they 
are interpreted impacts on the (re-)formation of the EU’s strategic narratives. It is arguably 
also the most complex stage of the process as so many different factors influence how 
individuals receive certain narratives. While narratives are often filtered through national 
lenses, regional ones as well as personal experiences and attitudes (of Europe and the EU) 
also influence the way in which EU narratives are perceived by individual security 
practitioners. CSDP training courses provide an interesting platform for analysing the 
reception of narratives as communicators and receivers meet and interact with one 
another, thus representing an excellent example of the interconnectedness of all three 
components of the narrative communication cycle.  
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While all three are discussed as part of this thesis, the main focus is on the projection and 
reception of strategic narratives concerning the EU’s security and defence policy. 
Furthermore, this study aims to contribute to the discussion of the concept of strategic 
narratives by focusing on individuals’ engagement in this process, assessing the extent to 
which their opinions and attitudes towards CSDP are shaped and how this might affect the 
implementation of the CSDP in return.  
When discussing strategic narratives, Roselle et al. distinguish between three different 
levels of narratives, all of which interlink and contribute to constructing an actor’s identity 
and creating an ‘imagined community’. These are context-specific narratives which are 
developed and reshaped continually.  
System narratives function at the macro level and serve to make sense of the world we live 
in and the system we envision to operate in. At the meso level, national (in the case of 
nation-states) identity narratives set out to explain what kind of actor a nation (or any other 
institution) is, how it interprets its past and envisions its future. Issue narratives work at the 
micro level by explaining the purpose and necessity of policies, thus providing solutions to 
common problems. All three narrative levels are discussed in the context of CSDP in more 
detail below.  
 
Applying the Concept of Strategic Narratives to CSDP Training 
Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin developed the concept of strategic narratives to assess 
narratives communicated through new media. However, it is used in this mixed methods 
study as a framework for assessing how the EU communicates international system 
narratives, identity narratives and policy narratives through the coordination of 
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standardised training for CSDP practitioners. Empirical research will include content 
analyses of two key policy documents, the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the recent 
Global Strategy for the EU (EUGS), interviews with elites involved in providing CSDP training, 
surveys with participants prior to training and interviews with trainees during/after 
residential training courses as well as observations from the training courses. The strategic 
narrative framework is operationalised in the same way across all the different research 
methods in order to achieve holistic and consistent findings. This is achieved through 
investigating the same theoretical constructs throughout the research process.  
Roselle et al.’s strategic narrative concept focuses on novel communication channels 
created by new media technologies which have the potential to provide platforms for 
altering power relationships (2014). Voices that previously went unheard and people who 
were previously unable to meet can now make use of these new tools to engage in narrative 
communication. The focus of this study is slightly different in that it adapts the concept of 
strategic narratives to CSDP training. While the EU has arguably little control over how its 
strategic narratives are filtered, mainly through national mass media channels, there is no 
doubt that through the creation of standardised training courses, the EU has also created a 
new platform for directly communicating its strategic narratives as well as enabling informal 
networking through exchanges and residential courses amongst CSDP practitioners.  
 
International System Narratives – New Security Threats and Security 
Priorities 
System narratives attempt to make sense of the world we live in and set out “what kind of 
order we want” (Miskimmon et al., 2011, p. 3). In the context of EU security and defence, 
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this is of particular interest as the EU is continually in the process of shaping its role as an 
international actor in a complex setting that combines supranational and intergovernmental 
decision-making. It is therefore crucial for the EU to outline its vision of the international 
system and to generate a common understanding of security and defence in Europe 
resulting in shared threat perceptions.  
The EU has released two key documents that try to establish such a narrative concerning the 
international system – the ESS in 2003 and the EUGS drafted in 2016. The Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy does not form part of this analysis for 
two reasons. While it would allow a more detailed tracing of the development of narratives 
over time, it has not been included due to constraints on the length of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the report does not form a key part of the training materials used during 
ESDC-run CSDP courses, making it less relevant for the analysis of narrative reception by 
training participants. The analysis of the two strategies forms a key part of this thesis and 
investigates how ideas of a multipolar and multilateral security environment, 
transatlanticism as well as the changing definition of security are projected and received. 
Special focus is therefore on the EU’s place in the international system, its vision of 
collaboration with other actors, and its overall role as a security provider. This means 
attention is given to what kind of narratives regarding world order are being communicated 
by the EU, but also what system narratives exist amongst study participants prior to CSDP 
training. As a result, the data collected may reveal whether clashes between differing 





(National) Identity Narratives - EU vs. National Identity  
National narratives are biographical identity narratives that put a state’s or organisation’s 
existence into context. By anchoring narratives in a common past, they purport seemingly 
naturally evolved values which are “intertwined with an envisioned space “(Roselle et al., 
2014, p. 76), thus providing recipients with common goals.   
In terms of identity narratives, this thesis explores the following ideas: is there a coherent 
European identity that is being communicated either by the EU itself or by the individual 
Member States? How is such a European identity defined? The extent to which distinctions 
are made between Bruter’s notions of civic and cultural pillars of European identity are 
investigated as well as Kantner’s differentiation between weak and strong European 
identity. A large number of scholars argue that national identities and European identity are 
not mutually exclusive, but do in fact correlate, meaning that those who have a strong sense 
of national identity are more likely to have a European identity (Mummendey and Waldzus, 
2004, Breakwell, 2004, Duchesne and Frognier, 1995, Risse, Bruter 2009).  
Yet, as discussed above and indicated by many Europe-wide surveys, national identity 
narratives remain one of the most successful tools to cohere large groups of people and 
thus still provide the primary point of identification for the majority of Europeans. Due to 
their emphasis on delineating the nation from ‘the other’, national identity narratives are 
the most likely to clash with European identity narratives which attempt to unite the 
national with ‘the other’. The situational aspect is especially relevant as most CSDP 
practitioners work to implement the EU’s security and defence policies on an 
intergovernmental basis, by representing their national governments, suggesting that their 
primary identification and allegiance may remain with their country. The aim here is not to 
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argue that European and national identity narratives are incompatible. Indeed, the view that 
identity is made up of various layers which can include identifying with one’s nation and 
Europe, seems robust. However, this thesis seeks to explore Barth’s argument that notions 
of identity are also very situation-specific (1969). While seemingly opposing narratives might 
be accepted by audiences as feasible, they may not elicit a complete change in 
behaviour/identification, but rather be employed only in certain circumstances. This begs 
the question as to whether CSDP practitioners develop a European identity in relation to 
their work on the CSDP that doesn’t permeate into other aspects of their live or if the 
opposite is the case and they have a European identity which does not affect their work as 
security practitioners.  
As well as potential clashes between European and national identity narratives, a number of 
other concepts need to be considered when investigating European identity narratives. The 
EU’s identity is closely tied to the EU Treaty documents, which claim that universal values 
such as peace, democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, etc., are ‘inherently European’ 
and thus unite all European citizens and provide a basis for creating a vision for a common 
European future. This idea of connecting Europe’s past to common goals is further 
illustrated by the notion of an ‘ever closer union’ as the best way of ensuring the prosperity 
of European citizens and being the most feasible approach to tackling global security 
threats. With regards to security and defence, this idea of integrating more and more policy 
areas is deeply rooted in recent European history as a shared European Defence Community 




Policy-Specific Narratives  
At the micro-level, Roselle et al. define issue narratives as providing context to actions taken 
by governments, and an attempt to convince audiences of the necessity to implement 
certain policies (2014, p. 76). Furthermore, issue narratives serve to “set out why a policy is 
needed (and normatively desirable) and how it will be successfully implemented” (ibid). This 
study thus focuses on narratives concerning the CSDP; such as the EU’s pursuit of a 
‘comprehensive approach’, which entails a blurring of the military-civilian dichotomy and 
the creation of a ‘European security culture’.  
 
 
The Importance of Socialisation 
It is crucial to look beyond the content of narratives and consider the impact of the 
environment in which they are projected on how they are received. Indeed, it is worth 
deliberating a statement by Michalski et al. remarking that “politics can create only the 
basic conditions for European unification” (2006, p. 98). This is further underlined by Cerutti 
who points out that it is “the attitude of the people (…) that determines if and which “idea 
of Europe’” will succeed (2008, p. 5). While a vision of European security and defence can 
easily be communicated through CSDP training, it is what the individuals make of it that 
determines whether a common security culture emerges and notions of a shared European 
identity develop.  Training courses coordinated by the ESDC are of a residential nature and 
devised to provide networking opportunities in addition to formal learning, thus 
encouraging individuals to interact transnationally and across the civilian-military divide. In 
line with findings from previous studies (mentioned above), Meyer argues that such 
interaction at EU level leads to socialisation processes (2005, p.  536), which shape the 
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identities and interests of actors (Checkel, 1999) through internalising norms and values and 
henceforth utilising them to “evaluate the appropriateness of an action” (March and Olsen, 
quoted in Cerutti and Lucarelli,2008, p. 27). This constructivist interpretation is frequently 
challenged by realist and neo-functionalist thinkers who argue that actors have fixed 
preferences and perceptions and thus only adapt their behaviour if they think it will help 
achieve their goals. Accordingly, any change in identification or loyalty is strategic rather 
than linked to a change of interests (Checkel, 2001, p. 561). Consequently, allegiance is 
governed by cost-benefit calculations and the potential of anything apart from strategic 
identification with the EU is dismissed as a result.  
Checkel’s approach to bridging the gap between the two opposing schools is particularly 
useful in this context.  He points out that a lot of “everyday interaction is about strategic 
exchange and self-interested behaviour” (1999, p.  546), both at organisational and 
individual level. Yet, to deny the impact of social learning on identity formation would be 
short-sighted, especially since research has provided extensive evidence that “discussion 
and persuasion within small groups consistently promote feelings of group identity” 
(Checkel, 2001, p. 563).  
This study assesses whether military and civilian staff display a mindset focused on cost-
benefit calculations determined by national interests or if a notion of a sense of community 
that goes beyond national borders is apparent and affecting the way in which individuals 




Conclusion to Chapter 4 
Reviewing existing literature on European identity has highlighted the complex nature of the 
concept and its many different interpretations and definitions. The extent to which a 
European identity is emerging and whether it is useful/required for the successful 
integration of security and defence is a highly debated topic which has gained new 
momentum with recent developments such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit and the refugee 
crisis. Focussing specifically on security practitioners provides a case study of individuals at 
the juncture between representing their country’s security policies and working on the 
implementation of a wider EU security and defence strategy. Some believe the latest rise in 
anti-EU sentiments in many EU Member States may mark the beginning of the end of the 
European integration project, or at least of further integration (see Serricchio et al. 2013; 
Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Hobolt 2015). This makes an assessment of individuals’ opinions 
FIGURE 2 - FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IDENTITY 




and views on the EU even more valuable as it contributes towards developing a prognosis 
for the future of security and defence in the EU.  
 
While no one theoretical concept can perfectly capture and explain the complex nature and 
construction of identity, this chapter has outlined how the concept of strategic narratives is 
a suitable vehicle for analysing the EU’s efforts at creating a sense of European identity 
amongst CSDP practitioners. Figure 2 above tries to capture these different concepts and 
processes. By focusing on the interplay between the projection and reception of strategic 
narratives, one acknowledges that the formation of identity is not merely a top-down 
phenomenon, but that individuals play a part in shaping identity through bottom-up 
processes, thus creating an ever-evolving loop between the formation, projection and 
reception of narratives and identities. Strategic narratives also reflect the fluidity of the 
concept of identity and the interconnectedness between different elements and layers 
which make up a person’s understanding of the world and their identification within it. This 
is achieved through the three levels of strategic narratives, providing an overall view of the 
world, a sense of identity and an understanding of how to best solve specific problems 
within this system. While it is important to note that all levels feed into each other and at 
times overlap, thus underlining its holistic approach, this thesis seeks to add another 
dimension to the strategic narrative framework by considering the specific role of 
standardised CSDP training courses as a platform for the communication of such narratives 
and subsequent construction of notions of European identity. The next chapter delineates 
the research design of this study and discusses the methods used for the collection of 
empirical data.  
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CHAPTER 5: Methodology and Methods  
 
Methodological Approach: Mixed Method Approach 
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical approach which informs this thesis and 
assumes that notions of European identity are shaped using strategic narratives. This thesis 
is thus based on a constructivist outlook which presupposes that knowledge is constructed 
and “social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social 
actors” (Bryman, 2003, p. 23). This view suggests that knowledge is not neutral, but always 
shaped by people and their interests. Furthermore, it implies that it is impossible for 
research to ‘discover the truth’. The focus on the individual who constructs meaning 
through social experiences and interactions suggests putting emphasis on a qualitative 
approach to data collection which hones in on individual attitudes and perceptions. Hence, a 
mixed methods approach was chosen for this study as combining qualitative and 
quantitative aspects delivers greater “breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration” (Creswell, et al., 2011, p. 123). Relying solely on qualitative methods would 
severely restrict the validity and comparability of data. Creswell further remarks that 
focusing on a small number of individuals in a qualitative manner results in a loss of 
generalisability, whereas examining a larger amount of people in a quantitative way on the 
other hand leads to a decreased understanding of the individual (2011, p. 8). As 
acknowledged above, no one research method is able to deliver perfect results or come 
close to ‘the truth’. By triangulating findings from both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods, a greater insight into the subject matter will be achieved that would not be 
obtainable through either method separately. As Tashakkori and Teddlie point out, this also 
“facilitates the complementarity and interpretation of data” (1998, p. ix). This is especially 
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important due to the way in which the theoretical framework is applied in this study – 
through looking at the same theoretical concepts across a number of different sources. 
Moreover, this strategy seeks to reduce the impact of bias on the part of the researcher. In 
order to gain a deeper understanding of how notions of identity are constructed and 
interpreted amongst individuals, this study employs a somewhat sequential research design 
which is explained in detail in Table 2 below.  
TABLE 2 – RESEARCH METHODS  
STRATEGY AIM SAMPLE TYPE OF QUESTIONS 
1 a) Content Analysis  Provide a first insight 
into narrative 
projection by the EU 




Strategy for the EU on 
Security and Defence 
Closed rating scale 
questions, and nominal 
data 
1 b) Expert semi-
structured interviews 
and observations 
Provide another angle 
with regards to the 
projection of strategic 
narratives, supplement 
findings from content 
analysis 
8 experts involved in 
the administration and 
delivery of ESDC 
training courses; 
Researcher’s 





2) Quantitative Online 
Survey 
Develop a snapshot of 
notions of identity 
amongst CSDP staff 
prior to participation in 
CSDP-related training 
195 Civilian and 
military staff of all 
levels of seniority 
participating in CSDP-
related training courses 




mainly closed questions 
and rating scale 
3) Qualitative semi-
structured interviews 
Obtain a detailed 
insight into notions of 
identity amongst CSDP 
staff and evaluate the 
reception of strategic 
narratives during 
training 
60 CSDP staff 




interview guide, open 
questions 
Source: Researcher’s own 
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Projection of Strategic Narratives 
Research Strategy and Rationale 
Primary data collection for this study consists of three components. In order to better 
understand which strategic narratives are communicated by the EU to CSDP practitioners, a 
content analysis of official strategy documents and training materials was carried out. These 
documents serve to guide decision-makers, but also provide crucial context for the practical 
implementation of security and defence policies by individuals at all levels. While such a 
content analysis draws out themes and concepts from key EU texts, it does not capture if 
and how these are discussed in practice. Findings from the content analysis are therefore 
supplemented by a small number of expert interviews with people who were directly 
involved in shaping discourse on EU security and defence policy during CSDP training 
courses as well as the researchers’ observations from CSDP training courses.  
 
Research Design - Content Analysis 
Numerous studies have been undertaken to determine the extent to which socialisation 
takes place amongst people working for the EU in Brussels (i.e. Davis Cross, 2011 and 
Howorth, 2014). However, the implementation of the CSDP occurs on an intergovernmental 
basis which means the majority of military staff involved in this process only collaborate 
with each other virtually or on an ad-hoc basis. However, the EU has identified the delivery 
of multinational CSDP-related training as a way of creating a common security culture. As 
Member States retain sovereignty over the delivery of military training, its viability as a 
platform for EU top-down socialisation is limited. Yet, those involved in providing the CSDP-
related training at a European level make use of a number of different tools to project their 
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vision for the EU onto European military personnel. One of these is through the use of 
official training documents and standardised curricula.  
Content analysis was chosen because it is a method that best accommodates a detailed and 
systematic deconstruction of the chosen documents (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 1). Stemler 
further defines the method as “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many 
words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Berelson, 
1952; Gao, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980; and Weber, 1990 quoted in Stemler, 2001, p. 1).  
Analysing the content of official ESDC materials will provide an insight into the EU’s goals 
vis-à-vis European security and defence collaboration and, more broadly, the EU’s own 
identity narrative. As content analysis focuses on the message itself rather than the 
communicator or the audience (Kassarjian, 1977, p.  9), it is a great tool for examining the 
projection of narratives. Honing in on this particular aspect of narrative communication will 
not only make it easier to juxtapose the projection and reception of narratives during the 
analysis, but also highlight the reciprocal relationship between the processes. Rather than 
making generalisations from these findings or drawing clear conclusions, the purpose of the 
content analysis is to provide a starting point for the comparison of narrative projection and 
reception.  
One key aspect of conducting content analysis is to ensure consistency with regards to 
coding. While this method is used in a qualitative manner in this study, it is vital that coding 
is transparent and uniform (Weber, 1990, p. 12) in order to avoid projecting one’s own 
views onto one’s findings. This is a valid concern and certainly represents a weakness of 
qualitative methods of research. This study uses the triangulation of a number of different 
research methods. Its aim is to facilitate a more holistic analysis that allows the 
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corroboration of findings and somewhat compensates for the individual research methods’ 
weaknesses.   
Due to the scope of this thesis, only a relatively small number of documents formed part of 
this content analysis. At first, it was foreseen to analyse the CSDP Handbooks published by 
the ESDC. There are three different handbooks – one general handbook, one for decision-
makers and one on missions and operations. These are provided (mostly electronically) to 
course participants as part of the training preparations and were thus considered a good 
source for analysing strategic narratives from the EU directly targeting CSDP practitioners. 
However, on closer examination, while small sections could have been used for content 
analysis, most of the handbooks’ content was factual as it contained information such as the 
organisation and functioning of relevant EU institutions and an overview of CSDP. It was 
however almost completely void of any material containing direct messages from the EU or 
on strategic direction. It was thus deemed unsuitable for detailed content analysis. This 
decision was further supported when it became obvious during observations that the 
handbooks did not play a noteworthy role during ESDC-coordinated training, thus 
weakening their importance in terms of strategic communication. The other key document 
that had been envisaged to form part of the content analysis was the ESS and the 
subsequent report on its implementation. The ESS featured frequently during training. 
Furthermore, with the new EUGS having been published subsequently (after the fieldwork 
was carried out), being able to compare the two documents and the development of 
strategy over time more than compensates for the unsuitability of the handbooks. Not only 
was the new Global Strategy discussed during some of the training courses, it is also 
substantially more detailed than the ESS, as it takes a broader approach to security, thus 





An analysis of the projection of strategic narratives formed a vital part of this study and 
while the content analysis of the two strategic documents (ESS and EUGS) made up the 
main part of this process, findings were supplemented by a small number of expert 
interviews and the researchers’ observations of the delivery of CSDP training courses.  
In total, eight expert interviews were conducted. In this case, the term ‘expert’ is taken to 
mean the following: any person that makes a significant contribution to the production of 
CSDP course content or its delivery. The number of interviews carried out do not claim any 
representative value, but they do provide a limited insight into the opinions and views of 
those who are tasked with communicating knowledge about EU security and defence to 
security practitioners.  While the scope of this thesis did not allow for a larger interview 
sample, it must be noted that these experts play a crucial role in the process of strategic 
communication. Key messages and information regarding CSDP are filtered down to 
practitioner level through their teaching, thus making them powerful projectors of the EU’s 
strategic narratives.  
In order to minimise any reluctance to voice opinions or views and to ensure responses are 
as open as possible during the interview process, the majority of these interviews were 
conducted anonymously. However, without violating any data protection or confidentiality, 
the expert sample can be described as follows: it is made up of current and former ESDC 
staff, as well as trainers from four European countries who are involved in the delivery of 
training courses coordinated by the College. These included high-ranking military staff, 
leading academics and EEAS staff. In addition to this, an interview was carried out with 
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Nathalie Tocci, Special Advisor to HR Mogherini who was a guest speaker at one of the 
courses and also one of the key individuals involved in drafting the 2016 Global Strategy.   
All interviews were conducted during the research period between September and 
November 2015 after approval was obtained from the University of Canterbury’s Human 
Ethics Committee. A total of only eight interviews was possible as it proved somewhat 
difficult to arrange and fit in these interviews in addition to the training participant 
interviews, especially as the experts often did not attend the whole course. Yet, the quality 
of interviews provides a satisfactory flavour of opinions from these communicators of EU 
strategic narratives and when triangulated with the content analysis and the researcher’s 
course observations constitutes a multifaceted analysis of the projection of narratives.  
 
Course Observations 
Course observations form another small part of the analysis of the EU’s projection of 
strategic narratives. In total, six different CSDP-related training courses were observed 
between September and November 2015. It has to be said that the role of the researcher 
during observations can at times be difficult as it can be near impossible to avoid researcher 
bias and ensure neutrality. With this in mind, the observations should be interpreted with 
caution and for what they are – one training participant’s experiences. It also has to be 
noted at this point that the researcher did not observe all parts of the training sessions. On a 
number of occasions, the training participants were split into groups to discuss certain 
security and defence-related scenarios and then present back to all participants while at 
other times they went on brief site visits. A few times course organisers encouraged some of 
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the interviews to be conducted during the training sessions. This meant that while the 
majority of sessions were observed, some had to be missed.  
The courses that formed part of this study were selected in order to cover a wide spectrum 
of content and target audiences. They ranged from courses aimed at new civilian and 
military staff, military officer training modules and senior CSDP staff training. In order to get 
a better idea of the extent to which course content was standardised, three CSDP 
Orientation Courses were chosen (all of which were hosted by different Member States). 
Furthermore, the European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers (EMILYO) 
Common Modules for officers-in-training were delivered by one military academy whereas 
the High-Level Course was the second module in a series hosted by four different Member 
States. This enabled the researcher to draw some comparisons between the many different 
courses coordinated by the ESDC and to gain a better understanding of how the courses are 
facilitated in practice.  
 
Reception of Strategic Narratives 
Research Strategy 
Communicating narratives is a two-way process. While it is crucial to investigate what and 
how strategic narratives are projected, it is just as important to examine how they are 
received by the target audience and what other processes might interfere with their 
adoption. An online survey with training participants prior to the course was carried out to 
capture existing views and attitudes amongst CSDP practitioners. This research method, 
while conducted on a relatively small scale with a sample of 195 respondents, forms the 
quantitative component of the study. By using mainly closed questions and scales, it allows 
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for direct comparisons of results. Furthermore, some of the questions (albeit slightly 
adapted) were taken from larger scale Europe-wide surveys such as Eurobarometer to allow 
situating the findings within a wider context.  
The main qualitative aspect of this study is made up of 60 semi-structured interviews with 
CSDP training participants. Conducting in-depth interviews with approximately 1/3 of the 
training participants surveyed previously enabled the researcher to ‘dig deeper’ regarding 
certain issues and investigate if and how narratives are received by individuals. These 
interviews were carried out during or after the CSDP training courses. As the researcher was 
present throughout the duration of the residential courses, she was not only able to 
interview participants in the training environment but was also able to observe training 
participants during informal sections of the course, such as break times and 
lunches/dinners. While these observations do not represent a standalone research method, 
they provide a further insight into the role of informal interaction during the strategic 
narrative communication process.  Surveying and interviewing the same group of people 
facilitated a more in-depth profiling of the participants and a more comprehensive analysis.  
 
Research Design – Online Surveys 
Using online surveys as a way of collecting empirical data is a popular research method and 
one that fits well with the overall survey design. As the purpose of the study is to investigate 
notions of identity amongst a specific group of professionals, using this method allows for a 
relatively large sample to be surveyed and their views and attitudes to be quantified. 
European identity is a very fluid concept that can be interpreted in many different ways. The 
online survey was selected to serve as a scoping tool for CSDP practitioners’ perceptions of 
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European identity, especially in the context of security and defence and also to situate their 
opinions within those of the wider European public.  
Conducting an online survey is not only the most economical research method; in terms of 
collecting and managing meaningful quantitative data, administering an online survey is also 
the most manageable form of data collection considering the scope and scale of this study. 
This research component aims to produce a dataset of 300 completed questionnaires which 
would represent approximately one quarter of training participants the ESDC reaches per 
year.  
Furthermore, despite being a relatively new research method, online surveys have a 
number of distinct advantages over face-to-face, telephone or postal surveys (Scully quoted 
in Kaina et al., 2015).  As Kaina et al. observe, being able to apply routing and filtering of 
questions to the questionnaire improves the respondent’s survey experience immensely by 
reducing frustration and completion times and therefore resulting in better completion 
rates. Furthermore, errors that occur during the transcription process and inconsistencies 
on behalf of the interviewer are eliminated (ibid, p. 205). Moreover, not only is the 
confidentiality of respondents ensured through secure online procedures, by administering 
the survey this way, sampling is not limited by geographic or time constraints. By securing 
endorsement from the ESDC itself, credibility and response rates were maximised. A direct 
link to the survey was placed on the online ESDC training portal (IDL), as well as an email 
sent out by the ESDC to all newly-registered staff asking them to complete the survey.  
In order to get a comprehensive insight into CSDP practitioners’ identifications, it was 
important to capture participants’ views and attitudes prior to the training. An online survey 
was used to obtain results that give an insight into the mind-set of young military officers. 
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The purpose of this research component was to inform and optimise interview questions, 
the main component of this study, but it also aimed to collect vital data that can situate the 
research within a wider academic field and enable comparisons with other studies on the 
military as well as notions of European identity. Furthermore, coherence across all research 
methods is paramount. This meant that the same theoretical framework that was applied to 
the content analysis was also employed for the development of survey questions.  
The survey had a number of objectives: one was to set the scene with regards to the group 
of people studied. This involved gathering statistical information such as nationality, 
rank/job within the armed forces, and time served within the military. This was 
complemented by data relating to knowledge of the CSDP and a stock-take of the amount of 
cross-national interaction/dealing with European matters occurring in the day-to-day 
routines of the target group.   
Focus was placed on capturing existing notions of identity amongst participants by covering 
different levels of identification such as a sense of belonging to the military, a region, 
nation-state or indeed a larger unit of reference such as Europe.  However, in order to 
corroborate these findings and to allow for comparison with a larger data set, which 
arguably more closely represented the ‘average European citizen’, some of the questions 
asked corresponded to identity-related questions that formed part of the large-scale 
Eurobarometer surveys as well as a study on European identity carried out by Bruter a 




Measuring European Identity 
Examining existing literature on identity formation has revealed conflicting opinions on 
whether budding allegiances to the EU also indicate the emergence of a European identity. 
Previous studies have illustrated the wide-ranging interpretation of the concept of 
‘European identity’, and also highlighted the need to further investigate how individuals 
interpret this concept.  Consequently, they have also shown how difficult it is to measure 
such a fluid idea.   
Bruter critically assesses the quantitative measurement of notions of European identity and 
points out that while there has been a significant amount of research into this matter, many 
of the survey questions represent “imprecise or inaccurate measures” (2008, p. 278). For 
instance, Eurobarometer was established in 1973 by the European Commission and 
Parliament in order to facilitate better understanding amongst Europeans (Eurobarometer 
Almanac 2013) and to track attitudes towards the European integration process. As some 
scholars have done, the surveys ask whether respondents perceive their country’s EU 
membership to be beneficial as a way to measure a sense of European identity.  
Bruter, however, argues that support for integration does not equal the existence of a 
European identity (ibid, p. 277). While support for European integration is certainly not 
sufficient proof of the existence of European identity, it represents one pillar of such an 
identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, support for the political institutions that 
represent one’s community can certainly be an expression of identification (see Easton 
1968). What Bruter shows however, is that investigating notions of identity requires 
detailed and varied questioning and cannot be measured with one variable alone.  
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Another problem with trying to measure identity is, what Burgess has coined its “language 
prison” – identity being something that is lived and dependent on context and not readily 
expressed through words (in Hermann et al., 2004).  This argument is often supported 
during surveys or interviews where participants are asked to define their identity and many 
struggle to do so. One way of trying to overcome this problem is by giving respondents pre-
defined options to select from. While this facilitates the evaluation of what identity means 
to individuals, it also contains bias towards certain interpretations of the term and thus 
represents another ‘prison’ that does not allow participants to express themselves freely.  
Bruter is not the only one to criticise the way identity is measured in Eurobarometer surveys 
(i.e. Kaina et al., 2015). While it is deemed useful to include the Eurobarometer questions in 
this study to allow direct comparisons between the ‘average European citizen’ surveyed 
through Eurobarometer and security providers, it is also crucial to supplement these with 
alternative measures.  
One of the key questions in the Eurobarometer survey, the so-called ‘Moreno question’: “In 
the near future, do you see yourself as – Nationality only, Nationality and European, 
European and Nationality, or European only” suggests there is a certain degree of friction 
between national and European identities (Bruter, 2008, p.  280). Moreover, it does not 
allow respondents to indicate they do not feel strongly about either and in fact might be 
more inclined to identify as a global citizen or have a dominant regional identity.  
There are numerous other problematic terms when it comes to the identity discourse used 
in studies. Bruter suggests that the use of the words “attachment” or “pride” instead of 
“identity” are equally problematic as those concepts are not the same and do not in fact 
yield the same empirical results (2008, p. 281). Furthermore, when asked about European 
114 
 
identity in general, respondents mainly refer to what Bruter calls “civic identity” rather than 
any cultural components (Bruter, 2009, p. 1512). 
In addition, studies have shown that European citizens first and foremost link ‘being 
European’ to borderlessness and free movement, and to the Euro (Bruter, 2005, and 
European Commission 2004). The European identity promoted by European elites referring 
to the European Union as a “peace machine” seems to be completely absent (Bruter, 2008, 
p.  283). These findings will be further explored in this study. 
For comparative reasons, this survey thus employs questions from both the Eurobarometer 
survey and Bruter's own study in addition to those specifically developed for this research. 
By triangulating questions in this way, it is hoped that their inevitable shortcomings are 
somewhat diminished, albeit being fully aware that no way of evaluating ideas of identity is 
without problems.  
 
Influences from Officer Role Conception Surveys 
Triangulating findings from conducting empirical research amongst military and civilian staff 
participating in CSDP training with those from Eurobarometer will provide a greater breadth 
of results. However, as there has not been a study regarding identity amongst CSDP 
practitioners themselves, it will also be useful to draw comparisons with a military role 
conception study carried out by Caforio and Nuciari (1994). One hypothesis of this study 
builds on the notion that, at least in the past, notions of identity amongst military personnel 
were inextricably linked to their profession. To establish the extent to which this is still the 
case today, opinions on the military and motivation for joining the armed forces was also 
collected. Civilian and military staff were asked slightly different questions about their job 
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motivation, but both sets of questions were inspired by the models developed during this 
study. On the one hand they test the validity and relevance of Caforio’s typification of 
military officers, on the other hand they enable a better assessment of the link between role 
conceptions amongst security personnel and their notions of identity.  
 
Structure of the Online Survey 
The structure of the online survey was carefully considered during the research design 
phase. Without a clear, fluid and easy-to-follow layout, the response rate would have been 
impacted negatively.  
As the theoretical framework for this study was developed using the concept of strategic 
narratives, it formed the starting point for all of the main research methods. With regards to 
the online survey this meant that only questions that clearly addressed one of the strategic 
narrative levels and their associated themes were included in the final survey. While a large 
number of questions were developed initially, a rigorous sifting process ensured the topics 
addressed were in line with the themes of the strategic framework. Doing this also made it 
easier to de-bulk the survey, cutting down the time it took to complete. As other studies 
have shown, the length it takes to complete a survey has a significant impact on a 
respondent’s likeliness to complete it in full (Kaina et al., 2015). The survey was initially 
envisaged to last thirty minutes, but after consulting with supervisors and colleagues, this 
was revised to between fifteen and twenty minutes. This shorter length was mainly 
achieved by streamlining the way questions were asked and by keeping open-ended 
questions to a minimum. This was also done as previous research has shown that having to 
type freely frequently decreases completion rates (see Knapp and Heidingsfelder in Reips et 
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al., 2001). While this limited the amount of detail respondents were able to provide, it 
delivered consistent and comparable data.  
Furthermore, by subsequently interviewing the online survey respondents, questions that 
had to be omitted at this stage or not asked in great detail could be addressed again during 
the semi-structured interview phase. The format of the survey also played an important role 
as presenting questions in a similar format helps to familiarise participants with the survey 
quickly, thus enabling them to navigate it more efficiently. This online survey was thus made 
up largely of multiple-choice questions, yes or no statements, sliding scales from one to five, 
and a small number of open-ended questions.  Sliding bars were chosen, as they require 
active input from respondents, which according to other research has been shown to 
achieve higher quality data as they pre-empt non-differentiation (Krosnick, 1999, p. 556).  
The full copy of the online survey can be found in Appendix 9. 
 
Online Survey Software 
This study employed the Qualtrics Online Survey Software to collect survey data. While 
other software such as Survey Monkey would have been adequate in terms of functionality 
and features, this software was chosen primarily because it is endorsed by the University of 
Canterbury. This meant that the survey templates already had the University’s logo 
embedded, thus giving the survey a professional and legitimate look. Moreover, the 
University also has a team dedicated to the administration of Qualtrics surveys which means 
if any problems or issues occur during the design or collection phase, expert support is 
readily available. Qualtrics is a sophisticated survey tool which enables researchers to 
choose from a large variety of question types and styles. It also features a routing function 
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which improves the design and ensures a smooth and streamlined survey experience 
tailored to different types of survey respondents, thus further increasing the likeliness of 
participation in and completion of the online survey (Maronick, 2009, p. 26) The experience 
of using Qualtrics during this research project was quite straight-forward and simple. A pilot 
survey was set up and tested before copying it across to the live survey platform.  
At the beginning of the survey, an information sheet and consent form were included to 
ensure that participants were aware of the purpose and ethical considerations of the study. 
As the survey mainly consisted of multiple choice and ranking questions, it took some 
testing in order to determine the most user-friendly and efficient way of presenting these. 
The format most commonly used was sliding scales and tick boxes. ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Prefer 
not to say’ options were included in all questions as well as the possibility to specify a 
response not listed through selecting ‘other’ where appropriate. In order to deliver 
consistent and comparable results, the survey was set up not to allow respondents to skip 
questions, but a progress bar kept participants informed about the length of the survey. On 
completion, respondents were once again asked to give consent to their survey being used 
in the study. Survey data was downloaded at regular intervals to prevent loss of data in case 
of software failure. This also meant that any anomalies or mistakes that may have been 
missed during the testing would likely be detected. Qualtrics enables users to download 
data in a number of different formats such as CSV and SPSS to cater for different types of 
subsequent data analysis.  
The software has a participant section where panels can be created, invited and monitored 
throughout the data collection. This would have been the ideal way of administering the 
survey as it allows the personalisation of invitations and enables the researcher to track 
responses. If participation is low, reminders can be sent out to participants. However, 
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despite the ESDC being willing to send an invitation email out to course participants, they 
were not ready to share participant data. This meant that a generic link was generated and 
then forwarded to course participants by the College instead. While this indirect invitation 
process and inability to send reminders may have had a negative impact on participants 
responding to the survey, this would have been somewhat offset by the invitation coming 
from a person that the course participants had previously corresponded with, making them 
more inclined to take part.   
No major problems occurred and due to the online accessibility of the survey software, data 
collection could be monitored throughout the research period. After the first ten interviews 
had been conducted, one question was added to the survey. While it was not ideal to do 
this after the survey had been launched, it was easy and did not cause any issues in terms of 
survey administration.  
 
Interviewing CSDP Training Participants 
Employing Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews form a core part of this study. This qualitative research method 
was chosen because research into individuals’ notions of identity requires a qualitative 
research element that enables study respondents to express their opinions as freely as 
possible without them having to modify these to fit pre-selected categories. Semi-structured 
interviews deliver in-depth findings (Collis and Hussey, 2003) by providing a more 
stimulating approach than merely conducting an online survey with respondents. 
Furthermore, this method also increases the likeliness of representing their actual attitudes 
more closely (Fowler, 2002, p. 91). A semi-structured style was chosen over an unstructured 
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method as the study focuses on a very specific, yet fluid concept, European identity, which 
is often interpreted in many different ways. If no structure was provided, the chances of 
gathering unusable data would increase and this would also make it more difficult to draw 
comparisons between respondents. On the other hand, not having a rigid interview 
structure and a set of unalterable questions provided the researcher with space for probing 
and going into more detail should the need arise. This was especially useful for course-
specific questions as well as current affairs events such as the refugee crisis and Paris terror 
attacks which had an impact on participants’ responses. Furthermore, it enabled the 
research to conduct interviews in the interviewee’s native tongue (German-speaking 
respondents were interviewed in German and interviews were translated by the 
researcher).  
Originally, a target was set of forty interviews lasting about thirty minutes each. In the end a 
total of sixty interviews were conducted during the three-month research period.  The two 
figures below (Figure 3 and 4) provide some basic information about the interviewees and 










FIGURE 3 - NATIONALITY OF INTERVIWEES  Source: Researcher’s own data 
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Overall staff were quite experienced with only 
14% having worked in the profession for less 
than 5 years. Furthermore, only ten interviewees 
were female. While this uneven distribution of 
attributes reflects the make-up of the courses 
and is therefore an interesting finding in itself, it 
also makes it difficult to draw comparisons 
between the different dichotomies. A larger 
sample would be required to do this.  
 
While the online survey focused on attitudes and 
opinions prior to participating in the CSDP 
training course, the purpose of the interviews is 
to explore notions of identity in greater detail, 
but most importantly, to assess the impact of the 
training and working on CSDP implementation on 
practitioners’ attitudes towards the EU and their 
notions of European identity. To avoid confusing 
opinion changes due to non-course related 
experiences as much as possible (although it is 
impossible to rule this out completely), focus 
was put on specifically asking questions 














Less than 1 year
Between 1 and 5 years
Between 5 and 10 years
More than 10 years
FIGURE 4 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
ABOUT INTERVIEWEES 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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and what they perceived the key messages of the course to be as well as what they 
personally found to be most - or least - useful about the course.  
The researcher had an important role to play. As discussed above, while some interviewees 
almost certainly associated the interviewer with the ESDC and thus may have adapted their 
responses accordingly (see Frith and Kitzinger, 1998), others saw her as a fellow course 
participant and were keen to exchange views on the training course. Having built a level of 
rapport with many of the participants throughout the residential courses meant that while 
interviewing became easier and more natural, it was at times also extremely difficult not to 
voice personal views which might steer respondents’ answers in a certain direction (Seale, 
1998, p. 127). 
 
Developing the Interview Guide 
It was crucial to develop an interview guide in preparation for the interviews. This consisted 
of questions and prompts during the interview process. However, while consistency across 
all sixty interviews was important, the phrasing of questions and the order they were asked 
in was somewhat flexible. Prompts for probing were useful and proved necessary especially 
when interviewing less experienced security practitioners. Having a relatively loose 
interview format facilitated a more natural and “pleasant” conversation which Converse and 
Schuman argue delivers good data (1974, p. 22). 
A number of set questions were drafted by using the theoretical framework developed 
around the concept of strategic narratives. While the focus of the content analysis was the 
projection of strategic narratives and the purpose of the online survey was to home in on 
pre-existing views and opinions, interviews were used to examine the reception of 
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narratives. Furthermore, they provided an opportunity to encourage respondents to 
elaborate on their notions of European identity and their understanding of CSDP. This 
meant that while there was some overlap between the survey and the interview, it was 
important not to duplicate questions so as to avoid response fatigue and ineffective data 
collection.   
Ideally, a small pilot study testing the interview guide would have taken place prior to the 
research period in order to optimise the questions and prompts. Unfortunately, this was not 
possible due to time and budget constraints around when the fieldwork could take place. 
This meant that the first six interviews served as a mini pilot during which the guide was 
slightly reformatted. This included some minor rephrasing of questions to make them easier 
to understand, adding some explanatory details as well as adding the question “What does 
Europe mean to you?”. This very open question was included because during the first few 
interviews it became evident that respondents often used EU and Europe interchangeably 
and this question tried to capture this seemingly fluid concept. Using such an open question 
tries to somewhat alleviate the “language prison” that the term identity finds itself in 
(Burgess in Hermann et.al, 2004). It also quickly became apparent that a certain order of 
questions seemed to work best in terms of making the interviewees feel comfortable and 
confident. A brief introduction to the order of questions was given by the researcher at the 
beginning of the interview: the first part of the interview was a review of the training course 
so far, followed by questions about the CSDP and the EU’s role as a security provider and 
finishing with ideas of personal identity (as a security provider and European identity). A 




The Logistics of Interviewing Security Practitioners 
Recruiting interviewees did not occur prior to the start of the different training courses. 
While this would have made the interview process more efficient, this would have also 
required more help from the ESDC in providing access to course participant data. At the 
beginning of each training course, the researcher and the study project were introduced to 
the group by the course organisers and participants were encouraged to volunteer their 
participation in the interview. The recruiting of interviewees then took place during early 
networking sessions and/or coffee and lunch breaks. All participants had previously 
completed the online survey, during which they were made aware of the next stage of the 
study. The timing of interviews varied from course to course. Some course organisers were 
happy for participants to briefly leave a session to be interviewed, whereas others insisted 
on interviews only occurring during break times. While the total number of interviews 
significantly exceeded the original target, numbers could have been maximised if 
interviewing had been allowed to take place during training sessions. At most venues, there 
was no separate room available in order to conduct the interviews, so most of the time a 
quiet corner had to be found instead. This sometimes meant that the quality of recordings 
suffered and could have been avoided if the room requirement had been indicated to the 
course organisers in advance.  
 
Data Analysis 
Framework for Analysing Data 
In order to achieve a robust triangulation of findings that increases validity and somewhat 
offsets the weaknesses of each research method, analysis of all types of data takes place 
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within the same analytical framework. This means that analysis of all research components 
is undertaken using the same theoretical constructs.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study uses the ‘strategic narrative’ framework 
developed by Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2013) and investigates the formation, 
projection and reception of strategic narratives during European CSDP training.  
While the matrix below provides a brief reminder of the theoretical constructs discussed in 
the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to explain how the different research techniques 
are employed to investigate the role of strategic narratives in shaping notions of identity 
amongst CSDP personnel.   
In order to achieve a coherent and comprehensive analysis, a coding framework was 
developed and applied to all types of data. This coding scheme translates the main 
components of Miskimmon et al.’s strategic narrative framework into the specific context of 
this study. The three different levels of narratives, system, identity and policy- specific were 
investigated during the early stages of the project. Considering the development of the EU’s 
CSDP informed the research process regarding the formation of the EU’s security and 
defence narratives and served as a starting point for studying the EU’s over-arching system 
narratives whereas the literature review discussed the complex nature of (European) 
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identity. The focus on the EU’s external and internal role and identity produced a 
preliminary coding framework (see Figure 5 below).  
 
This initial scheme was then used to carry out a content analysis of the two key strategic 
documents – the ESS and the EUGS. This process refined and advanced the original coding 
matrix by putting emphasis on establishing categories and sub-themes that covered all 
aspects of the strategic narratives communication process, whilst remaining succinct and 
simple in order to streamline the analysis of all types of data. On completion of the content 
analysis, the final coding framework was developed and employed to develop the survey 





threats and world 





















CSDP = pooling and 
sharing of resources
Projection of policies 
internationally




It uses the three levels of narrative as suggested by Roselle et al. (2013) and combines the 
key narratives found in the two security strategies with the knowledge gained from the 
theoretical explorations carried out in Chapters 3. As a result, an additional component was 
added to the three-level model of strategic narrative. As this thesis is concerned with how 
individuals receive the EU’s strategic narratives, it recognises that personal narratives may 
affect this process. In order to determine whether this is the case, practitioners’ experiences 
of Europe and the EU as well as their professional experiences need to be investigated.  
This framework was then also used to code results from the online survey and semi-
structured interviews with security practitioners as well as the expert interviews. While the 
coding themes developed during the content analysis were largely adequate for coding the 
interviews, a small number of additions had to be made. These consisted of coding for 
current affairs issues brought up in relation to CSDP and European identity as well as codes 
covering the participants’ evaluations of the CSDP courses.  
Personal narratives: Experiences in European environment, personal understanding 
of security and defence, job motivation, (course experiences) 
The EU in the 
International System
•Status Quo of security 
environment
•Credibility as a security 
actor










•Concepts of European 
identity




•View on European 
integration
•Impact of recent crises on 
European identity
Working on CSDP 
•Common security culture
•Comprehensive approach
•Future of security and 
defence in Europe
•National vs. European 
interests
•Role and purpose of CSDP
Source: Researcher’s own  FIGURE 6 - FINAL CODING FRAMEWORK 
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Using NVivo for Qualitative Data Analysis 
Once interview data had been collected and transcribed, it was crucial to find a reliable 
software that would not only store the data but would also serve as a coding and analysis 
tool. For this purpose, NVivo 11 Pro was chosen. NVivo allows the user to import files, 
develop codes (or ‘nodes’) and apply these and then enables the researcher to access the 
coded data and manipulate it as appropriate for analysis. Furthermore, it also has some 
basic analysis tools which can generate word frequencies, charts and other data 
visualisations. After completing a training course on using NVivo for qualitative data 
analysis, the researcher felt confident enough to make use of the various features and tools 
provided through the software.  
Creating the research project in NVivo was quite straight-forward as a coding scheme had 
been developed previously and merely needed setting up.  Furthermore, participant 
‘classifications’ such as gender, nationality, years of work experience, etc. were added in 
order to enable a detailed and differentiated analysis. Once all transcriptions had been 
imported, the first round of coding was carried out. The purpose of this was to establish 
whether the coding theme would work for the interview data and to get first impression of 
emerging themes and ideas. A more thorough and targeted second round of coding 
followed. A separate ‘useful quotes’ code was added. This would prove very beneficial in the 
analysis and discussion of interview data as it provided quick access to memorable passages. 
As the same coding scheme was applied to all types of primary data, it soon became 
apparent that NVivo was also suitable for conducting the content analysis which had 
previously been started using a paper-based coding system. Moreover, data collected during 
the literature review was also imported into the software and coded into the scheme. This 
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allowed not only the triangulation of all types of empirical data collected, but also enabled 
the incorporation of secondary data, thus facilitating a holistic analysis of the subject. Using 
a software like NVivo made the analysis of a relatively large amount of qualitative data 
much more manageable and also had a major impact on the overall management of data.   
 
Obtaining Ethical Approval  
Ethical considerations were a vital part of the fieldwork preparations. Any research involving 
human subjects is required to be reviewed by the Human Ethics Committee at the 
University of Canterbury. While the approval application process is fairly straightforward, it 
was important to get the process under way well in advance of the data collection phase. 
This is because on the one hand, it can take time for the Committee to review the 
application and request for changes to be made in order to comply with regulations. On the 
other hand, while the ESDC did not require a separate ethical approval, the University’s 
approval had to be in place before sending documentation off to the ESDC’s Academic 
Board and Steering Committee.  
In the application form, the researcher had to outline the purpose and different research 
components of the study as well as provide the online survey questions and interview guide. 
Furthermore, a detailed description of the subjects and the sampling process was required. 
This also involved drafting study information sheets and consent forms for the different 




Data Protection and Storage 
A key aspect of the application was the treatment of participant data and confidentiality. 
After choosing the research methods and designing the questions/guide, it became 
apparent that it would be ideal to select interview participants from the pool of online 
survey respondents. This would allow for the two data sources to be combined, thus 
providing a more holistic and detailed insight into participants’ views and attitudes. After 
developing the research strategy and becoming familiar with ethical regulations, it was 
decided that data could be discussed whilst maintaining participants’ anonymity. Reassuring 
participants that their responses would be treated confidentially, and that no identifying 
data would be published also facilitated their participation. Interview data would be stored 
on a password-protected hard drive, accessible only to the researcher, and the only 
identifying feature collected during the online survey would be the email address that 
participants provided on a voluntary basis. De-identification was then carried out according 
to Human Ethics Committee guidelines: participants were allocated a code on the consent 
form which was then used on transcripts and any other data. Interview participants' 
identifying data was stored separately from the de-identified survey data. It was clearly laid 
out that no identifying data would be used in the written analysis and discussion of data (in 
the form of a PhD thesis or any resulting articles). 
 
Focusing on CSDP Training Courses 
Scholars frequently refer to the role of education and training in shaping notions of identity 
(see Anderson, 2006, and Billig, 1995). Furthermore, the formal setting of a training 
environment (the residential training courses were mainly delivered in a lecture-style) is a 
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unique situation in which information and messages are communicated directly to a target 
audience: “The formation and transmission of group standards, values, attitudes and skills 
are accomplished largely by means of verbal communication” (Cartwright quoted in 
Kassarjian, 1977, p.  8). This makes it an ideal scenario for examining the projection of 
narratives. In addition, the informal interactions that occur around the training sessions 
represent another vital aspect of the communication process as the course participants are 
able to digest the information they have received through networking and exchanging ideas 
with colleagues, thus also potentially shaping narratives at the practitioner level. Moreover, 
conducting this study with subjects participating in the same (or similar) courses makes it 
easier to relate their experiences and views to one another.  
CSDP training courses coordinated by the ESDC merely represent one platform for the 
projection of strategic narratives in the EU security and defence context. This study could 
have been carried out in many different contexts such as amongst CSDP practitioners 
working in a certain role in the different Member States, or amongst staff in the EU Military 
Staff. However, as the implementation of the CSDP is focused on utilising a comprehensive 
approach and depends on intergovernmental cooperation, gathering data from civilian and 
military staff from Member States as well as EU institutions formed a vital part of this 
research. The training courses brought together such a cross-section of people and due to 
the course contents also attracted staff from all career stages, stretching from officer cadets 
and junior civil servants to very senior mission leaders. While conducting research with such 
a variety of people cannot provide any generalisable findings, it offers an insight into 
notions of identity amongst a wide cross-section of CSDP practitioners.  
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Albeit representing a somewhat artificial and unusual situation for CSDP practitioners, ESDC-
coordinated training courses were also chosen as the focus of this study for practical 
reasons. Due to the scope of this thesis and the associated financial and time constraints, it 
was crucial to select a scenario that facilitated access to a large sample within a small time 
frame. Thanks to a travel grant, the researcher was able to schedule a three-month data 
collection phase in Europe.  
This research sets out to achieve two objectives: The first is to establish the extent to which 
personnel implementing the CSDP represent a unique group of Europeans with distinct 
identifications, potentially similar to elite epistemic communities, or if rather they largely 
resemble the ‘average European citizen’. Secondly, a juxtaposition with findings from a 
study of role conceptions among military personnel will enable an evaluation of the current 
relationship between role understanding and identity amongst security providers. This 
triangulated approach will thus help verify the findings of this study and add another 
dimension to their interpretation (Bryman, A., 2006).  
 
Working with the European Security and Defence College 
As this study is concerned with investigating notions of European identity amongst a specific 
group of individuals, CSDP practitioners, gaining access to this target group formed a crucial 
part of organising the collection of primary data. Research into CSDP courses soon 
established that the ESDC based in Brussels was responsible for coordinating a significant 
number of EU-wide trainings and approaching the College would be the best mechanism for 
gaining access. Email exchanges with the ESDC quickly revealed that the staff there were in 
favour of the proposal and willing to support the study. However, as the College is a virtual 
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network with an Academic Board and Steering Committee made up of representatives from 
all the Member States approval had to be sought from all parties before the ESDC could 
endorse the research. Information and consent letters which had been drafted during the 
Ethical Approval process were sent to the members of the ESDC together with a concise 
research proposal and research strategy outlining the different stages of the project and 
what access was sought. These documents can be found in Appendices 1 to 2. Furthermore, 
confidentiality and privacy considerations were laid out in line with University of Canterbury 
ethical regulations. Once these had been considered by the two governing parties, the 
researcher was asked to present the study at their respective meetings in Brussels. Approval 
to conduct the research at ESDC-coordinated training courses was then subsequently 
granted by the Academic Board and Steering Committee.  
Endorsement of the study by the ESDC meant that the College staff would send out a survey 
invitation which included the relevant study information sheets to participants prior to most 
courses taking place between September 2015 and April 2016 (some courses were deemed 
unsuitable, such as ones put on for non-Europeans and were hence not included). The 
researcher was able to observe six different training courses which took place between 
September 2015 and November 2015 free of charge and was given the opportunity to give a 
short presentation about the project to participants at the beginning of each course and 
invite them to take part in an interview.  
Whereas providing an incentive, such as a voucher or prize draw, for participating in the 
study was initially considered, the support and endorsement from the College was enough 
to encourage individuals to take part in the online survey and subsequent interviews. The 
course coordinators also went out of their way to facilitate the study through offering free 
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accommodation and free or heavily subsidised meals during the training courses. This 
hugely facilitated the logistical aspects of the study. While conducting the research would 
not have been possible without the ESDC, due to their exceptional support, the data 
collection exceeded initial expectations.  
 
The Role of the Researcher 
The researcher has an important role during the data collection process. As Neuendorf 
points out, any human inquiry is essentially subjective (2002, p.  11). Despite trying to 
adhere to Durkheim’s principle of attempting to abandon all preconceptions (quoted in 
Seale, 1998, p.  254), researcher bias can never be completely overcome when conducting 
empirical research. In addition to bias on the part of the researcher, potential bias from 
study participants needs to be taken into account.  While obtaining approval and support 
from the ESDC had a substantial impact on gaining access to interview and survey 
participants and far outweighed any drawbacks, cooperating closely with the ‘projector of 
strategic narratives’ may have had a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of the 
study and the researcher herself.  
Although it was clearly stated in all information materials and consent forms that the 
research was completely independent from the ESDC, there is the possibility that course 
participants might at times have been under the impression that the study was being carried 
out on behalf of the College.  For example, the ESDC carries out its own course evaluations 
by asking participants to provide feedback on courses through an online survey. In this 
study, an assessment of the course and its impacts was also conducted during the 
interviews and due to the connection to the College, the researcher might have been 
134 
 
perceived as ‘part of the College’ or working for or on behalf of the College, when in reality 
the study was conducted completely independently and without any input from the College.  
Reflecting especially on the interview process, it appears that this perceived association had, 
at times, two main outcomes. One was that a small number of interviewees seemed to 
discuss the ESDC’s course in an extremely positive light, especially in comparison with other 
course participants’ opinions. The second was that the researcher’s position was interpreted 
as being a special intermediary between the participants and the course coordinators. To a 
certain extent, interviews were thus used to extensively elaborate on the quality of the 
course and feedback on the College’s activities. While a good level of reflection on the 
course was certainly envisaged, at times this had to be managed carefully to keep the 
interview on course and within scope.  
It is important to be aware of the possible impact that inferences such as these will have 
had on the responses given by course participants and to acknowledge that due to the 
researchers’ role, it is impossible to claim that course evaluations are free of bias and 
provide completely independently authentic views.  
The role of the researcher became evident on a number of other occasions too and raised 
some ethical concerns. For example, while it was certainly confirmed that participation in 
the online survey would be aided by personally meeting potential survey respondents and 
them being able to ‘put a face to the name’, on a number of occasions this was taken to an 
uncomfortable level when comments were made that participation in the interviews would 
occur due to the researcher’s nice appearance. On these occasions, which often took place 
in very male-dominated settings, the researcher became very aware of her role and how her 
own position might influence data collection. While it had been anticipated that a majority 
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of study participants would be male, this did not influence the selection of research 
methods. Yet, data collection was made somewhat uncomfortable at times due to these 
comments and highlighted the role of gender (bias) in this process. Furthermore, it alerted 
the researcher to carefully consider the potential impact of gender when choosing future 
research methodologies.  
 
Reliability of Findings and Limitations 
It is important to discuss the impact of this study in terms of weaknesses and limitations of 
research methods and the reliability of findings. While this study does not seek to provide 
findings that are widely generalisable due to its methodological approach and choice of 
research methods, it has endeavoured to gather reliable data by using robust and consistent 
data collection techniques. The biggest factor in ensuring the quality of findings, however, 
was the adoption of a mixed methods approach itself. When conducting qualitative 
research, it is almost impossible to avoid personal interpretations and researcher bias 
whereas quantitative methods restrict one’s ability to home in on individuals. This is why a 
mixed method approach, combining qualitative and quantitative aspects was deemed the 
most appropriate. As highlighted above, the combination of different research methods 
somewhat compensated for the weaknesses of individual methods and the relatively small 
scale of this study and the resulting sample sizes.  
Apart from the method-related limitations, there were a number of other factors which 
influenced findings. Firstly, the presumed nature of European identity, constantly evolving 
and being (re-)constructed means that it is also shaped by current events. Around the time 
of the fieldwork period towards the end of 2015, the aftermath of the financial crisis as well 
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as the refugee crisis all seemed to impact on participants’ perceptions of Europe/the EU. 
Had the research been carried out in the wake of Brexit, for example, findings might have 
been very different. The study can therefore only ever be a snapshot of notions of European 
identity at a given time. It is also important to stress that CSDP practitioners merely 
represent one specific group of people actively involved in implementing EU policy. They are 
quite distinct as they are a non-homogenous sample that combined national civil servants 
and military personnel as well as EU staff. While this makes for an interesting case study, it 
is also impossible to draw generalisations from any of the findings to other groups such as 
staff employed directly by the EU, or national civil servants/military.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 5 
This chapter has set out which research methods have been used to collect empirical data 
for this study and why they were chosen. Furthermore, it has highlighted the logistical 
matters that accompanied the data collection and analysis stages and outlined the 
application of the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter. Elucidating 
issues such as working with the ESDC, the organisation and setting of interviews as well as 
the software used to collect, and code data will provide valuable context and background 
information for the analysis of primary data in the following chapters. Furthermore, by 
critically evaluating the research approach, this chapter has laid out ways in which future 





CHAPTER 6: The Formation of European Security and Defence 
Narratives  
 
“Narratives take actors from one status quo to another” (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 7). 
CSDP-related strategic narratives play a crucial role in trying to convince security 
practitioners of the need to cooperate on the integration of European security and defence. 
As Freedman argues, narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring 
the responses of others to developing events (quoted in ibid, p.  3) and those who shape 
them seek, in the short term, to "extend their influence, manage expectations and change 
the discursive environments in which they operate" (ibid, p.  2). Miskimmon et al. further 
argue that "in the long term, getting others […] to buy into your strategic narrative can 
shape their interests, their identity, and their understanding of how international relations 
works and where it is heading (ibid, p.  3).  
While the focus of this study is on investigating if and how these narratives become 
persuasive and develop into a sense-making framework that nurtures a European 
integration identity amongst practitioners, it is also vital to consider their formation. By 
examining how security and defence-related narratives are formed and considering the 
actors involved in shaping them, this chapter seeks to capture the intention and vision of EU 
security policymakers. It does so by investigating two key types of communication: 
1) Drafting of the ESS and EUGS - tracing the processes that led to the drafting of the 
ESS and the EUGS is an important component of analysing the formation of strategic 
narratives regarding European security and defence. This includes considering the 
context in which they were composed as well as their original purpose. This analysis 
is informed by an interview conducted with Natalie Tocci, Special Adviser to EU High 
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Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
European Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini and was in charge of coordinating 
the drafting of the EUGS.  
2) The work of the ESDC – the College is tasked with coordinating EU-wide training on 
CSDP matters and thus makes a significant contribution to the formation of strategic 
narratives by compiling standardised curricula. As a training coordinator it also plays 
a vital role in the projection of these narratives. Examining the structure and work of 
the ESDC is supplemented by a number of expert interviews with individuals in 
charge of coordinating the College’s training activities and some of the trainers 
involved in their delivery.  
 
The Role of the ESS and EUGS in Forming CSDP-Related Strategic 
Narratives 
The European Security Strategy 
While there are numerous official documents that could serve as points of analysis for the 
CSDP, the two security strategies were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, their principal aim is 
to outline the EU’s vision of security and defence and also represent a key aspect of the 
work of the HR/VP, which is to develop strategy through consultation with Member States. 
As Tocci points out, “strategy-making is an identity-building exercise” (2017, p.  17), thus 
making the two documents particularly relevant to the investigation of an emerging 
European integration identity. Secondly, as this thesis is concerned with the views and 
attitudes of security practitioners at all levels rather than strategy experts, they are most 
likely to be familiar with these two key documents rather than less visible strategy outputs 
(such as the ESS Implementation Report in 2008 or the Strategic Review in 2015).  
139 
 
However, as the EUGS was published after data collection took place, it is not possible to 
assess the impact of its strategic narratives on the security practitioners who participated in 
this research. Despite this, it forms an important aspect of this thesis for two reasons. 
Firstly, comparing the two strategies in terms of narratives provides a vital insight into how 
the EU’s vision of European security and defence has developed since 2003 and how the 
identity it communicates has evolved. Secondly, including the EUGS in this thesis underlines 
the interconnectedness of the reception, formation and projection of narratives.  While the 
impact of the EUGS’ narratives cannot be investigated, the extent to which security 
practitioners’ views and attitudes are reflected in the EUGS can be considered. This aspect is 
evidenced by the comprehensive consultation phase that preceded the publication of the 
EUGS and included Tocci attending one of the CSDP training courses not only to inform 
practitioners about the latest developments in the drafting process, but to use the course as 
a platform for consulting with them, thus contributing to the formation of EU strategic 
narratives.  
The focus of this chapter is therefore on the drafting process of the strategies while the 
subsequent chapter looks at the projection of narratives communicated through these 
documents in more detail.  
The drafting of the ESS was a European ground-breaking event with regards to the 
formation of security and defence-related strategic narratives. For the first time, the EU 
spelt out its vision for security cooperation in Europe, producing a document to facilitate the 
creation of an external European security identity, as well as a framework designed to 
persuade Member States of the necessity to cooperate and integrate security and defence 
matters. While the ESDP had been adopted a few years prior to its drafting, progress on its 
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implementation was affected by the aftermath of 9/11 and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’. 
These events caused a significant rift amongst Member States with regards to engaging 
militarily in the Middle East,  once again highlighting some Member States’ preference of 
transatlantic allegiance over European integration (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 54). It 
was at this point that the EU tasked Javier Solana, the then High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, with the creation of a strategy document for the EU 
that would try to overcome recent divisions over how to respond to security crises. 
Furthermore, it was deemed to be a necessary response to the NSS published by the Bush 
administration in the United States (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Posen 2006; Jones 2007).  
The drafting process was quite swift and involved setting up a small team of experts who 
were charged with putting together an initial draft document which was presented to the 
European Council in June 2003. Six months of consultation followed during which seminars 
in various European capitals were convened, as well as consultations with the Political and 
Security Committee held, before it was formally adopted by the Council at the end of 2003 
(Tocci, 2016, p. 462).  
Emphasis was placed on juxtaposing the EU’s approach to that of the US by stressing the 
EU’s view of military intervention being a last resort, only to be used in conjunction with 
other ‘peaceful’ means such as political, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic measures 
(Bailes, 2008, p. 118). 
In addition to situating the EU's approach to security and defence in a wider, international 
context, the ESS also had an internal purpose. As the EU had never been a military power in 
its own right, and many Member States continued to be reluctant to engage militarily 
through the EU (Meyer, 2005, p. 538/9), strong emphasis was placed on the EU's 'normative 
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power'. One of the strategy's key narratives was thus centred around the idea that "the 
European perspective offers […] an incentive for reform" (Council of the European Union, 
2003) resulting in other countries wanting to emulate the EU's values and ways of acting on 
the international stage. Working towards a world order that is made up of "well-governed, 
democratic states" (ibid, p. 10) by employing its "full spectrum of instruments" (ibid) was 
thus a vision in line with but progressing from the EU's non-military role as it indicated the 
EU’s willingness to use force. A detailed look at how the EU attempted to project this 
'normative power' narrative is undertaken in the next chapter.  
As Miskimmon et al. point out, "the parameters of [the EU]'s strategic narratives are 
bounded by prevailing domestic and international understandings and expectations of [the 
EU], its history and evaluations of its reputation" (2014, p. 8). In this case, that means many, 
at times conflicting, interpretations of its role, especially with regards to security and 
defence co-exist. However, narratives also create a vision of the future and the ESS sought 
to shift the EU's role towards becoming a more comprehensive international actor by 
emphasising its responsibility in dealing with emerging security threats. Whereas the EU had 
previously tried to avoid using the term threat, this new policy document specifically set out 
to respond to new security threats (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 54). The EU's ambition 
to become a more active security actor was accompanied by a perceived need to develop 
greater internal cohesion through the creation of common threat perceptions and a 
common security culture.  
While the ESS reflects the EU's short-term security goals and the environment it was written 
in, the drafting process itself made it difficult to generate a shared vision for European 
security and defence. Despite its official adoption by the European Council, the formation of 
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narratives within the ESS was largely carried out by a small working group.  The EU's focus 
was on the swift production of a security strategy, thus missing out on potential long-term 
'buy-in' from Member States that could have been fostered by a more thorough 
consultation process. 
 
Shaping a New Narrative for the EU in the EUGS - an Interview with Natalie 
Tocci, Special Advisor to HR/VP Mogherini  
As part of a number of interviews with experts involved in the process of shaping EU 
security and defence narratives, an interview was conducted with Natalie Tocci, special 
advisor to HR/VP Mogherini. The interview took place in November 2015, some seven 
months before the EUGS was published. The purpose of this interview was to gain insight 
into the ongoing drafting process and to learn more about how this new strategy document 
related to the ESS. The interview also helped to trace the EUGS’ impact on the notion of a 
common security culture and the idea of a European identity.  
Tocci highlighted a few key aspects that shaped the drafting process. She believed that 
security narratives had changed greatly since the drafting of the ESS in 2003 and considered 
the then current security climate as a “slightly schizophrenic moment” (personal interview, 
2015). She explained that “we are living through a time of renationalisation of foreign 
policy” in which a “purely national narrative of closure” is emerging because “we don’t 
really like the direction the world is going in, therefore we need to close up”. She went on to 
argue that: 
It’s not only a renationalisation of foreign policy, but also a shift away from foreign 
policy decision making by foreign ministries which have generally been the ones who 
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have been engaged in long term, strategic thinking as opposed to chanceries and 
Heads of State and Government. And those trends are leading to a great amount of 
division. That trend is undeniable.  
However, Tocci also observed a trend in the other direction - a reaction to the emergence of 
new and complex security crises - and remarked:  
You have this growing awareness that because of the kind of challenges we are 
facing, because the world is changing basically, there is very little that governments 
can achieve by acting on their own. We have a growing appreciation of that. The 
general sense of feeling how important it is to stick together is more strongly felt 
today than it was, say 10 years ago”. (ibid)   
She further illustrated how these competing security narratives affected the EUGS drafting 
process by revealing that certain countries wanted a strategy that “remains tilting towards 
the vision/abstract, less operational and not too chest-beating about defence issues”. On 
the other hand, there were countries that “want exactly the opposite. They want something 
operational - something hard-nosed about defence issues” (ibid).  
In addition to a growing awareness of the need for greater cooperation as well as an 
opposing trend towards the “renationalisation of foreign policy”, Tocci believed that one of 
the main differences between the ESS and the EUGS was the way in which the EU sought to 
engage with the rest of the world. The ESS had a strong emphasis on the EU as an exporter 
of norms and values. It was “premised on the idea that the world was going in our direction, 
and it was up to us to shape the world, […] to remake the world in our image”. She was 
adamant that if this narrative hadn’t disappeared already, it had to go because it was simply 
“no longer an option”. Instead she suggested that the EUGS needed to recognise that it was 
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not about striving towards “a world looking like us, not assuming that we have the solutions 
to every problem or assuming that we know better than others”. Instead, she argued, the 
EUGS was about “reformulating what European engagement is going to look like”.  
As a result, she noted that the EUGS starts with “interests, not threats, and then goals. The 
goals reflect the risks, but also the opportunities. […] We want to tackle the ‘how’ question, 
not only the ‘what’ question” (ibid). While the ESS was excellent at talking about vision, 
Tocci pointed out that “we don’t have the luxury of just doing the vision thing we had in 
2003. The world is such a mess. It’s simply about protecting who we are, not imposing it on 
others”.  
Tocci also referred to the very different approach taken to drafting the EUGS. As opposed to 
the ESS (which, as already mentioned, was written by a relatively small group of 
practitioners in a matter of months), the drafting of the EUGS was preceded by a strategic 
reflection exercise which the NCRE contributed to with its research project “EU Perceptions 
in 10 Strategic Partners: Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU’s Politics Abroad”.  The 
exercise was carried out because at the time “there was no consensus to engage in a new 
strategy. That consensus had to be constructed”. Furthermore, in a separate article she 
stated that “if one of the basic purposes of the EUGS was to forge a common narrative on 
foreign and security policy among Europeans, it could not be a strategy cooked up in a room 
by one or two people. It had to be the product of a collective effort” (2016, p. 465). Such an 
inclusive approach was also more likely to result in increased support for the Strategy (ibid, 
p. 466).  Thus, the drafting process involved engagement with the wider community, 
including outreach and consultation with national parliaments, think tanks and academics. 
While many people took an interest and proactively made proposals and organised 
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meetings, Tocci pointed out that it proved difficult to move “beyond the usual suspects. […] 
It’s already difficult to engage with citizens from the national level, let alone the European 
level”. Despite these difficulties she believed “the public does actually look to the European 
level for answers. It’s as if the public understands that certain answers cannot be found at 
national level. You can argue that Europeans expect this from Europe”. 
When asked about the notion of a common European security culture amongst security 
practitioners, she argued that this was a “shared definition of what the goals of European 
foreign policy are and an understanding that it is only at the European level that most of 
these things can be achieved”. Tocci linked this to: 
A sense that the national interest is distinct from the European interest but cannot 
be achieved without the European level. It’s not about subsuming the national into 
the European, but sort of appreciation, which is cultural in a sense, that one cannot 
be achieved without the other.  
This focus on interests was also reflected in her interpretation of the idea of a European 
identity amongst security practitioners. She believed such an identity existed, but on a 
“completely different level from the national one. It’s not really about a deeply shared sense 
of common belonging. It’s more of an interest-driven identity; there is a growing sense that 
there needs to be a shared sense of direction”.  
Tocci’s realist definition of European identity suggests that, at least in the context of security 
and defence, an identification with Europe based on interests is sufficient in order to 
increase cooperation and integration. While no concrete plans had been made for 
communicating the strategy to practitioners at the time of interview, the decision to involve 
a large variety of stakeholders in the drafting process indicates that ‘buy-in’ and 
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identification with the strategy from all levels was sought from the beginning. In fact, the 
interviewer first met Tocci at an ESDC training course where she presented the latest 
developments to security practitioners and informed them how they could continue to 
engage with the process, thus trying to generate 'buy-in' from the beginning and at grass-
roots levels.  
The European Security and Defence College – Shaping EU Security and 
Defence Thinking?  
Having examined the formation of strategic narratives through the drafting of the ESS and 
the EUGS, this study also focuses on the role of the ESDC in shaping and most importantly 
projecting these narratives to European security practitioners.  
While the ESDC’s main purpose is the communication of a shared understanding of 
European security and defence, it certainly plays a significant role in shaping narratives.  In 
2005, the ESDC was created to provide a platform for strategic-level training and education 
on European Security and Defence matters, thus corresponding to the changing dynamics of 
security provision in Europe. Despite training and education primarily remaining the 
responsibility of individual Member States, for the first time a concerted effort was made to 
provide a channel for the ‘pooling and sharing’ of CSDP resources on this matter. As the first 
Head of the College, Weisserth, explained, this was also a way of reducing Member States’ 
training expenditure which, in many cases, was becoming increasingly unsustainable 
(personal interview, 2015).  
The ESDC is charged with providing CSDP training to “develop and promote a common 
understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel (Council Decision (CFSP) 
2016/2382 as amended by CD (CFSP) 2018/712). Moreover, the ESDC’s aim is not only to 
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create a better understanding of the CSDP amongst staff, it has also been established to 
foster better communication amongst multinational CSDP staff and to facilitate the 
emergence of a common security culture (see ibid).  
This means the College seeks to coordinate CSDP training within the EU which Member 
States participate in and contribute to on a voluntary basis. Efforts are made to render 
courses across Europe more coherent and standardised by encouraging Member States to 
engage in the College’s activities and through the development of standardised curricula for 
core courses. The structure of the College reflects the intergovernmental nature of EU 
foreign policy decision-making as the College’s activities require consensus from all EU 
Member States. Furthermore, as Weisserth points out, any member can suggest conducting 
pilot projects which are then included in the permanent training calendar if deemed useful 
by the Committee. By involving all member institutions in the formation of course content 
and making it freely available to anyone who wants to use it, the College aims to further 
increase its reach. Its Executive Academic Board is tasked with ensuring the quality and 
coherence of all courses while the Steering Committee has overall responsibility for training 
activities. Both the Board and the Committee meet on a regular basis and any additions or 
changes to the curricula have to be agreed by all members. It is then up to the individual 
members of the ESDC (consisting of more than140 European civilian and military 
educational and research institutions) to implement the courses on a voluntary basis and 
with guidance from the ESDC. This usually means that national hosting partners are 
principally in charge of sourcing speakers. The presenters are given a topic to discuss, yet 
largely retain control over the content of their contributions. Furthermore, as the ESDC has 
a limited budget and does not charge tuition fees, it also relies on the partner institutions to 
keep course-related costs to a minimum. Depending on the location of the course, this often 
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makes recruiting national speakers more financially appealing than having to spend money 
on bringing in presenters from abroad.  
Since its creation, more than 24,000 people have undertaken CSDP training arranged by the 
ESDC through more than 100 training events per year. As of 2019, the College has the 
capacity to provide training to approximately 5,500 staff per year which represents a 
significant increase since 2015 (when it was approximately 1,500) and coordinates the 
annual delivery of a variety of different training courses. For example, in the academic year 
2014/15, The ESDC provided over 80 training activities aimed at both military and civilian 
staff covering basic training, specialist/pre-deployment courses as well as high level training 
opportunities.  
Its two flagship residential courses are the CSDP Orientation Course (five days), which is 
intended for mid-ranking staff working on CSDP issues and the High-Level Course (four one-
week modules spread over a year) tailored towards senior staff and decision-makers. Both 
also include an online learning component. In 2015, 12 Orientation courses were hosted by 
11 different institutions, of which three were observed as part of this research (Brussels, 
Bucharest and Rome). Furthermore, one of the four modules of the High-Level Course 
formed part of this study. Both courses have core curricula that have been agreed by all 
members and should therefore serve as guidelines for the hosting institutions.  
The purpose of the CSDP Orientation Course is to provide participants with knowledge 
regarding the CSDP institutional framework, current policies, as well as structures and 
processes. It is also meant to offer networking opportunities to personnel involved in 
implementing the CSDP.  
The following topics have been deemed to be key course content:  
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• EU Institutional Framework (Treaties, European Parliament, Council, Commission 
and the Member States).  
• Key CSDP documents (EUGS, Capability Development Plan and Civilian Capability 
Development Plan).  
• EU Decision -Making in Crisis Management.  
• Civil-Military co-ordination in CSDP missions and operations.  
• CSDP missions and operations (characteristics, challenges and effects).  
• Coherence of EU action in crisis management (instruments and partners).  
• Working with Partners and International Organisations.  




Table 3 gives an idea of the intended course structure:  
 
 
TABLE 3 - SAMPLE CSDP MODULE OUTLINE 
Source: Taken from ESDC Orientation Course Standard Curriculum 2017 
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The High-Level Course with its four modules seeks to cover the above aspects in more 
depth, but also at a more advanced level and with a much more strategic perspective, thus 
providing participants with CSDP knowledge relevant for leadership positions.  Furthermore, 
by spreading the course over a whole year, participants are encouraged to build lasting 
working relationships with fellow course members and reflect on course content in-
between modules. 
 
EMILYO – European Initiative for the Exchange of Military Young Officers 
This initiative modelled on ERASMUS was agreed by a Council Conclusion in 2008 as a means 
to “strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces and promote a European security 
and defence culture” (Council Conclusion 15396/08). The ESDC was tasked with assisting 
national training academies to provide mobility opportunities to students and staff and to 
“facilitate shared approaches to the training of young European officers, in particular in the 
field of the ESDP” (ibid.). The Initiative consists of both exchange semesters and shorter 
residential modules with a focus on CSDP and are open to all EU Member States. The aim is 
to give students the opportunity to learn as well as train together, thus providing them with 
a greater understanding of European security and defence at the start of their careers. Two 
one-week modules, which took place at the Theresian Military Academy in Austria, formed 
part of this study and officers-in-training were also surveyed online.  
There are numerous other training tools that the EU has introduced, such as ‘Europe’s New 
Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management’ (ENTRi). This programme is sponsored by 
the European Commission and has 13 participating Member States. Moreover, it is also 
available to UN Peacekeeping, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
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and African Union staff. Moreover, training is provided by other EU institutions such as the 
EUMS (EU Military Staff) providing briefings and updates from their ‘lessons learned 
exercises’. While it would be very valuable to compare how these different bodies 
contribute to the shaping of narratives and their subsequent projection, due to the scope of 
this thesis, this study can only focus on the work of the ESDC.  
 
The ESDC's Approach to Shaping a Common Security Culture 
One of the key aims of these different training options is to create a common security 
culture amongst European security practitioners. When the ESDC was founded, EU officials 
referred to their vision of a creating common “European security culture” through 
education and training in the College’s Mission Statement (Council Joint Action 
2005/575/CFSP). The term ‘security culture’ is used and interpreted in many different ways 
and sometimes replaced by ‘strategic culture’ by the EU. Yet, many scholars would argue 
that strategic culture and security culture are two different things. While Gariup defines 
security culture as a “set of enduring and shared assumptions, beliefs and attitudes about 
threats and referent objects” (2009, p. 41), she considers strategic culture to refer to “the 
means deemed appropriate to make security” (ibid). Other scholars describe it as a shared 
mind-set involving “references to beliefs, ideas, attitudes, worldviews, collective memories, 
as well as practices, habits, traditions or patterns of behaviour” (Gray, 1999a; Heiselberg, 
2003; Johnston, 1995; Longhurst, 2004; Martinsen, 2004, quoted in Meyer, 2005, p. 528) 
which facilitate the implementation of the CSDP. Meyer combines the two differing notions 
by arguing that strategic culture comprises “the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, 
ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social 
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groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a 
community’s pursuit of security and defence goals (2005, p. 528). As this study focuses on 
investigating the emergence a shared value system that forms part of a European identity 
amongst security practitioners, Meyer’s definition of the term security culture best reflects 
the interwoven relationship between norms, values, identity and support for EU security 
and defence. In practice, Howorth argues that “national policy preferences […] will have to 
be offset against a growing awareness of the ways in which security policy is perceived by 
partner countries”, thus going beyond national interests (2002, p. 89).   
Some scholars argue that a common security culture either already exists amongst elites 
(Gariup, 2009, p. 117), or that it has been gradually emerging over the last few decades but 
requires a thorough socialisation process as well as an increasing harmonisation of 
approaches to the use of military force (Howorth, 2002, p. 89/90). At the same time there is 
no doubt that diverging national security cultures have resulted in incongruous 
interpretations of the CSDP as well as the ESS and EUGS.  Taking the case of France for 
example, its strategic culture is fashioned by an ambivalent relationship with NATO and a 
continuing relationship with its former colonies, both of which have resulted in France 
pursuing a powerful security and defence role for the EU (Irondelle and Besancenot in 
Kirchner and Sperling (eds.), 2010). While some Member States are clearly “quite prepared 
to consider the use of force as legitimate to defend certain values and beliefs”, others such 
as Germany have, for historical reasons, developed a culture which regards the use of force 
as a last resort that is to be avoided (Meyer, 2005, p. 529). Discussing national security 
cultures in detail is beyond the scope of this study but touching on these diverging notions 
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shows the complexities that the EU’s ambition of creating a common European security 
culture entails.  
With regards to this thesis, which focuses on the impact of the training courses coordinated 
by the ESDC and thus indirectly the creation of a European security culture, it is therefore 
vital to investigate not only notions of European identity, but also the construction of a 
European security culture as one manifestation of a shared sense of identity in EU security 
and defence. When asked for a definition, the former Head of the ESDC responded that it is 
simply creating a common understanding of the CSDP and “having a flexible, comprehensive 
approach to crisis management” that is “pervasive through all levels of hierarchy. […] Staff 
in management positions are important, but it has to be pervasive and start with teaching 
the most junior staff” (personal interview, 2015). The current Head of the College, Dubois, 
has continued to place the creation of a common security culture at the core of the ESDC’s 
activities as indicated in its latest publication “What we are – What we do” (2017) in which it 
calls itself “facilitator of a European security culture” (p. 9). Furthermore, he describes the 
EU’s security environment as a “ring of fire” and is of the opinion that unless EU Member 
States pull together and increase their cooperation on security and defence matters, Europe 
will “start to lose more and more influence in the world” (personal interview, 2015). While 
Dubois contemplates that greater cooperation may only be achieved through a crisis such as 
the influx of migrants, he deems the pursuit of a common security culture that fosters a 
“shared understanding of potential threats and interests” to be the best approach to 
becoming a more effective security actor. His view is similar to Kantner’s, suggesting that 
there needs to be greater awareness of ‘sitting in the same boat’ amongst practitioners, but 
that it may take a drastic event for Europeans to really pull together.  
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Getting security practitioners to adopt a truly ‘comprehensive approach’ is another key 
aspect of creating a common security culture and the ESDC tries to achieve this through its 
course content, but also by bringing together civilian and military staff from various fields 
related to security and defence, who might not otherwise interact, on residential courses 
with plenty of networking opportunities. As Dubois points out, applying a comprehensive 
approach, or to use the term introduced by the EUGS – integrated approach- is much easier 
when “you can just pick up the phone and say ‘Hey, we met on the ESDC course. We need to 
work together on this” (personal interview 2015).  
While the College’s activities and remit have increased significantly over the last five years, 
it is also obvious that buy-in from the Member States varies significantly and the creation of 
a common security culture remains a slow process. Due to the EU's nature and the ESDC's 
structure, the communication of narratives to course participants is mainly carried out 
locally. This means that the many voices that deliver ESDC-coordinated training courses 
reflect the diversity of the EU, but also make it difficult to project narratives coherently. 
When the College was founded, smaller nations especially welcomed the sharing of training 
resources, whereas others questioned the need for more institutions, especially since the 
NATO Defence College had been successfully delivering international courses since 1951. 
Weisserth remarked that this resulted in the continuous need to justify the existence of the 
virtual College, especially at the beginning. Indeed, he pointed out that, “still today, you will 
struggle to find links to EU level training courses on certain Member States’ training 
academy websites” (personal interview 2015). Participation in the training courses and 
activities of the ESDC may vary significantly from country to country, yet there is no doubt 
that the work of the ESDC has contributed to raising awareness of, and harmonising training 
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on CSDP. By producing standardised curricula on CSDP matters, the ESDC is participating in 
the formation of European security and defence narratives.   
 
Conclusion to Chapter 6 
When examining the ways in which the ESS and EUGS were drafted and how training on 
European security and defence is increasingly being harmonised, it becomes obvious that 
the EU is increasingly working towards creating more coherent narratives that can facilitate 
the creation of a common security culture and ultimately contribute to a change in the way 
European security is carried out. But it is also obvious that these new narratives have to 
compete with longer-established national and international ones that may favour 
international cooperation through NATO or promote a greater degree of sovereignty in the 
realm of security and defence. This highlights the importance of the EU's efforts to project 





CHAPTER 7: Projecting Strategic Narratives Relating to 
European Security and Defence 
 
When it comes to shaping notions of European identity, one of the key processes is to 
outline the EU’s role and identity in relation to other actors within the international system 
and to frame the context within which its identity is to function. The EU tries to project not 
only a certain vision of itself externally in its relations with other international actors, but at 
the same time internally to its citizens, many of whom remain or have become sceptical of 
the EU’s ambition to further increase cooperation and integration. Thus, creating and 
projecting a view of the world which necessitates the existence of EU security and defence 
cooperation is a crucial step in establishing and maintaining support for European security 
integration. Security practitioners in the EU, who for the most part work for national 
institutions, are confronted with these narratives through their work, but in particular, 
when attending ESDC-coordinated training courses. 
This chapter therefore investigates the projection of strategic narratives in relation to the 
Common Security and Defence Policy as a way of facilitating the emergence of a European 
integration identity. The two key identity-shaping documents that form part of this study 
are the European Security Strategy from 2003 and the European Global Strategy (2016). Not 
only do they represent the EU’s main strategic documents for the implementation of the 
CSDP, as Gariup notes they affirm a level of coherence and epitomize the EU’s dominant 
discourse on security and defence (2009, p. 121). Furthermore, they also “serve as the 
connecting thread throughout the trainings organised by the ESDC” (Biscop and Andersson, 
2008, p. 2) thus representing a key component in the projection of strategic narratives 
through CSDP training.  
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The analysis of strategic narratives is conducted in three steps. The first part of the chapter 
investigates how visions of the international system are communicated in the two strategy 
documents. This is followed by an examination of notions of European identity. Lastly an 
examination of the narratives communicating the role of CSDP in security provisions is 
undertaken.  
By conducting a content analysis of the ESS and the EUGS, one is able to establish key 
concepts and narratives as well as trace how these have developed and changed since the 
creation of the CSDP. In addition, the triangulation of all three levels of narratives provides a 
more holistic insight into the EU’s view of the international system, the EU’s place in it and 
the role of the CSDP in European security and defence provision. All three components are 
crucial for the successful implementation of EU foreign policy as illustrated by Hill and 
Wallace who stated more than two decades ago that an “identity of beliefs, values, and 
preferences, […] reshaped by the interpretation of external and internal developments, is 
essential for the construction of an effective foreign and security policy” (1996, p. 8). More 
recently, this was further underlined by Meyer who argued that the successful 
implementation of the ESS would depend “not just on the creation of the requisite military 
and civil capabilities, but also on a pool of sufficiently shared norms, beliefs and ideas 
regarding the means and ends of defence policy” (2005, p. 524).  
While a detailed analysis of the two strategy documents focuses on the content of EU 
security and defence narratives, when trying to examine their projection, it is also vital to 
consider how and by whom they are communicated in practice. A brief look at the training 
courses that formed part of this study is also undertaken at the end of this chapter. These 
courses provide a platform for interaction between projectors and receivers of strategic 
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narratives and as such serve to highlight the reciprocal link between policy-makers and 
implementers. By increasingly cooperating at EU level and undergoing joint training on 
CSDP, practitioners are not only confronted with potentially conflicting notions of different 
levels of narratives (i.e. European, national, regional), they also contribute to shaping 
narratives and notions of European identity at the same time (Freedman quoted in 
Ringsmose and Børgesen; 2011, p. 507).  
While the content analysis that formed part of this study was largely conducted in a 
deductive manner to construct an accurate strategic narrative framework specific to CSDP, 
it took as a starting point well known concepts related to security policies in Europe. 
Howorth suggests a number of dichotomies that are apparent amongst security cultures in 
Europe including “allied/neutral, Atlanticist/European, power projection/territorial defence, 
military/civilian instruments” (2002, p. 89). While this is by no means a comprehensive list 
of themes that may shape the EU’s strategic narratives, it was a helpful guide when 
conducting the initial content analysis of the ESS and EUGS.  
Successful projection of strategic narratives, Ringsmose and Børgesen point out, can only 
occur when narratives are perceived to be coherent and consistent (2011, p.  514). 
Furthermore, narratives need to “make sense of events related to the use of military force 
in ways that are likely to give rise to a particular feeling or opinion” (Antoniades, O’Loughlin, 
and Miskimmon, 2010) by “resonat[ing] with the intended audience’s core values” and thus 
tying “events together in an explanatory framework” (Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011, p. 
512). However, due to the nature of the EU, strategic narratives have an added degree of 
complexity as there is a possibility that “similar challenges, similar threats, and similar 
international obligations” (Dimitriu and De Graaf, 2016 p. 7) may be narrated in completely 
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diverging ways by different countries. This highlights the challenge for new strategies to 
either resonate with existing ones or be robust enough to be able to compete with them.  
 
Section a): Analysing the Strategies: What is Their Purpose?  
The ESS - Catalyst for a Fledgling CSDP?  
Drafting a strategy document for European security and defence was the EU’s first attempt 
at projecting narratives aimed at explaining its future vision for European security and 
defence and fostering support for the implementation of the CSDP. Furthermore, it was a 
response to the US National Security Strategy and served to outline how the EU sought to 
respond in the aftermath of 9/11. However, since its adoption in the early 2000s, the CSDP 
and specifically the 2003 European Security Strategy that followed have often been 
interpreted as too vague and leaving too much room for differing interpretations by EU 
Member States. Lindley-French argues that the strategy merely represents a “pre- concept” 
rather than a robust and detailed vision for the future of the EU’s security and defence 
(2004, p. 4-5) whereas Bailes  emphasises its “inspirational function” with regards to policy-
making (2005, p. 14). Whitman goes one step further and suggests that the ESS’s doctrine is 
more targeted at “Europe feeling good about itself” rather than defining its power and role 
in the international system (Whitman, 2006, p. 8). Efforts have since been made to define 
the scope of CSDP and the EU as a global security actor more clearly, and to demarcate its 
role in relation to other international organisations, in particular NATO, as fears over 
duplication have been ripe ever since the EU acquired military capacities in a move to 
further develop from its role as a civilian or, as some argue, normative power to global crisis 
manager. In 2008, the ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ 
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sought to reinforce its purpose and situate it within a changing security environment. Yet 
the CSDP and the ESS continued to be criticised for a lack of strategic vision, or poorly 
defined goals and hence both were often considered weak (Jegen and Merand , 2014, p. 
388). Despite this, Rayroux draws attention to the potentially useful ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
the CSDP and ESS present (2014). Indeed, it has often been observed that Member States 
interpret them quite differently - Heisbourg noted diverging interpretations of the 
‘Petersberg’ tasks and the subsequent ‘Headline Goals’ (2000) and Rayroux pointed to the 
many ambiguous concepts in the ESS, such as “effective multilateralism” or “preventative 
engagement” (2014, p. 388). He continued to argue that this vagueness can be construed as 
a vital strategy for the gradual Europeanisation of national foreign policies as it allows for a 
flexible interpretation that can be adapted by Member States to fit with existing interests 
and policies through presenting CSDP as a natural continuation of these (ibid, p. 392), thus 
circumventing pressures to make far-reaching changes or compromises. When applying this 
idea to the concept of strategic narratives, however, this vagueness is somewhat 
problematic as it is likely to reinforce the status quo (ibid, p. 401) rather than provide an 
alternative explanation of the international system. This suggests that the idea of loosely 
interpreting the ESS and implementing the CSDP as and when Member states see fit, is not 
enough to foster a truly common European approach. In light of this, Biscop and Andersson 
thus conclude that it is only the Member States’ political will that can transform the EU from 
a “mere global actor” to an “effective global power” (2008, p.  20). While the ESS was a first 
step towards creating a more defined EU security identity, it fell short of creating narratives 




The EUGS – An Insecure Europe in an Unstable World? 
Calls for a new security strategy had been ripe when the prospective HR/VP Mogherini 
announced her intent to reflect on the EU’s Security Strategy in 2014. Since 2003, not only 
had significant changes occurred with regards to security challenges, the situation of the EU 
itself had also altered, making the security system as predictably unpredictable (EUGS, p. 
46). Obviously, these opening sentences highlight the vastly different context in which the 
two strategic documents were drafted. The ESS had a fairly narrow focus laying out the EU’s 
approach to security in the lead-up to the 2004 EU enlargement which signalled continued 
wide-spread support for European integration. The EUGS on the other hand is a much 
broader (and longer) policy document conveying a strategic approach to security that 
incorporates all of the EU’s foreign policy tools at a time when the EU faced multiple 
existential crises, both internal and external (p. 7). As Grevi points out, the ESS reflected a 
“confident Europe projecting stability and values upon others in a relatively benign 
international environment” (2016, p. 3). While the EUGS continued to build on the strategic 
direction from 2003, it was less focused on the EU being a normative power abroad. 
Instead, it was much more concerned with its own internal credibility struggles which is 
evident from the emphasis placed on pursuing citizens’ interests and security concerns. 
Grevi demonstrates that the words interest and citizens occurred over thirty times in the 
EUGS, a document of approximately 15,000 words, compared with just three mentions in 
the ESS which is about 4200 words long (ibid, p. 3). In addition to reaffirming the need for 
EU security cooperation to overcome current crises and protect citizens’ interests, the 
Global Strategy also called for greater ‘strategic autonomy’, thus asking Member States to 
push for more security cooperation and integration. Conley cautions that any such efforts 
are impeded by “serious leadership and resource challenges” (2016, p. 13). This ambition to 
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be a more active security actor is accompanied by a more pragmatic and concrete approach 
to dealing with an ever more complex international system which in turn leaves little room 
for the ‘constructive ambiguity’ (Heisbourg, 2000) that was present in the ESS. While the 
EUGS’ purpose in these uncertain times was clearly laid out, the extent to which it will be 
implemented by Member States remains to be seen.  
In this context, ‘Interests’ were also referred more frequently than previously was the case. 
This strengthened pursuit of ‘our interests’ represents a considerable change in the EU’s 
narrative concerning its position in the international system. It is an interesting 
development, especially when considering Davies and Johns’ claim that missions whose 
objective it is to defend national interests are more widely supported than those with a 
purely humanitarian purpose (quoted in Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011, p. 513). It can be 
argued that this signifies somewhat of a move away from being concerned with projecting 
values and norms externally to help achieve a more secure EU, to a more inward-looking 
approach which tries to create cohesion within the Union to overcome internal conflicts. 
However, external security threats also played a substantial role in the EUGS. While the new 
Strategy was preceded by a separate, detailed strategic assessment exercise focusing on 
current threats and delivering a “diagnosis that precedes the prognosis” (Tocci, 2016, p. 
464), the EUGS reiterated the necessity for Member States to work together more closely, 
and to make EU security and defence cooperation the norm in the face of an international 




The Bigger Picture: The EU’s Place in the International System 
In its pursuit of being perceived as a key security player whose security and defence policy is 
worth pursuing and fully implementing by its Member States, the EU employs strategic 
narratives to situate itself as a key actor within a wider international system. As Roselle et 
al. point out, “international system narratives describe how the world is structured, who the 
players are, and how it works” (Roselle et al., 2014, p. 76) and therefore provide their target 
audience with the necessary background to make sense of an actor’s role and identity in a 
unified, coherent manner.  
The ESS and EUGS are key documents that attempt to purvey narratives explaining the 
global order and with the help of content analysis, the following key theme was identified as 
an international system narrative (Figure 7): 
 
FIGURE 6 - INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM NARRATIVES 
 
The Changing Nature of Security Threats 
Establishing common threat perceptions is one of the key goals in order to deepen EU 
security cooperation and integration. They often vary considerably from country to country 
and Meyer argues that these perceptions are shaped by conflicting societal and political 
1) The international system is increasingly complex - acting alone is no longer an 
option
The following sub-themes were also covered: 
a) From security threats to priorities: The common and complex challenges for 
Europe 
b) The EU's relationship with other international actors such as NATO 
Source: Researcher’s own 
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values and norms, communication of hostile intent and an actor’s potential to cause harm 
(2005, p. 533). The ESS thus sought to clearly set out what the EU perceived to be the main 
security concerns affecting Europe at the start of the 21st century:    
• Terrorism 
• Weapons of mass destruction 
• Regional conflicts 
• State failure 
• Organised crime 
While Andersson and Biscop rightly argue that the ESS did not rank or prioritise these 
threats due to the considerable divergences regarding threat perceptions amongst Member 
States (2008, p. 169), it comes as no surprise that this strategy, having been written in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and the launch of the ‘war on terror’, mentioned threats from terrorism 
most frequently. The other threats however were all referred to relatively evenly within the 
document as can be seen in Table 4 below.  
TABLE 4 – THREATS MENTIONED IN THE ESS 
Terrorism (also: terrorist, Taliban, Al Qaeda) 20 
Weapons of mass destruction (also: WMD, weapons, proliferation) 13 
Organised crime 12 
State failure (also: weak/ failing states) 11 
Regional conflicts (also: (in)stability, insecurity) 9 
 
Source: The European Security Strategy 
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The ESS mentioned the Middle East most prominently when referring to problematic 
regions (five times) and on another four occasions Afghanistan was mentioned specifically 
while the wider Mediterranean was alluded to three times. This was followed by the Balkans 
and Africa which were discussed six times. While all these threats were discussed in their 
own right, the ESS placed emphasis on the notion that they are all interconnected and often 
occur together, with the most frightening scenario being terrorist groups coming into 
possession of weapons of mass destruction.  
Securing the EU’s immediate neighbourhood was a key priority, yet the ESS pointed out that 
security had changed from constituting primarily territorial defence during the Cold War, to 
a situation where “the first line of defence” often lies abroad (p. 7). Haine argues that this 
statement implied a “projection of power, soft and hard, that Europe was not used to” up 
until this point (in Biscop and Andersson, 2008, p. 21). The Strategy also stated that 
aggression towards any individual Member State was highly unlikely and that threats had 
become “more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (p. 3). This is further underlined by 
the ESS acknowledging that lines between internal and external threats were increasingly 
blurred (p. 2). Despite the Strategy not using the term ‘human security’ as such, there was 
certainly an emphasis on providing humanitarian assistance in a time when the nature of 
conflicts was mostly intra-state and therefore frequently to the detriment of the civilian 
population. Furthermore, the ESS situated these security concerns in a wider context by 
framing poverty as the major root cause of many of the world’s conflicts and wars and 
alluding to the likeliness of (future) conflicts over resources, all of which have a direct or 
indirect impact on the EU (p. 3).  
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By highlighting the increasingly complex nature of security threats, the ESS constructed an 
international system narrative which implied that the best way of dealing with these 
multifaceted problems was through increasingly cooperating on security and defence at EU 
level, as they required comprehensive responses that Member States could not provide on 
their own.  
Thirteen years on from the EU’s first Security Strategy, the EUGS outlined “terrorism, hybrid 
threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity” as key issues for the EU 
and its citizens (p. 9). With regards to problematic regions, it specifically referred to security 
threats from Russia, terrorism and violence in North Africa, the Middle East and also within 
Europe (p. 7). However, the EUGS was not purely a security strategy, it encompassed all 
aspects of foreign policy. By defining security threats in a wider context and taking their root 
causes into account, the approach taken in the EUGS represented a much more holistic view 
of security issues and how to tackle them. There was less emphasis on explicitly spelling out 
the EU’s key threats as was the case in the ESS. This was partially because it was preceded 
by a strategic assessment exercise entitled “The European Union in a changing global 
environment” which contained a considerable focus on threats.  Instead, the Global Strategy 
was structured around five priorities:  
• The Security of the Union 
• State and Societal Resilience to our East and South 
• An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises 
• Cooperative Regional Orders 
• Global Governance for the 21st Century 
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Threats that were addressed separately under the “Security of the Union” priority were 
terrorism, cyber security and energy security. Unlike the ESS, the EUGS went into some 
detail regarding how it envisaged tackling these issues.  It suggested that living up to the 
EU’s values internally and externally (p. 21) as well as better engagement with the various 
actors and organisations involved in the conflict was the best way forward. Furthermore, 
the EU sought a more differentiated approach to conflict resolution and increased ‘local 
ownership’, thus also suggesting that the EU’s transformative or normative power may have 
been overestimated in the past.  
 
The EU’s Multilateralist Approach to Security and Defence 
‘Effective multilateralism’ has been a core principle of the EU’s wider foreign policy, and 
expanding cooperation with other international actors has always been on the EU’s security 
and defence agenda (Council of the European Union: 9; Biscop and Andersson, 2008; 
Jørgensen, 2009, Kissack, 2010; Koops, 2011). Some of the EU’s key ambitions as a 
multilateral actor can be broken down into its relationship with the US and NATO as well as 
with the United Nations. These are discussed below.  
At the time of drafting the ESS, Member States’ approaches to providing security varied 
significantly, such as a more ‘Atlanticist’ outlook in the United Kingdom, ‘Europeanist’ 
interpretations in France and neutral approaches in Austria and Sweden. France, for 
example, has had somewhat of a “love-hate relationship” with NATO (Rayroux, 2014, p. 390) 
and withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structures in 1966 before re-
joining in 2009. Some argue that France had wanted to shift its focus from NATO and a US-
dominated alliance to a more Europe-centric security outlook. The move to re-join the 
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military command is, by some, interpreted as France’s recognition that the EU is not (yet) 
able to adequately deal with security and defence issues (Irondelle, 2008). The United 
Kingdom on the other hand has continued to favour close transatlantic ties (Howorth, 2006, 
p. 217), evident in its decision to join the US-led coalition which invaded Iraq in 2003. It sees 
the CSDP as a tool only to be used in situations where the United States chooses not to get 
involved (Biehl quoted in Howorth, 2014). This, Biscop and Andersson concluded, had until 
then rendered the drafting of a security strategy “politically unfeasible” (2008, p. 1). Despite 
these differences, the ESS presented the EU as deeply embedded in a multilateral system 
with its transatlantic ties and the United Nations Charter at the centre. Moreover, it stated 
that states were no longer able to deal with security threats on their own (p. 1) with 
cooperation the only way forward.  
In terms of cooperation with other international actors, the EU’s transatlantic links featured 
most prominently. The ESS alluded to the role of the US in the European integration process 
and reiterated its dominant position as a military actor (p. 1), subsequently declaring the 
pursuit of an ‘effective and balanced’ relationship with the United States a necessity. While 
it pointed out that this partnership had the potential to be a “formidable force for good” (p. 
13), it failed to specify the envisaged nature of this partnership (Biscop and Andersson, 
2008, p. 168). Despite a lack of detail, there is little doubt that one of the main purposes of 
the ESS was to (re-)create cohesion between the EU and the US (Ojanen, 2006, p. 19) as well 
as within the EU after the rift caused by the differing outlooks on Iraq (Biscop and Anderson, 
2008, p. 172).  
The ESS’s focus on multilateral cooperation frames the EU as a global security actor wanting 
to cooperate (primarily with the US) to be a ‘force for good’ by operating within the 
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parameters of the UN Charter and with a focus on supporting the work of the UN, thus 
presenting an attractive model for the rest of the world to copy. But when analysing the 
EU’s approach to multilateralism in the ESS, it becomes obvious that there was a lack of 
consensus amongst Member States with regards to the level of autonomy the EU should 
strive for as an international actor and in its relationships with other actors (namely the US 
and NATO). The resulting vagueness regarding the EU’s relationship with other actors most 
likely facilitated Member State buy-in for the ESS, but it also posed a major impediment to 
an efficient and coherent implementation of the CSDP (Dassu and Menotti , 2005, p. 107).  
The EUGS on the other hand included a number of new security concepts that were not 
present in the ESS, namely the idea of “strategic autonomy” and the notion of the EU 
securing first and foremost its own borders and immediate neighbourhood rather than 
dealing with out-of-area conflicts. As Grevi remarks “there is a marked shift in emphasis 
from crisis management interventions abroad towards protecting Europe against both 
external threats and those spanning frontiers, such as terrorism and hybrid threats” (2016, 
p. 5). Despite not being explicitly stated in the ESS, up until then Europe’s territorial defence 
had been considered to be within NATO’s rather than the EU’s remit. While the Strategy 
acknowledged that NATO remained the “bedrock” of Euro-Atlantic security (p. 36), the 
EUGS suggested that the “EU should also be able to assist in protecting its Members upon 
their request” (p. 19). Furthermore, it called for the EU to develop ‘strategic autonomy’ in 
order to be able to tackle both internal and external security issues. When asked in an 
interview what the term meant, Tocci defined strategic autonomy as “the ability of the 
Union to decide autonomously and have the means to act upon its decisions. While it ought 
not to be confined to the military domain, it is evident that it is in this area that the EU’s 
strategic autonomy has not yet been realised” (Tocci, 2016, p. 3).  
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While it did not specify how this new autonomy would shape the EU’s approach to 
multilateralism, the Strategy designated a “sustainable, innovative and competitive 
European defence industry” (p. 45) as a key component of obtaining a greater level of 
autonomy. This call for greater independence in security matters was balanced with a 
continued emphasis on working with key international actors. The longstanding 
transatlantic partnership with the US was described as a core component of the EU’s 
international relations and one that the EU seeks to deepen further by pursuing further 
cooperation on issues such as cyber security, trade, crisis management, counter-terrorism, 
migration and energy and climate action (p. 37). 
 
The EU and NATO 
There is no doubt that NATO has been the most important security organisation for the 
majority of European countries for decades. It is a vital component of the EU’s multilateral 
approach to security provision, yet with the development of independent military 
capabilities, questions arose regarding how the EU and NATO would go forwards in dealing 
with security threats. In the ESS, NATO was described as one expression of the EU’s strong 
transatlantic link and while working with NATO was mentioned on several occasions (usually 
in tandem with the US and other international organisations) and permanent agreements 
such as Berlin Plus were alluded to, no further details were provided regarding the nature of 
future of EU-NATO cooperation. This is somewhat surprising as HR Solana was eager for the 
Europeanisation of military activities and a more visible EU role (Barros-Garcia, 2007). A 
more clearly defined EU-NATO relationship would have alleviated widespread fears over 
duplication and confusion over the role of the CSDP in relation to NATO, which, until then, 
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had been the main security provider in terms of hard power and military interventions in 
Europe (ibid, p. 12).  
Due to the above-mentioned uncertainty over their respective remits in the ESS, the EU’s 
relationship with NATO was discussed much more frequently in the EUGS. Having had to 
face persistent worries regarding duplication of efforts between itself and NATO, the EU 
needed to define its relationship with the organisation more clearly to justify its continued 
push for increased EU security and defence cooperation. The Global Strategy was less vague 
about EU-NATO relations and described it as the “strongest and most effective military 
alliance in the world” (p. 37). Furthermore, it argued that the EU should develop into a 
security actor that is capable of sharing, or at times, taking over responsibility for defending 
its Member States (p. 19). This links in with the other new priorities in the EUGS, namely a 
more inward-looking approach and the pursuit of strategic autonomy, aiming to establish a 
more balanced relationship with NATO.  
 
The EU’s Relationship with Other International Actors 
The UN Charter forms a key reference point for all actions taken by the EU, thus providing a 
framework for security provision, as well as legitimacy. Indeed, some experts were of the 
opinion that the UN played an active part in shaping an EU identity during the ESS drafting 
process (Biscop and Andersson, 2008, p.  46). While the ESS sought to strengthen the UN’s 
activities, it also reflected the limited timeframes the EU envisioned for crisis management 
missions, as evidenced by the length of the first EU military missions lasting three months 
(Artemis) and nine months (Concordia) respectively. This lack of long-term strategic vision 
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and differences in organisational cultures and interests have, at times, caused frictions 
between the EU and the UN (Koops, 2012, p. 15).  
According to the EUGS, the UN remains the “bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order” 
that the EU ascribed to (p. 10). In addition to reinforcing its support for UN activities and 
subscribing to the idea of global governance anchored in the UN Charter, the EUGS 
envisions a more prominent role for the EU which will see, “the EU[…] strengthen its voice 
and acquire greater visibility and cohesion” (p. 40). 
Other key international actors, in particular Russia, were also referred to in the security 
strategies. Whereas the ESS stated that the EU recognised the importance of working on 
improving relations (p. 14) to be able to deal with global security issues effectively, the 
EUGS was less ambitious in this respect: recent developments, such as Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, are reflected in the EU’s approach, limiting cooperation to “if and when interests 
overlap” (p. 34). Moreover, whilst acknowledging that the EU and Russia are 
interdependent, the EU views the management of this relationship as one of its key 
strategic challenges (p. 33). Being a much more detailed document, the EUGS also addresses 
its vision for cooperation with other regions and emerging powers as well as interacting 
with a variety of actors such as international organisations, civil society, and local 
communities in line with its goal of supporting cooperative regional orders (p. 32). 
Analysing both the ESS’ and the EUGS’ contents in terms of international system narratives 
has been insightful, especially with the added dimension of comparing narratives over a 
span of thirteen years. This examination has shown that while the EU’s narratives regarding 
its international relations have overall remained consistent, they have been adapted or 
expanded in response to changes in the international system. The key narrative running 
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through both strategic documents is therefore that security cooperation at EU level is the 
best response in a changed and continuously evolving security environment. An increasingly 
complex web of security threats which affect all Member States requires responses that no 
state can provide on their own. While the ESS seemed to take a reactive approach to 
security threats, the EUGS is somewhat more proactive in seeking to tackle the causes of 
these threats in a more comprehensive manner. A consistent theme is that of the EU being 
deeply embedded in a multilateral, rules-based framework of global governance defined by 
the United Nations. With regards to the EU’s key partners, the ESS concentrated on the EU’s 
transatlantic partnership with the United States.  The EUGS continued to value this 
partnership, but also elaborated much more on the EU’s relationships with a of variety 
international actors and stressed its ambition to achieve strategic autonomy, thus also 
displaying more assertive and independent behaviour in its international relations.  
The ESS sought to outline the EU’s strategic vision as a global security actor in 2003 and 
achieved this in a somewhat tentative and vague manner. The EUGS on the other hand tried 
to incorporate lessons learned from more than a dozen years of EU security and defence 
policy resulting in a much more pragmatic approach that is reflected in emphasising the EU’s 
vital interests over ambitions to be a ‘power for good’ in the world. Biscop argues that the 
EUGS’ “principled pragmatism” indicates a move towards Realpolitik in the original sense of 
the term (2016, p. 1). When comparing the level of ambition in the EUSS and EUGS, it 
becomes obvious that the EUGS takes a more modest approach, having become aware of its 
own limitations due to requiring consensus from all 28 Member States and the complexity 
of today’s security threats. Whether the EUGS has the power to generate greater 
cooperation amongst Member States leading to the EU becoming a stronger and more 
cohesive security actor remains to be seen, especially in a climate where doubts over the 
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very future of the Union have become rife and a considerable number of Member States 
appear keen to ‘re-nationalise’ policy making. With the first ever EU exit negotiations 
commencing in 2017, it is also to be expected that Member States may become preoccupied 
with these rather than heeding to the EU’s renewed call for increased security cooperation. 
 
Notions of European Identity in the EU’s Security Strategies 
Analysing the content of the ESS and EUGS in relation to the EU’s attempts at creating a 
shared European identity through projecting the EU’s values and norms as an international 
actor both externally and internally forms a key component of this thesis. The idea that 
security practitioners develop a sense of European integration identity through their work 
and thus potentially play a vital role in making the implementation of the CSDP more 
efficient is the main hypothesis of this study. While only minor differences and additions 
were noted between the international system narratives projected in the ESS and those in 
the EUGS, the EU’s projection of its identity seems to have undergone more substantial 
change. 
The ESS was the first strategic document that attempted to define the EU’s international 
strategy as a security actor. Having been penned shortly after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, it 
was supposed to overcome the intra-European rift caused by the military operation as well 
as to distinguish the EU’s approach to security and defence from that of the United States 
(Meyer, 2005, p. 541). While it had the potential to be a key document for outlining the EU’s 
identity as a security provider, its focus seemed to be on the EU’s threat perceptions and 
little was said about the EU’s identity, i.e. the values and norms that shape the Common 
Security and Defence Policy as summed up by Biscop et al. who argue that “the issue is that 
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the ESS is incomplete in terms of objectives, because to start with it is not clear about the 
values and interests to be defended" (2009, p. 9). However, while little is said about the EU’s 
values and interests, one identity-shaping aspect which was included in the ESS was the 
premise that “the world was going in [the EU’s] direction, and it was up to [the EU] to shape 
the world, […] to remake the world in [its] image” (Tocci interview). This reflects the idea of 
the EU being a normative power, a model which other countries strive to emulate.  
Exporting ‘European’ norms and values as a means to creating a more secure world builds 
on the EU’s status as a soft power, but also somewhat impeded its newly-acquired ability to 
utilise military power in line with the CSDP.  
With more than a decade passing between the adoption of the ESS and the launch of the 
EU’s Global Strategy, it is not surprising to find that key identity narratives have developed 
and changed significantly. One of the biggest differences between the two strategic 
documents is the circumstances they were written in. While the ESS was penned in the 
context of significant EU expansion and integration, the setting for the EUGS was somewhat 
different. Not only has the EU’s model of integration become less attractive to many 
external actors (Coelmont, 2012, p. 1), the EU is also experiencing substantial internal 
struggles questioning its existence and future direction. This apprehension on behalf of the 
Member States is reflected in the reception of the two documents. While the ESS was 
formally adopted by the European Council, the EUGS was not. Instead, it was ‘welcomed’ by 
the Council and largely overshadowed by the Brexit referendum result from the day before.  
In response to these rather different circumstances, the EUGS was a lot more explicit about 
the EU’s identity. Indeed, some argue that it attempted to “restore the fundamentals of the 
European project itself, by providing for our security, the original raison d’être of the 
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project, for it to be able to achieve all its other objectives” (Coelmont, 2016, p.  9). 
Furthermore, the Strategy not only acknowledged the need to foster more internal 
coherence, but also recognised that to be a credible global power, its behaviour needed to 
be in line with its strategy (Biscop et al., 2009, p.  20) and identity.  
Conducting a content analysis of both documents revealed two key narratives – one 
concerning the EU’s changing external identity as a global security actor, and the other 
projecting the EU as an internally cohesive organisation as shown in Figure 8 below. While 
these overarching themes can be found in both strategies, their interpretations have 
evolved considerably in the period spanning the ESS and the EUGS.  
 
The EU’s Expanding Role as a Security Actor 
The creation of the CSDP represented a momentous occasion for the EU. For the first time, EU 
Member States agreed to act jointly in the field of security and defence by adopting a European 
Security Strategy, which, Meyer argues, denoted a “departure in strategic thinking for the NATO- 
oriented countries, who had previously resisted giving the EU a strong role in security and defence 
(the UK), as well as for those pacific and self-defence- minded countries (Germany, Austria, Sweden), 
who had difficulties in signing up to a more activist use of force for the purpose of counteracting 
threats and defending human rights" (Meyer, 2005, p. 538/9).  
As security and defence policy had been decided within national settings until this point, it is 
important to consider these domestic contexts with regards to Member States’ approaches to 
1) The EU’s expanding role as a security actor: from soft 
power to comprehensive actor guided by principled 
pragmatism
2) Europe’s 'common values and interests' require further 
integration of security and defence
FIGURE 7 - THE EU'S IDENTITY NARRATIVES Source: Researcher’s own 
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interpreting this new role and identity for the EU. With the imminent EU enlargement by 10 new 
Member States, the creation of the CSDP and the adoption of the ESS signified a significant step 
towards increased cooperation, especially considering countries which had previously shown a 
strong preference for neutrality and a very restricted use of force (such as Finland) or indeed held 
the view that military intervention was a last resort that was to be avoided at all costs (Germany) 
(ibid, p. 529), ratified this new dimension to European security and defence provision.  
Considering these very different strategic starting points, finding a common basis for the type of 
actor the EU wanted to become was crucial. Yet, the ESS was void of clear references to the type of 
actor it wanted to project itself to be and instead only alluded to inevitably being a “global player” 
due to its size and economic clout (p. 1).  
As Ringsmose and Børgesen point out in their model of measuring strategic narratives surrounding 
the use of force in military missions, “different national audiences with different values and different 
historical experiences (regarding the use of military power) might react differently to the same type 
of strategic narrative” (2011, p. 513). In this case, however, the ESS’s weak definition of the EU’s 
power not only encouraged different interpretations of the CSDP, it also failed to provide a coherent 
and consistent sense-making framework for Member States (other than their existing national ones). 
In the absence of such an alternative sense-making mechanism at EU level, many scholars therefore 
argue that increasing levels of cooperation and a European strategic vision have a noticeable but less 
drastic impact on Member States’ understandings of security and defence. Instead of creating a 
distinct European identity, the result is, scholars argue, that a “national ‘weness’ [is increasingly 
being enmeshed] with a ‘European’ dimension (or layer), thus contributing to redefining national 
discourses of foreign and security policies” instead of encouraging the creation of a European 
security culture (Gariup, 2009; Milzow, 2012; Rogers, 2009; Waever, and Larsen, 2013). Whether this 




The EU – No Longer Just a Soft Power? 
The question over the kind of actor the EU seeks to project itself to be and what it actually 
represents also play a significant role in determining the EU’s identity as a security provider. While 
the ESS remained rather vague about the EU’s power, it was written not long after the establishment 
of the CSDP, which marked an important turning point in this respect. Up until this point, the EU’s 
involvement in international affairs had been limited to that of a civilian power with no military tools 
at its disposal. Many argued that the EU’s approach distinguished it from other states and 
organisations as a unique global actor that employed only non-coercive means in its interactions 
with other actors.  
The ESS marked a significant move towards making the use of force a viable option for the EU’s 
security and defence policy. Yet, Martin suggests that despite the inclusion of military means in the 
EU’s foreign policy, which might be seen as “a negation of the precise nature of the EU as an 
international actor”, the EU continued to shun “‘hard security” in favour of a more nuanced use of 
its armoury” (2007, p. 5). The final wording of the ESS continued to give strong preference to using 
non-coercive tools when tackling non-territorial security threats. Indeed, the ESS stated that 
“spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and 
abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of 
strengthening the international order” (ESS, 2003, p. 10). Moreover, when stating its strategic 
objectives, the ESS referred to the defence of its security and the promotion of its values in the same 
sentence (p. 6), underlining how the two goals seemingly go hand in hand. This approach is one of 
the reasons why the EU has been called a ‘normative power’ that not only aims to export its social 
model to other parts of the world to protect its own security, but also considers it a moral obligation 
to do so (see e.g. Manners, Solana). Furthermore, this term implies that the EU’s values and social 
norms are seen to be worth aspiring to by non-EU countries and thus hold a degree of power over 
them.  The ESS suggested that the EU, in collaboration with the US, can thus act as a “formidable 
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force for good in the world” (ESS, p.  13).  
The EUGS showed that a strong focus on a soft power approach to eradicating the root 
causes of security threats remained, as highlighted by Mogherini’s foreword: “The European 
Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are 
the best in this field” (EUGS, p. 4). Continuing to make use of its wide range of non-coercive 
foreign policy tools remained a key priority for the EU as emphasised further on in the 
Strategy, where the EU’s civilian power is alluded to as an identity-shaping “trademark” 
(EUGS, p. 47) that needs to be developed further.  
However, the EUGS moves away from the idea that other countries seek to emulate the 
EU’s norms and values and adopts a more pragmatic stance. Instead, the EUGS clearly 
strove for Member States to “live up to the values that have inspired [the EU’s] creation and 
development” (EUGS, p. 15) and in this way lead by example rather than pushing its norms 
on others. The EU’s vision of generating resilience among neighbouring states instead of 
asserting its normative power abroad (Howorth, 2016, p. 25), would offer the “strongest 
antidote we have against violent extremism” (EUGS, p. 21). Furthermore, the EUGS 
suggested that as the EU’s model is clearly not attractive to all international actors, it is vital 
to employ varied and situation-specific approaches and seek “reciprocal inspiration from 
different regional experiences” (EUGS, p. 32) as well as more long-term engagement and 
working with a wide range of actors to protect the EU’s interests. This indicates a much 
more differentiated and modest approach in line with lessons learnt from past missions and 
operations.  
However, the new Strategy was also a lot more explicit about how relying solely on soft 
power is “not enough in this fragile world” (p. 44), and clearly advocated the use of hard 
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power, should the situation require: “For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand” 
(EUGS, p.  4). While the provision of security remained the key focus of the EUGS, this 
reiteration of the EU’s willingness to exert hard power was also accompanied by a renewed 
call to further develop the EU’s defence capabilities through increasing defence expenditure 
and defence research as a means to enhancing the EU’s credibility as a hard power (EUGS, p. 
44).   
Another new term introduced by the EUGS in relation to the EU’s role in global affairs is 
‘strategic autonomy’. Howorth argues that it is one of the key phrases of the whole Global 
Strategy, appearing more than seven times within the document (2016, p. 25). While the 
Strategy went to great lengths laying out its commitment to multilateralism and the 
importance of fostering relationships with many different states, institutions, and regional 
actors, it also emphasised the need to become a more independent actor. It is argued that 
to “promote peace and security within and beyond its borders” (EUGS, p. 9), more 
autonomy was required. Moreover, the ability to protect European values and interests was 
also linked to achieving greater independence (EUGS, p. 4). However, the concept requires 
careful consideration as it was not clearly defined in the Strategy. The International 
Spectator, in an interview with Tocci, sums up this change in narrative from a “reactive, 
limited and generally securitised approach” relying largely on the EU’s transatlantic ties in 
the ESS to envisaging an “independent leadership role for Europe in the world” (2016, p. 8). 
While the request for a more autonomous role for the EU seemed to respond to changing 
threat perceptions and reflected lessons learnt from the previous thirteen years of CSDP 
implementation, the suggestion of an ‘independent leadership role’ somewhat exaggerated 
the EU’s ambitions presented in the EUGS, which at other times talks about more modest 
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ambitions. However, this highlights the need to further elaborate on the meaning of 
‘strategic autonomy’ if it is to be useful as a security and defence concept for the EU.  
 
The EU as the Epitome of Common European Values and Interests? 
Lucarelli and Manners believe that common values are a key component for constructing a European 
identity (in Kaina al., 2015, p. 59). While the promotion of ‘European values’ was described as an 
overarching objective for the ESS, it was only mentioned three times in the ESS.  Furthermore, 
whereas Article 2 in the EU Treaty spells out what the EU believes to be its core values, it wasn’t 
until 2007 and Article 21, §1 in the Lisbon Treaty that these were clearly linked to the EU’s security 
and defence policy: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance 
in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”.  
As Coelmont points out, not explicitly linking values and norms to its strategic vision resulted in the 
ESS failing to communicate adequately the reasons for a bigger role for the EU as a security and 
defence provider (2012, p. 4). Ringsmose and Børgesen explain that “if a given strategic narrative 
fails to present an unequivocal explanation of the overall objective […], the public will be left in 
bewilderment and without a credible conceptual framework for rationalising and interpreting 
events” (2011, p. 513). Without elucidating the EU’s identity as a security actor, shifting security 
practitioners’ focus from a national setting to the European level is problematic. The extent to which 
security practitioners recognise these values as European and see them as framework for validating 
EU security and defence cooperation and integration is explored in the next chapter.  
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The EUGS went into a lot more detail regarding the EU’s role as a security provider and the 
type of power it wanted to be. Moreover, it was also much more unambiguous about 
emphasising the pursuit of the EU’s common interests and values rather than wanting to 
export its model of governance to the rest of the world. Indeed, the term ‘values’ was 
referred to more than twenty times and ‘European values’ were clearly defined on a 
number of occasions. At one point, a specific link was made between “staying true to our 
values” and identity (p. 15). Furthermore, the EUGS suggested that there was a strong link 
between its values and interests, almost going so far as to suggest that the two terms could 
be used interchangeably: The EU’s “fundamental values are embedded in our interests. 
Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital 
interests underpinning our external action” (EUGS p. 13) and guiding the EU in “this difficult, 
more connected, contested and complex world” (ibid). The EUGS also acknowledged, 
however, that despite these seemingly common values and interests, “joining all our 
cultures together to achieve our shared goals and serve our common interests is a daily 
challenge, but it is also our greatest strength: diversity is what makes us strong”, herein 
reiterating the EU’s official motto (p. 4).  
By repeatedly linking the EU’s security and defence ambitions to the protection of European 
citizens’ interests and values, the Strategy sought to create a sense of common purpose and 
direction amongst its audience. It did so by tying these interests to the need to create a 
stronger Union that facilitates closer cooperation, and more specifically, increasing security 
and defence cooperation as the only way to ensure their protection: “We need a stronger 
Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects” (EUGS, p. 
13). However, the new Strategy also recognised the danger stemming from internal 
divisions within the EU and the negative effect these had on its credibility externally. It did 
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so on the one hand by reiterating the need to live up to the EU’s values internally to be a 
credible international actor (p. 15) and on the other by suggesting that interests within 
Europe are shared and that “there is no clash between national and European interests” […] 
and reiterating that “Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting 
together” (p. 16). While the purpose of this statement is clear, it represents a rather frail 
identity narrative as its credibility is somewhat weakened by its context which is marked by 
increased internal conflicts in the EU. Recent crises have highlighted that while values may 
continue to be shared, interests amongst Member States are somewhat diverging, 
suggesting a return to more nationalistic interpretations of the security environment (e.g. 
van Ham, 2016, Tocci 2016). Subsequently, such a framing of harmony between national 
and European interests is somewhat unconvincing and incapable of sufficiently tying 
together recent security and defence-related developments in an explanatory framework 
(see Antoniades, O’Loughlin, and Miskimmon 2010, p.  5). While the EUGS attempted to 
refocus Member States’ approaches to security and defence cooperation by alluding to the 
EU’s founding values and linking these to its current interests, it failed to explicitly suggest 
how to overcome this internal identity crisis.  
 
Principled Pragmatism as the EU’s New Guiding Principle  
While the idea of creating resilience as one of the EU’s new key priorities will be discussed in the 
next chapter, it forms part of what has been coined ‘principled pragmatism’ in the EUGS. This new 
approach to conducting foreign affairs is a key narrative within the Global Strategy and while its 
meaning was not defined at great length in the EUGS itself, Tocci contends that the concept 
attempted to overcome the “sterile debate on ‘interests versus values’” (2016, p. 6). Furthermore, 
she suggests that it asked us to “observe the world (and ourselves) as it is, not as we would like to 
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see it. We must be more modest at times in what we believe we can achieve and what we cannot” 
(2016, p. 6).  
In a way, the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ acted as an overarching identity narrative 
that attempted to make sense of the key priorities presented in the EUGS. By suggesting a 
more modest and differentiated approach to implementing the EU’s foreign policy, it also 
paved the way for a more inward-looking vision that concentrated on the security of the EU 
itself (combining internal and external security) and somewhat limited the EU’s focus on its 
neighbourhood. Howorth sums up that “where the ESS was bold, confident and even 
occasionally hubristic, the EUGS is realistic, modest and constructive” (2016, p.  25). This 
modesty also puts into perspective the kind of power that the EU holds in the international 
system as Tocci emphasises that the EU’s actions should occur “without the illusion that we 
can unilaterally bring peace, security, democracy or prosperity to the world. Not only is this 
an illusion, it is also a dangerous one” (2016, p. 6). Furthermore, a pragmatic approach to 
foreign affairs also explains the EU’s renewed emphasis on using hard power as a legitimate 
tool to implement security and defence decisions as it highlights the centrality of protecting 
European values and interests over being merely a ‘force for good’ in the world.  
To sum up, it can be said that the ESS did not contain any identity narratives that were 
comprehensive enough to convey a compelling framework for security practitioners to 
develop a common European approach to providing security and defence. The ESS sought to 
project an external EU identity centred around its newly gained role as a security provider 
characterised by having an extensive range of civilian and military tools at its disposal, thus 
rendering it a unique power within the international system. Furthermore, it attempted to 
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create a sense of shared European identity by alluding to common values that shape the 
EU’s CSDP.  
While identity narratives within the EUGS revealed some weaknesses in terms of definition 
and coherence, it seems that the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ has the potential to tie 
them together and thus shape the EU’s security and defence identity in the years ahead. 
However, as pointed out by many scholars, the EUGS unfortunately went largely unnoticed 
outside the EU’s security and defence community due to the timing of its publication a few 
days after the Brexit referendum, thus making it difficult to predict the extent to which it 
will be given the required attention from Member States, especially in light of the recent 
internal upheaval caused by Brexit (the fall-out of which remains unclear, in particular its 
effect on other Member State’s attitudes towards European integration) and other crises. 
However, despite all these internal problems, a 2016 Pew Survey indicated – somewhat 
counter-intuitively - that foreign policy at EU level remained one of the least politically 
contentious policy areas for Europeans, with 74% keen for the EU to engage more in world 
affairs (2016, p.  8). This suggests that the implementation of the CSDP remains a policy area 
that might see an increase in cooperation. Security practitioners’ views on this and their 
reception of these EU identity narratives are explored in the next chapter. 
 
The CSDP as the Best Tool to Protect Europe’s Security  
Issue narratives make up the last part of this study and in this particular case analysis 
focuses on strategic narratives surrounding the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. 
As Roselle et al. state, issue narratives provide context to governmental actions, describe 
the conflict or issue and explain how they resolve a certain issue, thus creating legitimacy 
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for the policy (2014, p. 76). While this is the most specific narrative level, it is also a very 
important one as these narratives attempt to convince their target audience that the CSDP 
is the best platform for dealing with a large number of current security and defence issues. 
This can only be achieved by closely linking CSDP narratives with those found at the other 
two levels, a common view of the international system and a sense of European identity 
implying shared interests, cultural norms, and values which enable joined and cohesive 
responses to security issues.  
 
Strategic Narratives on CSDP in the ESS and EUGS 
The ESS was written only four years after the signing of the Helsinki Headline Goal, which for 
the first time set out to add military capabilities to the EU’s foreign policy ‘toolbox’. Unlike 
its successor, the EUGS, this document focused solely on security and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy.  As mentioned previously, the Strategy was written in part as a response 
to America’s National Security Strategy and a number of large-scale terrorist attacks. 
However, one of its main purposes was also to clearly outline the advantages of increasingly 
conducting security and defence at EU level.  
The EUGS developed the EU’s strategic vision using a much wider approach, thus not only 
covering the CSDP, but also other foreign policy-related issues. However, further developing 
security and defence was a “matter of urgency” (EUGS, p. 10) and was discussed in detail in 
this much more comprehensive document. While there was some continuity in terms of 
themes from the ESS, such as the emphasis on multilateralism being the only way forward in 
security provision as well the centrality of the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’, there were 
also a number of new CSDP narratives in relation. The EUGS communicated a strategic 
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vision shaped by ‘principled pragmatism’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ as well as a strong focus 
on creating ‘resilience’ through its foreign policy. These new additions, Coelmont argues, 
constituted the core of the Strategy (2016, p. 10).  
When analysing the content of the ESS and EUGS, two key strategic narratives explaining the 
role and purpose of the CSDP stood out:  
 
 
Cooperation as the Only Way Forward 
While an emphasis on cooperation both within the EU and externally was also found to be 
one of the key international system narratives, the focus here however is on how the EU 
communicates the importance of the practical aspects of implementing the CSDP to its 
practitioners rather than solely considering the overarching idea of an ‘ever closer Union’.   
The ESS openly declared that “we are stronger when we act together” (2003, p. 13). 
However, this statement was made at a time when the EU comprised just 15 Member 
States, structures that had been put into place to implement the CSDP were still in their 
infancy and much improvement in terms of coherence and consistency was required. In fact, 
even five years after the adoption of the ESS, Biscop and Andersson argued that 
1) EU security and defence cooperation as the best way to adapt to a 
changing security environment and respond to ever more complex 
security threats
a) The practical advantages of EU cooperation
b) The EU's Comprehensive Approach
2) Establishing a common European security culture is important to 
improve security provision in Europe
FIGURE 8 - THE EU'S POLICY NARRATIVES Source: Researcher’s own 
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All the EU Member States and individual EU institutions pay lip service to the 
principle of coherence to improve coordination and avoid duplication of the EU’s 
external activities. The truth of the matter is that no Member State or institution has 
ever been prepared to give up completely its own role in the field. (2008, p. 125)  
While the ESS signified a significant step towards a more coherent EU (ibid, p. 137), calling 
for better coordination of EU level policy-making, it did not go into significant detail how 
this would be achieved. The Strategy set out the EU’s objective to streamline its efforts by 
‘pooling and sharing’ resources and capabilities between Member States as well as EU 
institutions including common threat assessments, intelligence sharing and better 
diplomatic communication (2003, p.  12). Furthermore, the ESS listed tools for responding to 
individual threats such as using a “mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other 
means” to deal with terrorism (ESS, p.  7), but apart from stating that “the European Union 
is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (ibid, p. 7), failed 
to explain why and how exactly the EU was a particularly capable security provider in these 
scenarios. Indeed, while the target audience may be familiar with their particular Member 
State’s strengths and capabilities, they are less likely to be aware of the instruments made 
available to the EU by the Member States and the possible impact of further ‘pooling and 
sharing’. Here, the ESS briefly mentioned potential benefits by suggesting that the 
“systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in 
the medium-term, increase capabilities” (ESS, p. 12).  
Despite not offering detailed information on the implementation of these objectives, the 
ESS did provide context regarding the benefits of cooperation by describing successful past 
and ongoing cooperation at EU level, referring to the EU’s response to 9/11, anti-
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proliferation policies and interventions in regional conflicts (ESS, p.  6). By alluding to 
previous successes, the Strategy attempted to go beyond expressing the need for increased 
cooperation, suggesting this is a continuation of a successful trend in international relations 
which adds a vital dimension to Member States’ own responses to security threats. Whether 
the CSDP is perceived to be a successful policy by security practitioners is explored during 
the interview analysis in the next chapter.  
Strongly situated in a time marked by numerous crises and upheaval, the EUGS continued to 
stress the need for more solidarity and mutual assistance when it comes to EU security: “In 
a more complex world of global power shifts and power diffusion, the EU must stand united. 
Forging unity as Europeans – across institutions, states and peoples – has never been so 
vital nor so urgent” (p. 16). It argued that cooperation between Member States needed to 
become more structured, with defence cooperation in particular “becom[ing] the norm” 
(EUGS, p. 11). The EUGS projected the need to ‘stand united’ not only by claiming that it was 
important for external credibility, but by relating increased cooperation directly to the 
“security, prosperity and democracy” of EU citizens themselves (p. 8), once more displaying 
a much more internal focus. Powerful language was used to deliver this message: “Our 
shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together. Only the combined 
weight of a true union has the potential” to achieve this (p. 16).  
 
Dealing with a Changed/Changing Security Environment 
Adapting to a changed and continuously evolving security environment is one of the key 
challenges the EU faces. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s armed forces have been 
undergoing major changes, not just in terms of the role they play and the tasks they 
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undertake, but also in relation to defence spending and downsizing. As Howorth remarks, by 
the time the ESS had been written, European forces had decreased in size by 43% since the 
end of the Cold War to approximately 4.9 million (Howorth, 2014, p. 82). The decreased 
emphasis on territorial defence brought with it the need to develop a new focus. As Kaldor 
et al. point out the EU, especially the European Commission, has thus developed a key 
discourse around the concept of human security and conflict prevention (2007, p.  277). 
They define the idea as “the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both 
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’” (ibid, p. 273). While the concept of human 
security was not explicitly referred to in the ESS, it is clear from the amount of times that 
words such as ‘civilian’ (8), ‘human’ (3) and ‘humanitarian’ (3) were referred to in this 
context, that one of the EU’s key narratives regarding the CSDP was its usefulness for 
providing human security. Furthermore, it placed emphasis on conflict prevention as the 
best way to stop crises from escalating (ESS, p. 7).  By focusing on the pursuit of human 
security, the ESS promoted a wider definition that also addressed “poverty, development, 
social injustice, aid, trade, arms control and governance” (ibid, p. 277), thus tying it in with 
the EU’s perceived strength of being a civilian power and the EU’s ‘comprehensive 
approach’.  
While certain threats and security requirements remained constant during the time 
between the ESS and EUGS, some other far-reaching developments occurred in those years. 
Most European governments had to further reduce their defence spending, resulting in 
smaller armed forces. In addition to these logistical changes, the EU’s neighbourhood also 
became less stable. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its ongoing conflict with Ukraine has 
brought instability onto the EU’s doorstep and put many Baltic countries on edge. 
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Furthermore, many European countries feel threatened by the influx of refugees from the 
Middle East and Africa. The EUGS contained several key changes in response to this 
changing security environment which are reflected in the Strategy. The opening lines entail 
references to instabilities in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and an acknowledgement 
of how internal and external security are becoming increasingly intertwined (p. 7). 
Furthermore, whereas the ESS had largely avoided discussing defence, the EUGS envisioned 
a greater role for the EU regarding the defence of its own borders. While the CSDP had 
previously been concerned solely with providing security externally, the new Strategy 
refocused EU security and defence to also include internal issues, i.e. suggesting it could 
support border protection missions (p. 20). These developments indicate that the EUGS not 
only continued to project itself as a security actor able to respond to a changing security 
environment, but also highlighted its ambitions to take on a bigger role as a security 
provider.   
 
The EU’s Comprehensive Approach 
The term ‘comprehensive approach’ has been frequently used in the EU’s security and 
defence policy discourse and has thus become a defining component of CSDP narrative. It 
singled out the EU as a uniquely equipped international actor which has at its disposal many 
(mainly non-coercive) tools enabling it to respond to security and defence issues 
comprehensively. The EU defines this approach as “the strategically coherent use of EU 
tools and instruments” (EU Commission, 13). While the term ‘comprehensive approach’ was 
not used in the ESS, it was referred to indirectly on numerous occasions. When the ESS was 
developed, the addition of military capabilities to the EU’s range of foreign policy 
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implementation instruments was still a recent innovation. The ESS therefore tried to foster a 
coherent approach to combining different tools by linking it to the demands of a rather 
changed and constantly evolving security environment. Here, the Strategy explained how 
security threats such as terrorism and regional conflicts are best tackled using both civilian 
and military measures (ESS, p. 7). NATO had previously been the sole international 
organisation providing using military capabilities to secure Europe, hence this addition to EU 
security and defence implementation required strategic rethinking on the part of EU 
Member States. The ESS thus focused on the EU’s perceived key tasks of conflict prevention 
and crisis management. Here, it alluded to the weaknesses of past interventions where 
“military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos” (ESS, p. 12) arguing that greater 
coherence when employing military and civilian tools is key in the EU’s attempt to establish 
itself as a successful security provider.  The ESS does however not provide any practical 
suggestions that go beyond the ‘pooling and sharing’ of resources and capabilities.  
The EUGS continued the promotion of a comprehensive approach to security and defence 
provision and sought to expand its meaning and scope (p. 9) to incorporate a “multi-
phased”, “multilevel” and “multilateral” method of dealing with conflicts, summing it up as 
engaging in a “practical and principled way in peacebuilding” (p. 28). While the EUGS 
continued to encourage the ‘normalisation’ of cooperation on security and defence matters 
and joined-up actions between Member States, this expansion of the EU’s comprehensive 




EU Security and Defence Provision Steered by Principled Pragmatism 
The EUGS declared that external action would be guided by ‘principled pragmatism’ in the 
years to come, thus “charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis 
of rash interventionism” (p. 16). Adopting this notion implies a more modest and realist 
approach to providing security and defence which is justified by “emphasising our own 
security, the neighbourhood, and hard power” and much less focus on spreading democracy 
(Biscop, 2016). This new approach manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, the EUGS 
specifically addressed the ‘defence’ component of the CSDP, which went largely 
unacknowledged in the ESS. The Strategy communicates the “indispensability of a credible 
military instrument” (ibid, p. 3) to “deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external 
threats”, independently of NATO if necessary (p. 19). Furthermore, it advocated the 
expansion of EU defence spending and research and making full use of the EDA’s potential 
(p. 21). With regards to conflict prevention and crisis management, it suggested a much 
more ‘tailor-made’ approach with strong emphasis on working with a wide range of 
international partners at all levels of society.  
 
Creating Resilience  
Resilience was one of the key concepts of the EUGS and, as a result, is mentioned more than 
forty times in the fifty-one-page document. It is defined as “the ability of states and 
societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises” (p. 
23) which is reflected in their societies feeling like they are “better off and hav[ing] hope for 
the future” (p. 26). Tocci, who was put in charge of formulating the EUGS notes that 
pursuing resilience enables the EU to move beyond the “perennial dichotomy of democracy 
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versus stability” (Ulgen, 2016, p. 46). The Strategy discussed the term resilience by strongly 
tying it to internal benefits as well as contributing to a safer world externally: “The EU will 
foster the resilience of its democracies, and live up to the values that have inspired its 
creation and development” (p. 15) by respecting “domestic, European and international law 
across all spheres, from migration and asylum to energy, counter-terrorism and trade” (p. 
16). This strong focus on safeguarding European values and interests, which underpins all 
aspects of the EUGS, was also reflected in the EU’s approach to facilitating resilient states 
abroad: “It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies 
to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa” as well as 
regions beyond those covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (p. 9).   
The Strategy clearly spelled out how the EU envisaged to achieve resilience externally. On 
the one hand, it believed the EU continued to hold a degree of normative power, or “power 
of attraction” as it is referred to in the EUGS (p. 25), which can encourage transformation, 
on the other it seeks to tackle “the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal 
and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe 
and its partners” (ibid). In addition, the EUGS promoted a strategic vision of prompt (and, if 
necessary, long term) action to prevent conflict, and facilitating locally owned agreements 
rather than imposing European models as well as working not only with national 
institutions, but ones representing all levels of society (p. 24). The EUGS also placed 
emphasis on adopting a “multifaceted” and “tailor-made” approach to fostering resilience 
(p. 25) which linked in with the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ and stressed the 




Conclusion to Chapter 7 Section a) 
While the ESS attempted to justify the establishment of the CSDP and the need to increase 
security and defence cooperation at EU level, it fell short of providing sufficient practical, 
more concrete steps towards achieving greater strategic coherence through adopting a 
comprehensive approach.  
In 2006, Howorth interpreted the establishment of the CSDP in quite a positive light, 
pointing out that a shift from  
British Atlanticism, French exceptionalism and German pacifism towards a common 
acceptance of integrated European interventionism, based not solely on the classical 
stakes of national interest, but also on far more idealistic motivations such as 
humanitarianism and ethics produced a new normative paradigm into international 
relations. (p. 213) 
However, a recently published analysis of the security goals of these three European 
countries, who have the highest defence spending in the EU, suggested that their level of 
commitment to the CSDP remained very low and their interests “out of step with those of 
the EU as a whole” (Chappell, et al., 2016, p. 208), thus representing a significant barrier to 
strategic coherence at EU level. This gloomy assessment made so many years after the 
adoption of the ESS highlights the biggest problem of CSDP implementation – a lack of 
political will at national level to fully implement the policy and increase cooperation at EU 
level. It also suggests that little progress has been made in terms of creating a common 
strategic vision for the EU. 
The EUGS presented a much more coherent and consistent narrative framework for its 
latest strategic vision. The narratives relating to the need for increased cooperation to 
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tackle security threats adequately, actions guided by principled pragmatism and the 
emphasis on fostering resilience as the overarching driving narratives behind CSPD 
implementation are neatly linked together and closely tied to a strong internal focus on 
safeguarding European citizens’ interests and values. By appealing to the audience’s core 
values (Ringsmose and Børgesen, 2011, p. 512), the EUGS tried to communicate an 
explanatory framework for CSDP implementation and further European integration, thus 
attempting to respond to the EU’s current internal climate which is marked by a lack of 
internal unity. However, political will remains the stumbling block for closer security and 
defence cooperation and the extent to which these narratives resonate with security 
practitioners is therefore explored in the next chapter.   
 
Section b): Observing and Analysing the Content of ESDC-Coordinated 
Training Courses 
While the two Strategies provide the EU’s official strategic vision for its security and 
defence, the training courses coordinated by the ESDC provided an opportunity to observe 
how the EU’s security and defence narratives are projected in a more practical, yet 
structured and somewhat regulated setting. This study involved observing six training 
courses, so cannot make any claims or indeed generalisations regarding the overall 
coherence and standardisation of training curricula. Yet, some observations from training 
courses attended during the data collection phase provide an insight into the ESDC’s 
activities and what CSDP training looks like in practice. Of the courses observed, three were 
Orientation Courses (the most common/popular training coordinated by the ESDC), one 
High Level Course Module (one of the College’s ‘flagship courses’) and two Military Erasmus 
Courses. Observations were focused on the course content and the extent to which the 
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standardised curricula were adhered to by the selected presenters, the variety of speakers 
(national and EU staff, military and civilian) and more informal aspects such as the 
atmosphere between participants and presenters as well as opportunities provided for 
informal networking.  
When examining the projection of strategic narratives, it is important to consider who is 
communicating. While there is little doubt about who the authors of the two Strategies 
were, the nature of the ESDC with its network structure and the selection of speakers by the 
individual course organisers means that there is a larger degree of variation in terms of who 
communicates and what is projected by these individuals. From observations and the course 
outlines, it is evident that while the core curriculum is adhered to, there was often a higher 
ratio of speakers with a national background compared to representatives from EU 
institutions as summarised in the chart (Figure 9) below.  
 
FIGURE 9 - COURSE SPEAKER RATIOS 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Rome CSDP Course





Source: Researcher’s own data 
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CSDP Orientation Courses  
First of all, it has to be noted that despite having a prescribed core curriculum, these 
training courses are run by national members of the ESDC. Thus, all three training sessions 
were conducted slightly differently, and their content differed to a certain extent, giving 
each one a ‘local flavour’.  
The Brussels course was, for the first time, a joint session for (mostly new) EUMS and EU HQ 
staff and participants from MS combining content from two courses, namely the Orientation 
Course and “CSDP Foundation Training for EU HQ”. This meant that the audience was larger 
than normal with over 70 participants, which, on the one hand, provided more networking 
opportunities, but at the same time made formal group discussions and individual 
participation more difficult. The course benefitted from subject experts being readily 
available due to its location and meant that participants largely received an ‘insider’s view’ 
of CSDP processes. Furthermore, course attendees’ EU experiences were enriched through a 
visit to the European Parliament.  
The Orientation Course in Bucharest had quite a different flavour. It was hosted by the 
Romanian National College of Home Affairs and approximately half of the 41 participants 
were Romanian staff responsible mainly for internal affairs while the other half was made 
up of representatives from Member States and EU institutions. The hosting institution’s 
focus on internal affairs was reflected in the course content, which at times appeared to 
differ significantly from the suggested curriculum and the topics outlined in the course 
schedule. Furthermore, logistical limitations (i.e. budget, location, etc.) resulted in a 
selection of speakers largely from within Romania. Participants felt this provided them with 
a somewhat national interpretation of CSDP processes (quote from course participants), 
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which some considered to be a valuable contribution by providing an alternative to a more 
EU-centric approach, while others felt it was too focused on Romanian internal affairs. 
Furthermore, on occasion speakers completely abandoned the topic they were meant to 
talk about and instead focused on a subject of their choosing (mainly Romanian issues). 
While this was certainly of value to the Romanian participants, a number of other 
Europeans noted that some of the content was not relevant to them and created a bit of a 
barrier between locals and foreigners (Interviewee 31, German).  
The third Orientation Course that formed part of this study took place in Rome and was 
hosted by the Italian Ministry of Defence and the Centre for Defence Higher Studies. 46 
participants from a range of different Member States were present. There seemed to be 
more of a balance between local and international attendees as well as presenters than was 
the case in Romania. One of the presentations which was especially well-received was that 
of Dr Tocci who gave a briefing on the drafting of the latest Global Strategy for the EU. It 
appeared that insights from academics were much appreciated at this course as well as the 
one in Brussels as they provided a different angle on implementation issues.  
 
High Level Course - Module 2  
The High-Level Course is a modular course, hosted by four different countries and taking 
place over the duration of a year. The first module had taken place a few months prior in 
Brussels and offered a high level introduction to the CSDP. Module 2 took place in Bucharest 
during the data collection period. This course was also hosted by the Romanian National 
College of Home Affairs and was attended by 63 high-ranking Member State representatives 
and EU officials. Participants were largely from other EU Member States with only a small 
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number of Romanian attendees. In terms of content, this course faced similar issues to the 
Orientation Course. While there was more balance with regards to national and 
international speakers, presentations from Romanian speakers had a noticeable national 
slant and at times veered off topic quite considerably. Furthermore, the (only) scheduled 
syndicate work that had been planned for Day 4 of the module was cancelled on the spot 
due to insufficient preparation and explanation, much to the dismay of the participants, 
who felt discussing critical issues in groups was one of the main reasons for attending the 
course. An excursion to experience Romanian sea border forces in action was well received. 
However, logistical problems further added to a level of dissatisfaction among the 
participants.  
 
EMILYO Common Modules 
The Military Erasmus courses are offered by several European military academies, with 
Austria being a major contributor. The two modules that form part of this study were 
provided by the Theresian military Academy in Wiener Neustadt and were attended by 
officer cadets attending the Academy as part of their international semester and ones 
visiting only to attend a specific course. Staff from the academy ran both modules.  
While all other training courses that form part of this study were focused specifically on 
CSDP and the EU institutions and mechanisms involved in its implementation, the ‘Military 
Erasmus’ courses did not set out to directly provide CSDP-specific training, but instead 
aimed to create a more coherent officer education across Europe and thereby more EU-
minded staff by offering joint training in Military English and the Law of Armed Conflicts.  
This is an important aspect to consider when evaluating the course content and its impact 
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on perceptions of the EU’s role in security and defence. It was however somewhat surprising 
that explicit references to CSDP or EU involvement in security and defence were not made 
during the courses. In fact, at one point during the Law of Armed Conflicts course, when 
international security actors were discussed, the EU was the only one not mentioned with 
regards to involvement by European countries. Instead, NATO was referred to frequently, 
especially with regards to international standards and cooperation. However, specific 
modules on CSDP for officer cadets are offered several times per year to provide them with 
basic knowledge of the policy. It therefore seems this initiative takes more of an indirect 
approach by widening young officers’ horizons about Europe and the EU in a less formal 
way. The strength of common modules for officer cadets lies in normalising exposure to and 
collaboration with fellow European military staff from the beginning of an officer’s career.  
 
Are Narratives Communicated Successfully to CSDP Practitioners during ESDC 
Training Courses? 
One of the main interview questions regarding the communication of narratives was what 
the interviewees felt were key messages that they were taking away from the training 
course. This question was asked without any prompts to avoid interviewer bias and to 
receive responses that reflected participants’ impressions of what the key points of the 
course were to them. Interview data shows that this approach resulted in a wide range of 
responses ranging from feedback statements about the course itself, personal gains such as 
better English knowledge and successful networking. Out of the 60 interviews, 44 contained 
direct responses to the question (others either indicated that they didn’t know whether 
they were taking away any key messages or the question was not asked). One particular 
response stood out as it directly contradicted the study’s hypothesis that training courses 
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are a platform for the projection of narratives: “I don't know if I'll take away any message. 
[…] I don't expect a message as such to be transmitted by the ESDC. That would be quite 
difficult, I suppose all Member States have their own views on CSDP which they will follow 
up when they get back to Brussels” (Interviewee 33, Irish). Not only was the respondent 
sceptical about whether it was actually possible for the EU to communicate any messages 
through the course, they also emphasised the perceived superiority of national 
interpretations of CSDP over EU discourse, even amongst those located in Brussels. While 
this was the only response that explicitly questioned the EU’s ability to transmit key 
messages this way, it alludes to the centrality of participants’ expectations regarding course 
content and benefit to them as opposed to the power of the EU as a narrator.  
The majority of participants’ responses could be divided into the following categories as 
shown in Table 5 below:  
TABLE 5 - CATEGORISED KEY MESSAGES TAKEN AWAY FROM TRAINING 
International system: relations with NATO, the EU as a global actor, threats, 
multilateralism 
15% 
European identity: EU vs. national interests, values 28% 
CSDP-related: comprehensive approach, civ-mil. relations, financing 26% 
Personal gains: networking, better knowledge of EU processes, English skills, 
going abroad 
18% 
Course feedback 13% 
 
With regards to messages taken away regarding the international system, the most common 
response was that the course had reminded participants that the CSDP is still a “work in 
progress” and “far from reaching its full potential” (Interviewee 8, Denmark) while others 
put into question to the EUs ambitions as a security actor. One interviewee even felt less 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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convinced of the EU’s power as a security provider after the training course than before 
(Interviewee 27, Spanish). Other respondents felt that the training and working in an 
international environment had underlined the need for increased cooperation within the 
EU, but also with external partners, NATO in particular, in order to achieve the EU’s 
ambitions as an international security actor: “It has taught me that the only way to survive is 
to work together in this part of the world. You can no longer afford to go solo” (Interviewee 
49, Netherlands). While many emphasised that they were supportive of a stronger role in 
conflict management for the EU, one participant suggested that this partnership would 
eventually result in a ‘European army’. The idea of a European army was brought up on 
numerous occasions. Often, its meaning was not clearly defined by interviewees, but many 
felt that the EU would not truly be a security actor without it as highlighted by a German 
officer-in-training who was of the opinion that “we won't be able to solve problems without 
a European army” (Interviewee 15, German). The idea of establishing a European army 
continues to be brought up by politicians on a regular basis (i.e. Juncker in 2015; Orban and 
Sobotka, 2016; Macron and Merkel in 2018), and seems to be supported by a considerable 
number of study participants on the grounds that it would be more cost-effective and give 
the EU more independence from NATO and the US.  
A shift towards a more inward-looking interpretation of the CSDP as described in the latest 
Global Strategy can also be detected amongst interviewees as illustrated by one from 
Slovakia:” First we need to have security amongst ourselves. We need to understand how to 
protect ourselves because now [our situation] is dangerous” (Interviewee 25, Slovakia). The 
refugee crisis and the situation in Ukraine was discussed by the majority of respondents and 
many of them highlighted how the EU should focus more on security issues on its own 
borders and in its neighbourhood: “The Eastern problems, the economic problems, the 
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refugee problems. The EU has to be prepared for anything at any time” (Interviewee 13, 
Lithuania). An interviewee from Slovakia believed that these more tangible threats would 
result in the EU trying to strengthen its engagement within its neighbourhood (Interviewee 
50, Slovakian). In terms of the CSDP training having an impact on participants’ views, one 
respondent stated that “for instance, taking into consideration the current situation which 
we now have in Europe, the migration influx, the situation in the Mediterranean, the crisis 
on our Eastern border, this course has given a lot when it comes to CSDP and the issues 
which we should be able to do within our common policies” (Interviewee 4, Finnish). 
Another practitioner pointed out that “the biggest learning point is the need and the drive 
to link defence subjects to all the other aspects of the EU - the integration of both. That's 
also the hard part, but it's our strength. Human rights with economic power and defence. 
That's the real value” (Interviewee 49, Netherlands).  
It seems course participants did not refer much to the EU and its position in the 
international system when discussing perceived key messages. When considering the coding 
categories above, it becomes apparent that a narrower focus, around questions over EU and 
national interests as well as specific issues regarding the implementation of the CSDP, 
seemed to play more heavily on practitioners’ minds.  
 
(Mis-) Communicating the CSDP During Training Courses 
CSDP training offers an important platform for communicating key strategic narratives and 
to ensure consistency with regards to training content, the ESDC has standardised its core 
courses. However, as these are run by the individual member institutions of the ESDC, 
adherence to agreed topics and their delivery very much depends on who these institutions 
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select to present the subject matter. Here, perceptions of the training courses differed quite 
considerably. While the ‘common modules’ that formed part of an officer’s education were 
generally not a topic of discussion during the interviews due to them being embedded into a 
structured course, the more ad-hoc nature of CSDP training courses on the other hand was 
frequently criticised during the interviews. Many interviewees felt that presenters did not 
adhere to the curriculum, instead either putting their own national slant on certain topics, 
or lecturing about completely different topics altogether, as illustrated by this comment: 
“What I dislike most is […] they give us their view of the EU. I am not interested in a national 
view of the EU. I am interested in the EU as such because I already have my national views. 
It's the EU views I am interested in” (Interviewee 36, Austrian).  Numerous security 
practitioners commented that this had had a significant impact not only on the messages 
they took away from the training course, but also on the overall impression they got from 
‘the EU’. As a result, a number of interviewees stated that the somewhat unsystematic 
nature of training delivery and the national interpretation of some topics was 
representative of the EU as a whole: “[the course] typifies the dysfunction of the EU and 
trying to organise 28 states. Some of the course has been well run and some bits have been 
awful and that's typical. Trying to coordinate 28 states for a common position is difficult at 
the best of times” (Interviewee 37, Irish). Another observation that a number of 
interviewees shared was that the delivery of the training course had revealed the 
shortcomings of CSDP implementation in a way that was not conducive to facilitating a more 
CSDP-focused approach amongst security practitioners: “I think this course will confirm my 
negative vision of EU in the future” (Interviewee 25, Slovakian) while another remarked : “I 
thought the [EU’s] role was stronger, but after the course I am not so sure” (Interviewee 27, 
Spanish). One course participant even went so far as to say that the course had “reinforced 
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everything that is wrong about the EU” and called it “military tourism” (Interviewee 32, 
Ireland).  
Training participants felt mostly positive about the EU’s informal ways of communicating its 
strategic narratives. While one or two interviewees indicated that they felt bringing 
together civilian and military staff made it difficult to get debates going (Interviewee 44, 
Finnish), most other training participants saw this ‘comprehensive’ approach to CSDP 
training as beneficial: “I think having a joint course for military and civilian staff is also really 
helpful. Usually, those kinds of courses are not possible. There is often disagreement 
between the two 'camps’” (Interviewee 51, German). Another commented that “so far the 
most rewarding has been the possibility to interact with other course participants. People 
with different experiences talking about things you cannot find on the internet - personal 
experiences. That makes you think in a different way” (Interviewee 42, Swedish).  
Furthermore, despite remarking that official networking opportunities were often sparse, 
course attendees felt the informal interactions with fellow participants allowed them to get 
a better understanding of EU security cooperation, but also with regards to developing their 
intercultural awareness: “I have a deeper understanding especially of the Romanians now. 
Seeing how they talk, react and learning about their identity” (Interviewee 31, German). 
These observations highlight the fact that narratives are not solely communicated through 
course content, but also the very nature of ESDC-coordinated training courses. By bringing 
together security practitioners with civilian and military backgrounds as well as from many 
different Member States, the EU indirectly projects its strategic narratives regarding its 
Common Security and Defence Policy. The positive impact of informal interactions amongst 
course participants underlines the importance of this indirect projection of the EU’s 
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strategic narratives which not only facilitates the communication of CSDP narratives but ties 
together all narrative levels.  Furthermore, it emphasises the importance of the individual in 
the process of narrative projection and reception. Not only are networking opportunities 
and informal interactions an indirect tool for communicating narratives, but personal 
experiences and anecdotes are also crucial in steering the reception of narratives.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 7 Section b) 
Observing such a variety of courses aimed at civilian and military staff covering the whole 
spectrum of career stages provided a valuable and specific insight into the ESDC’s efforts to 
help create a common security culture through training. It highlighted both the benefits and 
the challenges of joint training. While all courses succeeded in creating platforms for 
interaction and socialisation amongst European security and defence staff, the fact that 
training delivery largely remained the responsibility of Member States meant that it did not 
seem truly standardised and coherent. Furthermore, a clear distinction has to be made 
between specific training courses on CSDP issues and joint training initiatives such as the 
‘Military Erasmus’. While CSDP-related courses focused on overtly narrating CSDP to staff, 
the military student mobility scheme aimed at fostering a better understanding between 
European military personnel, an increasing willingness to collaborate on security and 
defence and, overall, a sense of solidarity. Yet, a combination of neither of the two modules 
specifically addressing EU security and defence, and an apparent general lack of knowledge 
regarding the EU’s security and defence policy amongst officer cadets seems to suggest that 
an increase in awareness of the EU as a channel for security and defence collaboration was 
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not achieved through the scheme. Instead, other international organisations, specifically 








CHAPTER 8: Receiving EU Strategic Narratives  
While the EU has taken significant steps towards forming narratives which provide a 
framework for understanding its pursuit of European security integration through the 
drafting of strategic documents such as the ESS and the EUGS as well as the creation of the 
ESDC, it is equally important to consider how these efforts are perceived by their target 
audiences, one of them being European security practitioners themselves. As Nye points out 
“what the target thinks is particularly important, and the targets matter as much as the 
agents" (Nye quoted in Roselle et al., 2014, p. 75). Whereas the previous chapter 
investigated the EU’s attempts at projecting strategic narratives with the aim of 
“explain[ing] the world and set[ting] constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and 
shape[ing] perceived interests” (ibid, p. 76), this chapter is devoted to examining how these 
are perceived by security practitioners participating in CSDP courses. Furthermore, empirical 
data is analysed to establish the extent to which the EU’s narratives are contested in a 
European security setting that is governed by national decisions and has, at least until 
recently, predominantly been shaped by national interests and cooperation through NATO 
rather than EU channels.  
The framework for analysis is the same as the one applied to the projection of strategic 
narratives and looks at the reception of narratives regarding the international system, the 
EU’s identity as well as the CSDP specifically. The data used to shed light onto how these 
narratives are received comprises primary data collected through an online survey amongst 
security practitioners prior to participating in CSDP training as well as interviews with the 
same practitioners during and after the training courses which are coordinated by the ESDC. 
By combining these two types of data, both the effects of working on EU security and 
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defence on a daily basis and the direct impact of CSDP training were scrutinised. While data 
from the online survey conducted between September and November 2015 is used to 
establish the extent to which attitudes were congruous, distinctive from or indeed clashing 
with the narratives communicated through the EU’s strategy documents, interview data 
from EU-level training between September and November 2015 was gathered to highlight 
how narratives are received by their target audience and whether they challenge 
individuals’ existing understanding of security and defence.  
As the analysis is structured around the three different levels of narrative, it is divided into 
three sections starting with a) The EU in the International System according to Security 
Professionals. This is an investigation of overarching views of European security and 
defence, which correspond to international system narratives. It then explores security 
practitioners’ interpretations of the role and identity of the EU, its values and goals and the 
extent to which there is contestation between EU and national narratives in b) Notions of 
European Identity amongst CSDP Staff. This is followed by c) Practitioners’ Views of the 
CSDP and the Future of European Security and Defence, which is an examination of security 
practitioners’ views of the EU’s CSDP and its perceived usefulness for dealing with security 





Section a) The EU in the International System according to 
Security Professionals  
As the purpose of strategic narratives is to provide a framework for contextualising foreign 
policy developments in a manner that leads to the creation of common attitudes and 
opinions amongst their audiences (see Antoniades, O’Loughlin, and Miskimmon, 2010), this 
first section examines how European security practitioners viewed the EU in the 
international security environment prior to taking part in CSDP training. In addition to 
investigating the extent to which notions of the EU as a key multilateral security actor 
existed amongst study participants, it also considers whether EU level training courses 
convey the EU’s international system narratives in a manner that shapes their way of 
making sense of international relations. As already noted, Ringsmose and Børgesen suggest 
that to be effective narratives have to “resonate with the intended audience’s core values 
and advocate a persuasive cause-effect description that ties events together” (2011, p. 512). 
While core values are discussed in the next section dealing with identity narratives, this one 
seeks to understand the extent to which international system narratives were congruous 
with the way CSDP practitioners viewed the security system and attempts to determine how 
they were received during the CSDP training process.  
 
Security Practitioners’ Views of the International System Prior to 
Participation in CSDP Training 
As security provision in the EU remains an intergovernmental undertaking with Member 
States retaining full sovereignty over their decision-making processes, it was not surprising 
that most security practitioners who participated in this study were employed by their 
governments to work on CSDP or seconded to the EU for limited periods of time, thus 
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operating mainly within a national context. The overwhelming majority of study participants 
(96%) were national civilian or military staff and only a small number, (eight out of 195 
respondents) worked directly for the EU rather than represented their country in an EU 
setting. It was therefore important to establish how aware all of these individuals were of 
the EU’s CSDP and its strategic vision. Furthermore, it was of interest to see whether views 
differed from those directly employed by an EU institution and those working for Member 
States. There were four survey questions which aimed to measure participants’ awareness 
of the EU’s security and defence policy, including one, which related to participants’ 
understanding of NATO, thus providing an interesting comparison, as NATO is a very well-
established security actor and as such is an organisation that many security practitioners 
may be more familiar with.  
The most general question was aimed at establishing security practitioners’ views on how 
the international system works and started by asking security practitioners to rate their 
understanding of EU political processes. While this question did not provide an insight into 
their views of the international system itself, it did give an indication of how engaged they 
were with EU procedures. Prior to launching the online survey, it was thought that 
knowledge of EU processes and, in particular CSDP and the ESS, would be fairly low as a 
large proportion of training participants were new to working on EU security and defence 
whereas a better understanding of NATO’s role was anticipated due to its long-established 




FIGURE 10 - UNDERSTANDING OF CSDP-RELATED 
MATTERS 
As can be seen in Figure 10 above, a slight majority of respondents indicated a good or very 
good understanding of EU processes (44% and 12% respectively), while 34% said their 
knowledge was fair and 7% believed it was poor or very poor (6% and 1% respectively). 
Considering the extent to which the EU is often criticised for being too complex and lacking 
transparency and therefore difficult to understand, this self-assessment by CSDP 
practitioners is in line with prior expectations.   
With regards to their area of expertise being security and defence issues, the survey data 
showed that participants did not feel they understood the CSDP better than the EU’s 
political processes in general as 40% and 17% respectively rated their knowledge as good or 
very good. The number of respondents specifying their understanding to be fair, poor or 
very poor is almost identical to those in the previous question, suggesting that at least prior 
to CSDP training little emphasis had been placed on gaining specific knowledge of the CSDP.  
When asked about an even more specific aspect of EU security and defence, this lack of 












EU Political Processes CSDP ESS the Role of NATO
Overall, how would you rate your understanding of...
Very poor Poor Fair Good Very good No answer
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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European Security Strategy had the lowest positive scores with only 30% and 12% of 
participants respectively indicating their knowledge was good or very good. This is 
significantly lower than all other categories. Consequently, approximately one quarter of 
respondents indicated their understanding of the ESS to be poor or very poor (19% and 5 % 
respectively) while the proportion of respondents describing their understanding as fair was 
similar to the other two questions (at 30%).  
Survey results show that CSDP practitioners felt they were most familiar with the role of 
NATO, as more than two-thirds stated their knowledge was good or very good (40% and 
29% respectively). This was a significantly higher response than all EU-centred knowledge 
and not unexpected as cooperation through NATO and working within a NATO framework 
has been in place considerably longer than EU-level cooperation and a better understanding 
of its role, processes and purpose is thus more likely. Security practitioners’ familiarity with 
NATO was further underlined by the fact that it ranked considerably higher despite - one in 
six survey respondents being from a non-NATO country- thus suggesting that knowledge of 
NATO processes is something that all European security practitioners share. This is further 
illustrated by the mean scores (5 = very good, 4 = good, 3 = fair, 2 = poor, 1 = very poor) in 

















FIGURE 11 - UNDERSTANDING OF CSDP-RELATED 
MATTERS – MEAN VALUE 
 
When interpreting these findings, it is important to consider the setting of this study. As the 
researcher worked closely with the ESDC and thus indirectly also with the EU’s Member 
States, it is likely that participants responded to some extent in a way that was socially 
desirable or made them look as competent as possible. As Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 
argue, this kind of bias is especially common in organisational behaviour studies as 
participants tend to believe that there is a chance that their institution might see their 
responses (2002, p. 247). While such a bias is not expected to have a significant impact on 
results, it is worth keeping in mind when evaluating findings.   
 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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Exploring the Reception of International System Narratives Amongst 
CSDP Practitioners 
FIGURE 12 - THE EU'S INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
NARRATIVES  
The EU’s Priorities in a Changing Security System 
In order to gain a better understanding of security practitioners’ understanding of security 
and defence and the role that the EU plays as a security provider, survey respondents were 
asked to rate how important it is that their country:  
• Protects its inhabitants and their interests using military force; 
• Uses primarily non-coercive means to achieve peaceful relations with other states; 
• Provides humanitarian assistance to the weak and vulnerable internationally; and, 
• Cooperates with other states through international organisations such as the UN, 
NATO and the EU. 
They were then asked the same question in relation to the EU. These questions were not 
asked in order to attempt to rank security and defence priorities, but rather to establish 
whether security practitioners perceived the EU’s role as a security provider to be different 
from that of nation-states. Despite not expecting any considerable variations in ratings 
between national and EU priorities, a slight divergence of priorities was anticipated prior to 
conducting this research due to the assumption that the EU was generally perceived to be 
Source: Researcher’s own 
1) The international system is increasingly complex - acting alone is no longer an option
Within these, the following themes were covered: 
a) From security threats to priorities: The common and complex challenges for Europe 
b) The EU's relationship with other international actors such as NATO 
Source: Researcher’s own  
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primarily a soft power with a limited security role. The chart below (Figure 13) shows the 
priorities perceived to be ‘very important’ for the EU versus participants’ countries.  
Survey results seem to confirm that the traditional focus of security on territorial defence, 
and in particular the use of military force, was no longer the main priority, receiving the 
lowest agglomerated ‘important’ score out of the four priority areas with 79%, consisting of 
26% ‘very important’ and 53% ‘important’. These ratings also reflect the changing nature of 
security threats, which nowadays often requires a comprehensive combination of military 
and civilian measures. When asked how important they felt it was that the EU protects its 
inhabitants using military force, a similar proportion of study participants deemed it 
important (28% very important and 52% important). When taking into consideration 
previous research and publications, it might seem somewhat surprising that security 
practitioners considered the use of military force to be as important for the EU as it is for 
their countries. However, it is important to note that this aspect of security provision also 







Security and Defence Priorities ('very important' rating)
Protects its inhabitants and their interests using military force
Uses primarily non-coercive means to achieve peaceful relations with other states
Provides humanitarian assistance to the weak and vulnerable internationally
Cooperates with other states through international organisations such as the UN, NATO [and the EU]
FIGURE 13 - SECURITY AND DEFENCE PRIORITIES: 
EU VS. STATE 
 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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responses for both national governments and the EU regarding the importance of using 
peaceful means and providing humanitarian assistance, it seems security practitioners saw 
the EU primarily as a security provider that focuses on using non-coercive means and 
offering humanitarian assistance. The extent to which such an interpretation of the data is 
warranted is discussed when analysing empirical data in relation to the extent to which the 
EU was perceived to be a useful tool for security provision and therefore a credible security 
actor later on in the analysis.   
The second priority received corresponding results with regards to importance, which were 
significantly higher than the use of military force: ‘Using non-coercive means to achieve 
peaceful relations with other states’ was considered important by 84% of respondents (48% 
very important and 36% important). This figure was the same when asked about the EU 
(with a 51%/33% split). Furthermore, on both occasions it obtained the second highest ‘very 
important’ ratings, thus suggesting that security practitioners very much considered 
employing civilian measures as a key part of dealing with security threats in today’s world.  
Humanitarian assistance has been one of the key priorities for the EU since the launch of the 
CSDP in the early 2000s. While 79% of respondents declared it to be an important task for 
their national governments (35% very important and 44% important), the figures for the EU 
were 47% for ‘very important’ and 37% for ‘important’. Considering the nature of the EU’s 
engagement in missions and operations to date, the results indicate that providing 
humanitarian assistance internationally was perceived to be slightly more important for the 
EU than it was for the individual Member States. While a more pronounced difference may 
have been expected due to the fact that the majority of the CSDP missions have been 
civilian in nature, these findings suggest that humanitarian assistance has become a key 
aspect of security and defence provision.  
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Moreover, a multilateral approach to security and defence was crucial in the eyes of security 
practitioners. This is evident from the large number of ‘important’ ratings this question 
received both for national governments and the EU (91% and 89% respectively). This seems 
to suggest that there was a widespread understanding amongst CSDP practitioners that 
security and defence issues can no longer be tackled by individual countries and multilateral 
cooperation was a necessity for any organisation providing security.   
 
Security Practitioners’ Views on the Roles of the EU and NATO 
The online survey clearly revealed that participants felt much more knowledgeable about 
the role of NATO than the EU and open-ended responses often included references to NATO 
being Europe’s key security provider. This suggests that successful implementation of the 
CSDP hinges on the untangling of the remits of and the relationship between the EU and 
NATO. When interviewed about the EU’s role as a security provider, and in particular its 
military capabilities, some practitioners indicated that they thought the EU had none or that 
it was not yet in a position to successfully engage militarily. However, numerous 
interviewees were of the opinion that it was not within the EU’s remit to act as a military 
power at all. One interviewee, a military officer-in-training, described the EU’s role as 
follows:  
I don't know how much [the] EU is acting as a security provider. I think NATO is much 
more effective. Quite a lot of countries in the EU are also in NATO. So NATO is the 
main thing. […] When I think about [the] EU, it's money, political decisions, borders, 
maybe human rights. When I think about NATO, everything is about the military, 
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about security. So I think the EU is not a main actor in security. (Interviewee 18, 
Lithuanian)  
Another participant stated that “the EU is a gap filler in different fields of security that are 
not military” (Interviewee 1, Sweden).  
Struggling to separate the functions of the EU and NATO was frequently alluded to, such as 
by a Romanian course participant: “The relationship between EU and NATO, differentiating 
between what they both do is difficult. It is part of the problem. It makes us react too late 
and causes other problems” (Interviewee 23, Romania). Other participants saw a clear 
distinction between their remits because they did not (yet) consider the EU to be a full 
security provider as evidenced by a statement from an interview participant from a country 
seeking EU membership: “The large majority of my citizens feel different about NATO and 
the EU. They see EU as a chance to live a decent life and to be better off. But NATO is 
separate. It's the security sector”. (Interview 22, Moldovan). This sentiment was also shared 
by a Spanish participant who stated that “We depend on NATO a lot. Hopefully in the future 
we can start doing smaller steps to create an independent military force in Europe. But right 
now, the missions are more oriented towards civilian work. The real military ones are 
NATO” (Interviewee 28, Spanish). A Swedish respondent had a similar view as they believed 
that “we will maybe see NATO become the military toolbox and the EU becoming, not 
softer, but another part of the toolbox” (Interviewee 42, Swedish). These opinions indicate 
that a strong focus on civilian work continued to dominate and that there was little 
acknowledgement of the EU’s military capabilities. The idea of allocating civilian tasks to the 
EU and military ones to NATO appeared to be a popular vision for the future of European 
security and defence.  
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Furthermore, results from this study showed that the relationship between NATO and the 
EU was a key issue when assessing support for further integration of EU security and 
defence. Whereas some course participants linked their reluctance towards further 
integration to ongoing frictions within the EU, many felt that EU-NATO relations were a 
problematic issue, suggesting that clearly defining each organisations’ role was a major 
aspect of determining the future of CSDP: “I don't believe that there will be any dramatic 
change in the foreseeable future. Hard security is given by the Member States to NATO, but 
EU has learnt to support security of its Member States for quite practical and technical 
issues” (Interviewee 6, Finnish). Another interviewee had a similar vision for the EU having a 
somewhat subordinate role: “I think European security has to emerge gradually as a 
cooperation with NATO. Security arrangements are currently anchored in the transatlantic 
partnership and I think a lot of other countries agree with that” (Interviewee 8, Danish). 
Moreover, due to the perceived overlap and duplication of efforts between the EU and 
NATO, some security practitioners argued for a CSDP that focuses solely on civilian aspects 
of security as this was “an area where we can move much more freely” (Interviewee 23, 
Romanian). Many practitioners shared this view and agreed with the EU in so far that closer 
cooperation between the two was necessary to improve security and defence provision in 
Europe. 
This continued perception of NATO being Europe’s main security and only defence provider 
is a strong counter-narrative to the EU’s focus on fostering a truly comprehensive approach 
that includes a credible military role for the EU. However, while the EUGS acknowledges this 
by stating that “when it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework 
for most Member States” (p. 20), it also advocates for the EU to take on a more active role.   
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The EU’s Relationship with Other Global Actors 
While many interviewees commented on a lack of clarity concerning the EU’s relationship 
with NATO, many recognised the importance of working with other international actors 
when responding to global security threats. Indeed, for one interviewee this was one of the 
crucial conclusions from the training course “Here I agree with lecturers […]. We are not 
prepared on our own. To approach this, we need cooperation. Globally, we need to do this” 
(Interviewee 34, Spanish).  
However, whereas many considered the EU to be a key actor in international affairs (albeit 
most often not in a military sense, only in a civilian capacity), others had a more modest 
view of the EU’s role in the international system: “They [the EU] have a direct link to the 
USA. They are like a satellite of the US. The US is making their foreign policy. It all depends 
on the two major players in the world. US and Russia, everyone else is just a little fish, even 
NATO” (Interviewee 47, Slovakia). There seemed to be two main visions regarding the future 
of the transatlantic partnership – one purporting the continuation of a strong cooperation 
between the EU and the US and another seeking a more autonomous role.  
While a strong emphasis on employing a multilateral approach with significant cooperation 
between the EU and the US is foreseen in the most recent EUGS, the Strategy also calls for 
more ‘strategic autonomy’ to better protect its own interests (p. 4). This autonomy is not 
explained in more detail, thus rendering future transatlantic developments somewhat 
vague. Some practitioners felt greater independence from NATO and the US was needed to 
deal with Europe’s own security problems in an efficient manner. This was illustrated by a 
comment from Interviewee 36 (Austrian) referring to a map showing ‘US responsibilities’ in 
Europe during a training session: “We shouldn't let the Americans tell us where left and 
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right is. I don't need an American flag on my map, it's the EU. Of course, they are partners 
and friends, but where we are is the front”. Another interviewee stated that “NATO means 
USA, USA leads NATO and it leads European countries. It would be better if Europe itself 
creates its own rules and security” (Interviewee 18, Lithuania). Others clearly believed that 
increased EU-NATO cooperation was the answer to solving ever more complex security 
issues: “Most Member States want to move closer to NATO. Possibly in time NATO will look 
after the hard power aspect in Europe and we would look after the soft power, like trade 
embargoes, development funds, etc.” (Interviewee 33, Irish). A Dutch study participant 
suggested that:  
In future we should be more complementary to NATO. […] NATO is the number one 
security provider simply because it is an organisation where the US are fully involved 
and will remain fully involved. They are seen by many EU Member States as the 
umbrella for safety. Transatlantic ties are important and should never be cut, and in 
this vein the EU should be a stronger pillar within NATO and really step up to the 
plate with their spending. (Interviewee 41, Netherlands)  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 8 Section a) 
The EU communicates a vision of the international system as becoming ever more complex, 
thus requiring the deepening of security and defence cooperation internally as well as 
externally through a strong focus on multilateralism. Security practitioners who formed part 
of this study were overall aware of the advantages of working increasingly with European 
partners and other international partners, but they repeatedly pointed out that it was still 
up to the national governments to push for the implementation of the EU’s ambitions. 
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Furthermore, despite the EU’s promotion of a comprehensive approach to security 
provision, many believed that in order to avoid duplication and confusion, the EU should 
limit itself to civilian tasks and leave military missions up to NATO. This implies that overall 
security practitioners see the EU as a security provider in the international system, but not 







Section b) Notions of European Identity amongst CSDP Staff  
The content analysis of the ESS and EUGS discussed in the previous chapter revealed two 
key narratives communicating notions of European identity in relation to EU security and 
defence as shown in Figure 14 below:  





In line with the narratives listed above, analysis of notions of identity amongst CSDP 
practitioners was conducted according to a number of themes which can be found below. 
These were derived from the theoretical framework used in this study and were also shaped 
by the definition of European integration identity developed as part of this thesis.  
Investigating the emergence of a European integration identity:  
1. Personal notions of European identity:  
a. ‘European’ values 
b. A sense of belonging and community with fellow Europeans 
c. European identity vs. national identity 
2. The EU’s external identity 
a) hard power/soft power/normative power? 
b) Perceived external perceptions of Europe/EU  
c) The role of ‘the other’  
FIGURE 14- THE EU'S IDENTITY NARRATIVES 
1) The EU’s expanding role as a security actor: 
from soft power to developing a comprehensive 
approach steered by principled pragmatism
2) Europe’s common values and interests as the 
driving force to create a stronger Union 
Source: Researcher’s own  
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3. Impact of receiving European identity narratives through CSDP training on views of 
European integration: positive perceptions vs. disillusionment 
4. The impact of recent crises on notions of identity  
While the majority of these were derived from the content analysis of the ESS and EUGS, a 
few themes also emerged during the survey and interview process, namely the impact of 
recent crises on interviewees’ perceptions of European identity and the EU’s efforts at 
communicating a European identity. The former was also mentioned occasionally during the 
survey, but due to a lack of open-ended questions, views on this could only be expressed 
minimally. The latter was added as the EU’s ability, or lack thereof, to communicate a 
European identity during training was repeatedly brought up by interviewees. Findings from 
both the online survey and interviews provide an insight into whether a “strong collective 
identity” which goes beyond “general support for decisions being taken at EU level” 
(Kantner, 2006, p. 207) and towards a “shared ethical self-understanding which underpins 
the pursuit of common interests and collective projects” (ibid, p. 512) is developing amongst 
security practitioners as a result of working on CSDP matters and undergoing collective 
training.  
Both the online surveys and the in-depth interviews contribute to the investigation of 
notions of European (integration) identity among training participants. On the one hand, 
analysing the results from the online survey conducted amongst security practitioners prior 
to participating in CSDP training sheds light on security practitioners’ primary identifications 
as well as existing notions of European identity. Questions relating to notions of identity 
made up the largest part of the online survey and covered several different aspects. In 
addition to collecting contextual information regarding participants’ experiences of training 
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and exchanges, questions captured respondents’ overall identifications as well as whether 
they felt European identity existed, what such an identity consisted of and what it meant to 
be a European citizen. Furthermore, the survey investigated individuals’ values and, if and 
how they corresponded to those that participants attributed to the EU. There were also two 
identity questions specifically relating to the role of security practitioners– one concerning 
uniforms displaying the European flag and another one asking participants about their views 
on the idea of a European army. In addition to these questions directly related to the 
concept of European identity, the survey also incorporated a number of questions regarding 
participants’ motivations for choosing their current careers. While these investigated more 
personal notions of identity, the aim was to get an insight into whether military 
professionals, and also civil servants related to the notion of wanting to ‘serve their nation’ 
and whether this was accompanied by a strong attachment to their nation-states.  
However, this research method only allowed limited explorations of notions of identity and 
since identity is a somewhat vague concept, and as such interpreted in many different ways, 
a qualitative look at what European identity meant to study participants was crucial. 
Subsequent in-depth interviews facilitated a more thorough exploration of CSDP 
practitioners’ relationships with Europe and the EU. Furthermore, they honed in on what 
training participants took away from the training courses as key messages relating to 
notions of identity and explored if and how the EU’s identity narratives were accepted or 
rejected by training participants.  
While the narratives projected in the ESS and EUGS overlap somewhat, it is also evident that 
the EU’s narration of identity has progressed and developed since the publication of the 
ESS. The 2015 study participants would not have been familiar with the then yet to be 
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published 2016 EUGS document at the time of data collection but may have been exposed 
to some of its content and rhetoric through their work or by participating in the courses. As 
such, it is only possible to evaluate how far security practitioners’ views correspond to the 
strategic identity narratives projected in the EUGS rather than trying to measure their direct 
impact on practitioners.  
An interview guide rather than a fixed set of interview questions was used to provide some 
structure to the interviews, but also allowing a degree of flexibility regarding the order and 
phrasing of identity-related questions, as well as providing opportunities to probe certain 
statements further. Due to the chosen approach to interviewing, the analysis follows coded 
themes rather than the exact interview questions, but an overview of identity-related 
questions is provided below.  
A number of questions were aimed directly at further investigating notions of European 
identity, including whether interviewees could see themselves working for the EU rather 
than their country and whether they thought there was a distinctly ‘European’ way of 
approaching their work. Training participants were also asked whether there was a sense of 
community and shared values and interests at their work and the extent to which they felt 
this was important. They were also asked a very open question – “what does Europe mean 
to you”, offering an opportunity to express their views and explore the extent to which they 
differentiated between Europe and the EU. This also allowed interviewees to voice their 
interpretation of the concept of European identity. Furthermore, interviewees were asked 
to comment on the impact of the training course, in particular regarding their feelings about 
the EU and further integration, as well as what key messages they were taking away. 
Additionally, one question that only members of the armed forces were asked was about 
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their personal attitudes towards ‘serving their nation’, as well as how they felt about 
‘making the ultimate sacrifice’ and whether it mattered to them whom they risked their 
lives for.  
 
(European) Identity amongst Survey Respondents Prior to CSDP 
Training 
A key aspect of this study was to record CSDP practitioners’ notions of identity prior to 
participating in ESDC-coordinated training courses with a view to establish existing 
identifications and views on Europe and the EU. While it is impossible to ascertain precisely 
how individuals arrived at their opinions and thus determine the exact impact of 
subsequent CSDP training, this exercise nevertheless provided a valuable assessment of how 
security practitioners, who have traditionally had strong ties to their nation-state as their 
employer, situated themselves within Europe and specifically the EU. Furthermore, 
examining participants’ notions of identity prior to CSDP training provided a starting point 
for assessing the extent to which European identity narratives communicated during the 
courses were compatible with existing identity narratives, particularly national ones.  
 
Personal Notions of European identity 
As this study investigates notions of European integration identity, which is closely linked to 
the EU as an institution, survey questions centred on participants’ understandings of what it 
means to be an EU citizen and what values they associated with the EU, whereas 
identification with Europe was explored in more detail during the in-depth interviews.  
The first question (Question 30) directly examining participants’ identities asked 
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respondents to indicate the extent to which they identified with the following: a region 
within their country; their country; Europe; being a citizen of the world. Respondents were 
asked to rank their identification from 1 (not at all), to 5 (to a great extent). While seven 
participants selected ‘other’, none of them specified a meaningful fifth category. Taking the 
mean value from all responses, identification with the different categories was as follows in 
Figure 15:  
 
FIGURE 15 - IDENTIFICATION WITH REGION, COUNTRY, EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
 
The results indicate that CSDP practitioners identified with their country to the greatest 
extent with a mean of 4.67, while ‘being a citizen of the world’ received the lowest mean 
score (3.55). Identification with a country’s region and with Europe received almost identical 
scores (4.15 and 4.22 respectively).  
It was expected that survey respondents would identify most with their country, and 
indeed, less than 2% rated their identification with their country below a three. However, 
region and Europe receiving almost the same scores was somewhat unexpected, especially 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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as regional movements have been gaining momentum in a number of European countries 
(e.g. Spain, Belgium, UK), while Euroscepticism had seen a significant increase in recent 
years (Coelmont, 2016, p. 9). Whereas a mean score of 3.55 indicates that respondents felt 
somewhat connected to the rest of the world and identified as global citizens, this 
significantly lower rating also suggests that their identifications seemed to be defined more 
by a geographically confined sense of belonging.  
 
Does a European Identity Currently Exist? 
 
Despite being difficult to define, the concept of European identity is frequently used in 
everyday life. Respondents were thus asked directly whether they thought such an identity 
existed.  A breakdown of responses is shown in Figure 16.  
 
FIGURE 16 - EXISTENCE OF A COMMON EUROPEAN IDENTITY 




This question was followed up with a more detailed question regarding the make-up of such 
European identity in the eyes of security practitioners (only those who chose ‘yes’ or 
‘partially’ were asked this follow-up question).  
More than 85% responded positively, thus confirming that the vast majority of security 
practitioners believed in the existence of a European identity. It is however worth noting 
that only one in five respondents selected ‘yes’ and almost two-thirds chose ‘partially’ in 
response to this question. While training participants were asked what European identity 
meant to them without the use of prompts during the interview phase, the online survey 
provided a list of elements making up European identity from which respondents had to 
select what they felt were the two most important aspects.  These statements were taken 
from a questionnaire designed by Bruter as part of a larger study on European identity in 
2009 (p. 1530). The mean values for each of these can be found below in Figure 17. 
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 FIGURE 17 - WHAT DOES BEING EUROPEAN MEAN TO YOU? Source: Researcher’s own data 
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How Do Security Practitioners Define Being an EU Citizen? 
One of the key narratives in the EUGS revolves around the notion that European security 
and defence cooperation centres on protecting EU citizens’ interests and values. While it is 
unlikely that survey respondents were aware of this at the time of completing the online 
survey, it is clear from survey responses that this narrative resonated with them. When 
asked what being a European citizen meant to them, out of the options provided, the notion 
of ‘having common ideals’ received the highest mean score (4.34 out of 5) indicating that 
security practitioners felt they share values and goals with fellow Europeans. Having a 
common flag, anthem and passport however received the lowest mean score, suggesting 
that the EU’s direct attempts at creating a sense of European identity through the use of 
symbols had thus far had little impact on practitioners’ understandings of what it means to 
be an EU citizen.  
This study seeks to establish whether a European integration identity is emerging amongst 
security practitioners based on the idea that individuals develop a sense of belonging and 
shared values and goals through civic and cultural aspects of ‘being European’. The 
statements chosen for this question can be divided into a number of different categories, 
vaguely corresponding to Bruter’s classifications of civic European identity (evolving around 
the EU as a political entity defining its citizens’ rights, duties, as well as interests) and 
cultural European identity (related to a sense of community with fellow Europeans through 





TABLE 6 - CIVIC AND CULTURAL EUROPEAN IDENTITY CATEGORIES 
Civic European Identity Score Cultural European Identity Score 
Having the right to vote in European 
elections 
3.89 Having a shared European heritage 3.99 
Having common institutions 3.96 Having a common European history 3.74 
Having the right to travel to another 
European country without passing 
through customs 
4.25 Having some common ideals 4.34 
Having the right to travel to another EU 
country without having to show your 
passport/ID 
4.1 Being a member of the 'European 
family' 
3.92 
  Having a European flag, anthem and 
passport 
3.36 
Overall mean score 3.91  3.87 
 
 
‘Having some common ideals’ received the highest mean score of all statements, suggesting 
that survey participants felt they shared certain values and goals with fellow Europeans.  
Being able to travel freely across Europe as a key manifestation of being a European citizen 
also ranked very highly amongst CSDP practitioners while symbols introduced by the EU in 
an attempt to create a sense of European identity as noted above (Bruter, 2009, p. 1503) 
achieved the lowest mean score. Some of these results were somewhat unexpected. Bruter 
argued that civic identification with Europe is stronger than cultural identification with 
fellow Europeans, meaning that European identity is generally “associated with EU 
citizenship rather than a cultural reality” (ibid, p. 1512). However, when considering the 
mean scores from the two categories in this survey, it emerges that cultural identity 
statements overall achieved almost the same score as civic identity ones. It is impossible to 
draw conclusions from these findings as to whether they suggest that CSDP practitioners 
either have a stronger sense of ‘cultural European identity’ through their EU-related work or 
if notions of a cultural European identity have developed amongst Europeans since Bruter’s 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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2009 study a decade ago. But the results indicate that there was a considerable degree of 
perceived shared values and goals amongst survey respondents.  
This investigation of what European identity means to security practitioners was followed 
up by taking a broader approach during interviews. Here, training participants were asked 
what ‘Europe’ meant to them to better understand the extent to which individuals 
differentiate between the EU and Europe, but also to get an idea of what they associate 
with it. Responses generally fitted into the above two categories. On the one hand, training 
participants frequently alluded to the personal benefits of being able to travel freely within 
the EU’s borders and being able to feel not quite at home, but “comfortable” in any 
European country (Interviewee 33, Irish). One interviewee shared the following anecdote:  
I was driving with my sons to the Netherlands where I was posted and was always 
very excited when I was crossing the Austrian-German border and pointed out to 
them: look at the border; look at the border! Until one day one of them pointed out: 
Daddy, this border exists only in your mind. It's no longer there. It's on a map, but 
you don't feel it. Why should I be excited about a border that doesn't exist? 
(Interviewee 36, Austria)  
These views not only illustrate that developing a sense of European identity takes place over 
time and changes from one generation to the next, they also show that many respondents 
associated Europe with the benefits that European integration has brought them. 
Furthermore, the anecdote highlights how different generations perceive the EU differently, 
with the younger citizens taking many aspects for granted. However, positive references to 
EU institutions were scarce and a number of interviewees voicing criticisms such as this one: 
“the institutions are completely irrelevant in my view to the vast majority of Europeans” 
(Interviewee 32, Irish).  
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Security practitioners also frequently mentioned values in relation to Europe. One training 
participant felt that Europe stood for “accepting diversity, religion, and other things, in 
every sense, rule of law, all of us, we should accept this” (Interviewee 29, Romanian), while 
another summed it up as “several countries or nation-states with a shared history and 
values trying to build up something to have a better or more secure life” (Interviewee 34, 
Germany). This statement seems to connect the idea of having common values and goals 
and using these to advance European integration. However, others also pointed out that 
there were significant differences between the regions, such as an interviewee who 
commented: “I see Europe as two groups of countries. The West and the East” (Interviewee 
19, Poland). This perceived division between regions within the EU became apparent on a 
number of occasions, most commonly amongst participants from Eastern European 
countries which had joined the EU after 2004. They felt they were not perceived as equal to 
older members.  
  
The Impact of Personal Experiences on the Concept of European Identity 
One of the hypotheses of this study was that personal experiences would play a role in 
determining individual notions of European identity. The online survey thus included a few 
questions regarding participants’ exposure to different experiences. While substantially 
more questions would have been required to develop a comprehensive analysis and draw 
firm conclusions on this hypothesis, due to the scope of this thesis only a few aspects -such 
as experiences through European exchanges as well as the frequency of interactions with 
European colleagues at work - formed part of the online survey. This allowed a comparison 
between identifications amongst those with and without exchange experiences as well as 
those with frequent and irregular contact with fellow European professionals.  
239 
 
38% of survey participants indicated that they had taken part in an exchange with another 
European country and with regards to a European identity, those who had participated in 
exchanges were slightly more likely to believe in its existence (23% compared to 16%) or at 
least partially (62% versus 57%) as shown in Figure 19. However, when considering 
interactions with fellow Europeans as part of participants’ jobs, those who worked with 
colleagues from other Member States on a daily or weekly basis (approximately 36%) were 
not more convinced of the existence of a European identity than those with less frequent 
contact.  
When asked about the extent to which they identified with Europe, those with previous 
exchange experience rated their identification higher than those who hadn’t been abroad 
on exchange (as illustrated in Figure 18). There were no noticeable differences between 
those with and without regular interactions with fellow Europeans at work. This suggests 
that working with European colleagues on a regular basis has surprisingly little impact on 











Identify somewhat or to a
great extent with Europe
Don't really identify with
Europe or not at all
Don't know Blank
To what extent do you identify with Europe?
With exchange experience Without exchange experience
With regular interactions Without regular interactions
FIGURE 18 - IDENTIFICATION WITH EUROPE: EXCHANGE EXPERIENCE 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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experiences were not drastically more pro-European or believed a European identity 
existed, this group of respondents consistently showed a more positive attitude towards 
identifying with Europe.    
While training participants were asked what European identity meant to them without the 
use of prompts during the interview phase, the online survey provided a list of elements 
constituting European identity (drawn from a Eurobarometer questionnaire) from which 
respondents had to select what they felt were the two most important aspects.  Survey 
respondents overwhelmingly selected ‘democratic values’ (74%) as one of the most 
important elements of European identity, followed by a ‘common culture’ (26%) and 
‘common history’ (23%). When considering Bruter’s civic and cultural identity distinction, it 
becomes obvious that CSDP practitioners understood European identity primarily as a 
cultural identity consisting of a shared value system shaped by a common cultural and 














Does a European identity currently exist?
With exchange experience Without exchange experience
With regular interactions Without regular interactions
FIGURE 19 - EXISTENCE OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY: EXCHANGE EXPERIENCE 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
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currency and symbols. Seven respondents also chose to specify an ‘other’ element, such as 
‘economy’, ‘common education’, ‘human rights’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘our aspirations and hopes 
for future generations’. Again, most of these were closely related to ‘democratic values’, 
further supporting the cultural interpretation of European identity by participants.  
Whereas the online survey had asked CSDP practitioners to indicate what they perceived to 
be key European values and which ones they considered to be important personally from a 
pre-defined list, interviews facilitated a less structured and unprompted discussion of what 
‘European values’ meant to individuals.  
The first thing to note was that the idea of ‘European values’ was frequently discussed by 
interviewees in relation to ‘interests’. Many were of the opinion that interests very much 
drove people’s interactions at the European level and retained a strong national flavour. The 
closely related concept of common values, however, seemed at first glance to be a uniting 
factor for Europeans. Numerous interviewees shared sentiments such as: “I think there are 
a lot of common values amongst the Member States, amongst the people. I think that is one 
of the key things that identifies Europeans as Europeans” (Interviewee 33, Irish). Many 
referred to ‘Christian’ roots or values as well as Europe being the birthplace of ‘modern 
democracy’ (Interviewee 42, Swedish). However, a distinction was made by some 
participants who specifically pointed out that these values did not have anything to do with 
the EU as an institution: “These are not values which are fostered by the EU” (Interviewee 
31, German).  
One interviewee summed up European values as “my understanding of human rights and 
democracy and personal freedom. These are the main core values. This is what really ties 
me to Europe. This is where basically whenever I go to Europe, I feel at home” (Interviewee 
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50, Slovakian) whereas another named “respect, consideration for someone's opinion, 
respect for religions” as key elements (Interviewee 58, Romanian). Many also agreed that 
Europe’s violent history and, in particular, the two World Wars had contributed to shaping 
core European values of peace and human rights (Interviewee 54, Italian). Another 
noteworthy matter which was raised on a number of occasions was the perceived flexible 
nature of ‘values’. One respondent remarked that “Europe means to me in general common 
values that are constantly being renegotiated. Having common experiences that are marked 
by hundreds of years of conflict in the region” (Interviewee 51, German), while another 
pointed out that sharing values was no longer straight-forward:  
We don't share the same values anymore. Not only because of immigration, but also 
internal problems. There are differences. We now have a big Europe. We share the 
ancient values of the EU, the Christian roots and so on. But the main issue is that no 
one can say what is the common value of Europe today. There are fragilities within 
the countries and it is difficult to define [shared values]. (Interviewee 35, French)  
These comments support the notion that values are not considered to be fixed and while 
the EU might be promoting certain values as essentially ‘European’, it is the people who 
determine whether they identify these to be European. 
The Importance of Multinational Training  
The importance of personal experiences during the CSDP training courses could be noted in 
on numerous occasions. During some courses, participants were asked to participate in 
problem-solving syndicate exercises, which, in addition to these informal conversations, 
provided individuals with food for thought and are often deemed to have been some of the 
most useful aspects of the course. A participant from Sweden stated that up until then “the 
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most rewarding has been the possibility to interact with other course participants. People 
with different experiences talking about things you cannot find on the internet - personal 
experiences. That makes you think in a different way” (Interviewee 42, Sweden). Another 
practitioner had a very similar view: 
 When we meet people from other cultures or other branches, civilian, military, you 
always learn things. With the migration issues going on now, it's quite interesting to 
discuss. It's one thing to hear the official statement in Brussels, but it is also 
interesting to hear how people behind the scenes are thinking. Is the official opinion 
reflected in the people? (Interviewee 38, Sweden)  
This suggests that residential training courses have the potential to shape individuals’ views 
on two levels: through structured talks and lectures as well as through exchanging views 
with fellow Europeans via informal discussions and networking amongst a wide range of 
CSDP practitioners.  
 
Variations in Values Associated with European Identity 
The next question attempted to delve deeper into the idea of common European values 
and, in particular, tried to examine whether an overlap between personal values and those 
associated with the EU existed. Firstly, respondents were asked to choose the three most 
important values to them personally, and then to select three values which they felt best 





Despite a slightly different distribution of scores as shown in Figure 20 above, results 
showed that the order of the top three items was identical for personal and EU values, 
suggesting that overall, respondents felt that the EU projected values that adequately 
represented the views individuals stood for. For individuals, democracy was the most 
important value, selected by 53% and followed by human rights and the rule of law with 
38% each. Security practitioners felt even more strongly about the EU representing these 
FIGURE 20- MOST IMPORTANT VALUES: PERSONAL VS. EU Source: Researcher’s own data 
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values, with scores significantly higher at 68% for democracy, 42% for human rights 
although slightly lower for rule of law at 34%. The data suggests that personal values were 
slightly more wide-ranging with seven items scoring more than 20% while only five EU 
values received over 20%. In the ‘other’ category, only four additional values were specified 
with regards to personal importance: ‘health’, ‘history’, ‘strict rules’ and ‘integrity’. The 
following were provided for the EU ‘other’ category: ‘bureaucracy’, ‘free market economy’ 
and ‘finding compromises’.  
While values associated with the EU seemed to match those held by security practitioners, 
interviews revealed that participants perceived there to be considerable regional 
differences regarding values in the EU.  Whereas some interviewees were of the opinion 
that recent political developments had had a detrimental impact on European values, others 
questioned whether the EU had become too big to have common values. A certain 
perceived schism between values in Eastern and Western European countries could be 
detected amongst a number of Eastern European participants. An interviewee from 
Lithuania felt that “the degree of tolerance that is in East and West Europe, it differs. 
Sometimes I think there is a problem with understanding freedom” (Interviewee 13, 
Lithuania), while another remarked that “I am from an Eastern European country. We have 
lots in common with Polish or Czech guys, but things are quite different between us and 
Italians and Germans or Austrians” (Interviewee 18, Lithuania). One Lithuanian summed 
these sentiments up as follows: “I see Europe as two groups of countries. The West and the 
East” (Interviewee 19, Lithuania).   
Some CSDP practitioners seemed to take a sceptical stance towards the idea of common 
European values as evidenced by a Finnish participant who felt that: 
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Our national values are much stronger for all Member States. Of course, it is easy in 
Brussels, if you work for an EU institution, to talk about something like that, but in 
the Member States the national identities are much stronger and they talk a 
different language I think. Common values with someone 2000 km away can be far-
fetched”. (Interviewee 24, Finnish)  
This apparent clash between national and European values, interests and identities was 
brought up frequently and is discussed in more detail below. However, in summary, it can 
be said that overall, security practitioners were of the opinion that despite slight differences 
in values, European integration was about making these differences work to the EU’s 
advantage: “Values are the core, very important, but because of our history which is very 
different, it is very difficult to change. We have different values, not better or worse, but 
different. We have to work with these” (Interviewee 35, France). Such a perspective reflects 
the EU’s official motto of ‘unity through diversity’.  
 
The EU’s Identity Abroad 
Following on from these questions which attempted to home in on how security 
practitioners interpreted the concept of European identity and what values they believed 
the EU to represent, they were asked about identification with the EU specifically in the 
context of their work. Security practitioners were therefore asked how they felt about the 
EU flag on uniforms when deployed on CSDP missions. The rating scale ranged from ‘it’s a 
very bad thing’ (1) to ‘it’s a very good thing’ (5) and the mean score was 4.26, indicating that 
security practitioners had a strongly positive view of visually taking on an EU identity when 
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on operations abroad. Indeed, only 4% felt this was a bad thing while a further 13% 
indicated that it didn’t matter to them.  
 
External Perceptions of EU Security Practitioners 
External perceptions and confrontation with ‘the other’ were only mentioned by a small 
number of interviewees and tended to come up whenever the participant had previously 
been deployed on an EU mission or operation and had thus ‘represented’ the EU abroad.  
A number of interviewees mentioned that when taking an ‘external view’, one realised that 
“within Europe it's difficult to see it happening, but when you compare Europe to other 
parts of the world, you realise there is such a thing as a European identity”. The participant 
further explained that “it looks like everybody has their own different positions and it's 
really hard to bring them all together. But compared to the outside world, the EU has been 
acting quite united and has been able to come up with its position, also vis-à-vis Russia, 
which hasn't been easy” (Interviewee 40, Finland). Using a more practical example, an 
Austrian training participant noted that you notice a “European identity when you go 
shopping in Milano, in Vienna, in Helsinki. It's European, distinctively different to the 
American identity” (Interviewee 36, Austria).  
While some respondents alluded to the existence of a European identity when comparing it 
to non-European identities, little was said about the impact of external experiences on 
individuals’ notions of European identity. One of the few comments was made by a Spanish 
member of the military, who described his experience as follows: “It is like the Blue helmets. 
When you are acting as part of the EU, they see you as a European, not as Spanish, or 
whatever. They see you as doing something good for the country. In most countries we are 
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welcome. They know we are trying to do something good for them”. The interviewee went 
on to explain that “you never lost your national identity, but with so many people from 
other countries, it felt international, being part of a big coalition was good” (Interviewee 28, 
Spain). Another training participant had a similar view: “How Europe is viewed from abroad? 
I think you have to view Europe as one. I think Europe has more influence as one than the 
Member States on their own” (Interviewee 5, German).  
That the EU and Europe is indeed often perceived as one entity with a distinct, somewhat 
normative, identity is further highlighted by a comment from a training participant from a 
candidate country: 
I know that every citizen from my country watches the news and is trying to 
understand how it is to be European citizen. […] It is very important to understand 
the very core idea about problems and to see how Europeans have the tools to solve 
these problems and it is very important for us to see that EU is always trying to solve 
the issues and the threats by democratic means, not using military forces. 
(Interviewee 22, Moldova) 
This remark was made in relation to the 2015/16 refugee crisis that the EU was faced with 
and, unsurprisingly, recent crises such as this one were discussed in relation to European 
identity on a number of occasions.  
 
A Clash of Identities?  
During the interviews, practitioners were asked how they dealt with working on 
implementing an EU policy at the same time as working to represent their countries. This 
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was especially interesting as the majority of the sample fell into the category of being 
employed by a national institution rather than directly through the EU (only eight out of the 
195 stated their employer was an EU institution).  
Responses that referred to national and/or European notions of identity highlighted that 
individuals interpret these concepts rather differently (even when they are from the same 
country). Some argued that their own country’s history made it difficult for them to feel 
attached to their nation and to develop a sense of “respect and honour” for their ancestors. 
As a result, they have “stronger feelings for the continent” than their country and thus want 
to defend it (Interviewee 17, Lithuania). Yet, another colleague from Lithuania indicated that 
the country’s Soviet past made it difficult for Lithuanians to trust the idea of a EU, 
furthermore suggesting that “some people in Lithuania think that Europeans are bad. […] 
They are worried we would be occupied by Europe” (Interviewee 16, Lithuania). These 
rather different views of Europe show that notions of European identity are strongly 
interwoven with national identities and despite sharing the same history, individuals use 
certain elements of national identity in very different ways when developing their own 
notions of European identity.  
Another interviewee stated that they believed Romanians in general felt “more European 
than national because they waited a lot to be accepted in this big family” (Interviewee 26, 
Romania). This comment suggests to a certain extent that the EU wields some normative 
power, and that the notion of the EU being an exclusive club that others want to be part of, 
has an impact on people’s notions of identity. However, this sentiment was quite rare and 
many others asserted their national identity over notions of European identity as underlined 
by this Swedish interviewee: “Some politicians always want to discuss us as Europeans. But I 
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don't think many people feel in the morning: “I am European”. I represent my Member 
State. I wake up thinking I am from the northern part of Sweden” (Interviewee 38, Sweden). 
Other security practitioners pointed out that they felt existing notions of “national pride and 
sovereignty” (Interviewee 36, Austria), or different national perspectives (Interviewee 35, 
France) presented obstacles to a common identity emerging amongst Europeans.  
Two interviewees summed up the general sentiment amongst training participants: 
I think there is a sense of belonging to the EU community. There is a lot of socialising 
and you talk about personal things. But at the same time you are aware that you 
represent your national views and interests. You know each other’s limits and you 
deal with them. So there is a sense of community, but national interests are crucial. 
(Interviewee 51, German) 
 Another participant further explained that “I belong to my nation. But [working in a 
European environment] has helped me to see the European identity. I am trying to work 
towards a common position. (Interviewee 30, Malta). This supremacy of national interests 
over any European considerations is common amongst security practitioners’ approach to 
work.  
The last identity-related question survey participants were asked was whether they believed 
that their views of European integration had changed since becoming involved in CSDP 
implementation. While this study assesses the impact of CSDP training on notions of identity 
amongst security practitioners, it is impossible to ascertain whether any changes can be 
solely attributed to a specific course and the strategic narratives projected. However, survey 
participants were asked whether they believed their views of European integration had 
changed since embarking on implementing the CSDP.  
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Figure 21 shows that responses included a minority of participants (21%) who were unsure 
whether their views had changed. The remaining respondents were almost equally divided 
regarding the impact of taking on a CSDP-related role on their views of European integration 
(38% said yes, 41% said no). When asked to explain their responses, participants who felt 
their views had changed provided comments such as: “I started to appreciate the 
complexity of EU issues, institutions and decision-making. It is so difficult that it is close to 
impossible to comprehend without being an "insider" (Survey Participant, Czech).  
This sentiment was shared by numerous respondents. Many indicated that they had 
obtained a deeper understanding of EU processes which gave them a better grasp of 
international politics in general: “It has become more important to unify the common 
efforts to secure the world - no country can stand alone and by pooling our efforts we can 
offer a more comprehensive approach” (Survey Respondent, Danish). This response shows 
that the respondent was even using language frequently used in an EU security context – 




Q58 - Would you say your views of European integration 
have changed since taking on a role that involves 
implementing the CSDP?
Yes No Don't know
FIGURE 21- CHANGED VIEWS THROUGH WORK ON CSDP Source: Researcher’s own data 
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coming from a citizen of a Member State that has opted out of the CSDP and who doesn’t 
work for an EU institution as this also suggests that they do not share their government’s 
stance on European security and defence. Another respondent stated that since 
commencing their job, they had “realised that EU is truly seeking for peace, stability and 
wellbeing in all of its Member States, as well as for the neighbour countries. And also, 
common security means a more strategic security and defence rather than a bigger military 
force” (Survey participant, Romanian). Working on CSDP implementation led this 
respondent to believe that the EU sought to protect its citizens’ interests and security while 
at the same time largely refrained from utilising military tools to achieve this. 
While most comments regarding an increase in knowledge were positive, a small number 
also suggested that through their work they had become somewhat disillusioned, saying 
that they had become more “sceptical” or that they thought more “negatively” towards 
European integration. An issue that most respondents agreed on was that they appreciated 
the challenges the EU was facing (both internally and externally) more after becoming 
involved in CSDP implementation.   
When considering the main identity narratives projected by the EU, it became obvious that 
these were somewhat reflected in respondents’ comments regarding changes in their views. 
While the expression ‘common security culture’ was not directly used by participants, they 
frequently referred to the need to develop a more joined-up collective approach as they felt 
individual Member States could no longer deal adequately with security threats on their 
own. This was illustrated by a respondent’s comment which also contained specific language 
employed by the EU (the use of ‘comprehensive approach’): “It has become more important 
to unify the common efforts to secure the world - no country can stand alone and by 
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pooling our efforts we can offer a more comprehensive approach”. Furthermore, he went 
on to note that working on CSDP issues seems to result in an understanding that the EU 
needs take on more responsibility as a security provider: “I realise now how important it is 
for the EU to act decisively outside the territory of the EU, to focus on the root causes of 
many of the factors adding to instability in the neighbouring regions” (Survey Participant, 
Finnish). 
 
Perceptions of EU Power – The EU’s International Identity  
 
The content analysis of both the ESS and the EUGS highlighted the EU’s ambition to project 
itself not just as a soft power, but as a pragmatic actor that is willing to use all the tools at its 
disposal to deal with security threats. While the ESS was vaguer about the use of military 
force and put more emphasis on exporting democracy and its value system, thus presenting 
itself as a somewhat normative power, the EUGS stressed a new ‘principled pragmatism’ 
and reiterated the need to employ civilian as well military measures when implementing its 
foreign policy. It is however important to bear in mind that interviews were conducted 
before the EUGS was released and most interviewees could not be familiar with the new 
Strategy’s content.  
When asked about what kind of power the EU represented, the majority of interview 
participants indicated that they saw the EU primarily as a soft power. Many felt that the EU 
not only lacked the capabilities to be a credible hard power, but they also believed that it 
did not want to project itself as a military union (Interviewee 30, Maltese) and in fact 
wanted to be seen as “a soft power and using more multilateralism and diplomacy and so 
on, but […] it could move to more of a hard power.” (Interviewee 46, Slovakian). A German 
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participant had a similar view of the EU continuing to rely mainly on soft power: “To be 
honest, the EU provides security via money, that's my impression. When I read the numbers 
in reports I get, the fact that they don't have their own capabilities means they have to use 
money. They are a security provider, but in an indirect way” (Interviewee 31, German).  
While this is quite a limited interpretation of the EU’s role as a security provider, others 
continued to consider the EU’s soft power approach as a significant strength:  
The EU has a very strong advantage. It is a soft power. NATO is not a soft power. US 
is hard power. So people, may I say, feel very angry about them. […] You can achieve 
many things with soft power, many more than with hard power. (Interviewee 12, 
Greece) 
An interviewee from Germany had a similar opinion: “It's important also not to come across 
as a military force, but as an actor that offers advice and the tools for other states to solve 
their problems on their own” (Interviewee 51, Germany). These responses suggest that 
there seemed to be a considerable amount of objection to the idea of the EU moving 
towards being a more traditional military power amongst CSDP practitioners.  
Furthermore, many practitioners were of the opinion that soft power not only continued to 
be the EU’s unique selling point, but also felt that the EU was trying to maintain this identity.  
Only one interviewee specifically stated that they wanted the EU to take on a greater 
military identity: “I understand that EU sees itself to be a soft power and using more 
multilateralism and diplomacy and so on, but I think it could move to be more of a hard 
power” (Interviewee 46, Slovakia).  
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Despite this strong perception of the EU’s identity being largely defined by soft power, only 
a limited number of interviewees referred to the EU’s normative role. While one 
interviewee felt that Europe is known for its human rights and should therefore also project 
these “in our direct vicinity – it’s a way of creating stability” (Interviewee 49, Netherlands), 
another deliberated that “at the moment we expect everyone to play by the values and the 
rules that we think are important, but other people are looking at it in a different way, so 
we should be thinking about other options” (Interviewee 33, Ireland). While this view 
seemed to be in line with the stance taken by the EU in the EUGS, which promoted a much 
more differentiated and individual approach to dealing with security issues, it underlined 
that CSDP practitioners did not seem to view the EU as a substantive normative power.  
 
Perceived Threats to European Identity 
Notions of European identity are fluid, thus constantly being renegotiated and interpreted 
by individuals. The political climate and the perceived problems facing Europe were 
frequently said to impact not only on a sense of community and common identity amongst 
Europeans, but also on the very existence of the EU. However, only a small number of 
interviewees argued that issues such as the refugee crisis had the potential to unite 
Europeans further: “It gets Europe more connected. 28 Member States try to work together. 
The Greek crisis for example, it makes you strive to be more united. With the refugee crisis 
as well, we work together so that we get out of it together” (Interviewee 30, Malta).  
Instead, the majority of training participants felt recent crises had had a rather negative 
impact: “Talking about refugees, the Hungarian government decided to build a fence, other 
countries do not agree with this. Opinions collide and this hurts a sense of community” 
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(Interviewee 17, Lithuanian). A Swedish colleague made the following assessment: “So that's 
a danger in the current situation that different parts of the EU are breaking apart from each 
other. I don't think we will overcome that any time soon” (Interviewee 1). A training 
participant from the Netherlands concluded that “this will be the Litmus test, the migration 
issue. If you cannot solve these issues together, then it has only been words and not really 
based on values and everybody can start building fences and walls (Interviewee 41, Dutch).  
This notion of interests taking priority over values in crisis situations was echoed by another 
interviewee, who argued that:  
When the systems come under pressure from a problem like the migration issue, I 
think it will by necessity force people back to look at interests and they need to be 
willing to, on occasion, let interests take priority. If you don't serve your interests on 
occasion, you won't be successful enough to have your values. (Interviewee 37, Irish)  
In relation to recent crises threatening a sense of community and European identity, a 
couple of security practitioners stated that they believed the EU itself did not play any role 
in promoting unity. Rather, they argued that the “political ambition of the EU” may have 
created a divide in Europe (Interviewee 43, British) and another claimed that it was on the 
edge of falling apart, but that the people would “manage to keep it up because mostly it is 
the people, not the governments. They feel like a community” (Interviewee 10, Greek). 
While these comments focused on the state of the EU, other interviewees commented on 
the rise of nationalistic movements in their own countries and other parts of Europe 
(Interviewee 4, Finnish). One training participant concluded that what was happening in 
Europe was  
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A more nationalistic movement which frightens me, which is the worst that could 
happen. It's the worst that could happen after 60 years of EU, peace. It has never 
been so bad as it is now in a time that you see progress, that you see countries being 
happy to join the EU from the Eastern European region. It's terrible that on the 
national side, governments, politicians, academics are so negative about the EU. 
(Interviewee 41, Dutch)  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 8 Section b) 
This examination of notions of national and European identities has shown that while these 
were interpreted quite differently at the personal level, they only played a small part in 
practitioners’ professional lives as decisions and behaviour were still very much driven by 
overarching national perspectives and interests. With regards to the identity narratives 
communicated by the EU, this analysis has revealed the following insights. Firstly, the ESS 
and EUGS communicated a stronger international identity for the EU that includes the use 
of hard power. While CSDP practitioners were very much aware of the need to act together 
to achieve better security solutions, thus requiring the EU to take on a more comprehensive 
role as a security provider, the vast majority of CSDP practitioners did not see the EU as a 
military power. Instead, they were of the opinion that the EU’s soft power remained its 
greatest asset and that NATO should be the organisation to provide ‘hard security’. 
Secondly, the new EUGS was based on the assumption that Europeans share common 
values and interests which demand closer security cooperation. Security practitioners 
agreed that they shared certain overarching values with one another and through their 
work became more aware of differing views and approaches. While a basic “shared self-
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understanding” (Kantner, 2005, p. 207) seemed to be present, thus making individuals more 
willing to compromise, ultimately, national identity and, above all, interests continued to 
determine their behaviour. Many interviewees referred to contemporary problems such as 
the financial crisis and the refugee crisis as an indication, on the one hand that values and 
interests were not as common as one might think, and on the other hand that in times of 
difficulty, it was nationalist sentiments and not a common European identity that seemed to 
gain popularity. This suggests that a shift from a ‘weak’ to a ‘strong collective identity’ was 
somewhat impeded by these events evoking stronger national notions of collective identity 
instead.  
Thirdly, while a common security culture as promoted in the ESS and the EUGS was 
generally considered to be a useful long-term goal and, in theory, a vital tool for making the 
CSDP more efficient and coherent, the majority of training participants were previously 
unfamiliar with the expression and felt that it was not something that would realistically be 
achieved any time soon. 
To conclude, it can be said that while CSDP practitioners’ attitudes towards security and 
defence at EU level were not inconsistent with the strategic visions outlined in the ESS and 
EUGS and communicated through a number of strategic narratives, considerations of a 
common European identity or a sense of community did not determine the implementation 
of the CSDP. Instead, civilian and military staff largely retained a ‘national mind-set’, which, 
through their work and interactions at European level, had become more aware of and open 
to different approaches and compromise. This was summed up by a German interviewee’s 
use of the idea of a “Wahrnehmungshorizont” (perceptual horizon): The EU is a “space of 
Wahrnehmungshorizont. It is not a closed community, but it is a joined sense of 
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togetherness, that maybe is not far reaching, but you make sense of things in a similar way” 





Section c): Practitioners’ Views of the CSDP and the Future of 
European Security and Defence  
 
Strategic narratives relating directly to the CSDP are the most specific narratives projected 
by the EU.  This means that they are situated within a wider European integration 
framework made up of narratives explaining the international system and fostering an 
identification with Europe and the EU in particular. However, their reception by security 
practitioners is crucial as they not only have a practical approach to interpreting them due 
to the nature of their work, they often also come up against national security policy 
narratives. A content analysis of the EU’s two strategies relating to the CSDP revealed two 
key narratives (as shown in Figure 22 below): 
These entail calls for increased cooperation and multilateralism to cope with changing 
security threats, implementing a comprehensive approach that includes a stronger military 
component and, more recently, a more pragmatic and inwardly-focused approach to 
security and defence at EU level. All of these are aimed at simplifying the practical 
implementation of security policy, thus having the potential to resonate with security 
practitioners focused on the practical aspects of security provision.  
 
1) EU security and defence cooperation as the best way to adapt to a changing 
security environment and respond to ever more complex security threats
2) Establishing a common European security culture and increasing solidarity to 
improve security provision in Europe
FIGURE 22 - THE EU'S POLICY NARRATIVES Source: Researcher’s own  
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Understanding of CSDP Amongst Security Practitioners Prior to 
Participating in ESDC-Coordinated Training  
 
Initially, to get a better grasp of how individuals viewed the security system and the EU’s 
role in it, it was important to capture how much they felt they knew about the EU’s security 
and defence policy, and whether they distinguished between the role of their nation-state 
and the EU as a security actor. Measuring how aware CSDP practitioners were of the EU’s 
key strategic document as well as how useful they perceived EU security and defence 
cooperation to be gave a valuable insight into the EU’s legitimacy in this policy area. In 
addition to gaining an impression of security practitioners’ concepts of the international 
system and the EU’s role within it through conducting an online survey, the interviews 
sought to delve deeper into the subject matter through asking training participants about 
what they perceived to be key security threats in today’s world and probing them further on 
their views on the EU’s role as a security actor. They were also asked how they felt Europe’s 
security and defence might develop in the future. This included prompts regarding whether 
they thought closer cooperation or integration was likely or desirable. Both research 
methods were employed to determine if there were common views amongst security 
practitioners and whether the EU’s framing of security and defence cooperation resonated 
with them, thus also investigating the extent to which respondents received and responded 
to narratives communicated during CSDP training. Special attention was paid to the key 
messages participants took away from the training course and whether these featured any 
of the EU’s key narratives regarding the CSDP.  
Naturally, there was a high level of awareness regarding the current security environment 
and a perceived need to develop a common approach to security and defence. However, 
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the level of knowledge of the CSDP varied significantly. This became especially obvious 
during interviews which revealed that some training participants had become aware of the 
policy for the first time: “[The course] gave me a good background on what the goal was. I 
didn't know there was a CSDP. I didn't know. Apparently, there is one. It's good to be aware 
of that, the agenda, the frustrations of the persons in the field, the decision-makers” 
(Interviewee 48, Dutch). The fact that some security practitioners in Europe were not aware 
of the CSDP at all prior to attending the training course indicates that the EU’s internal 
communication of its security policy was not reaching its target audience sufficiently and 
highlights the importance of ESDC-coordinated training courses. However, the EU’s failure 
to adequately project the importance of the CSDP is further underlined by a participant who 
stated that the course was not portrayed “as something very important or valuable, neither 
in the nations, nor in the EU organisations” (Interviewee 36, Austrian).  
Despite some course participants being confronted with the CSDP for the first time, the 
majority attended the courses with at least some, but often considerable background 
knowledge. Some more experienced CSDP practitioners remarked that the “presentations 
do not really correspond to the target audience” (Interviewee 34, German). This highlighted 
once more not only the difficulties associated with delivering training to professionals from 
various national backgrounds, but also the practical aspects of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach – bringing together people from civilian as well as military backgrounds with 
different approaches to, and varying degrees of knowledge of European security and 
defence. Some interviewees perceived this to be a disadvantage, mentioning that discussing 
the CSDP with fellow course participants had been difficult due to the group being “so split 
and from so many different institutions” (Interviewee 44, Finnish). However, for others this 
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was a positive aspect and they pointed out that “the interaction with people from different 
areas of CSDP is the most positive [aspect of the course]” (Interviewee 42, Swedish). 
 
The EU’s Credibility as a Security Actor 
Following on from questions regarding their knowledge of EU processes and CSDP, survey 
respondents were invited to consider whether they felt the EU was a credible global security 
actor. This question was asked to establish whether security practitioners believed the EU 






As discussed previously, self-rated knowledge of the CSDP was relatively high, (with a mean 
score of 3.67 out of 5) whereas perceived knowledge of the ESS was significantly lower 
(mean score of 3.27 out of 5). This indicated that security practitioners felt familiar with the 
overall policy but were less aware of the EU’s strategic vision for security and defence 
provision. When asked how credible they thought the EU was as a global security actor, the 
majority of respondents selected ‘somewhat credible’ (55%), indicating that they felt the EU 
had some way to go before coming across as a credible security provider. This is further 












Not at all credible
FIGURE 23 - THE EU'S CREDIBILITY AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR 
Source: Researcher’s own data 
264 
 
This survey question was followed up by an open-ended one asking respondents to explain 
their rating. Here, answers varied, hence the main explanations for the EU’s perceived lack 
of credibility were coded as follows: 
• Internal divisions: lack of coherence, no consensus, national interests 
prevail, lack of political will 
• Lack of knowledge regarding the EU’s role as a security provider within 
and outside the EU  
• Lack of independence: too reliant on US, in the shadow of NATO 
• Not a real hard power: soft power approach prevails, credible as an aid 
donor, too ‘soft’, only economic power 
 
Figure 24 above shows the number or responses coded into each of the categories. One 
respondent recited a well-known phrase: “sadly, the EU is still an economic giant, a political 
dwarf, and a military worm" (Survey respondent, Spanish). An overwhelming majority of 
those who believed that the EU was not yet a fully credible global security actor mentioned 
internal problems as the main obstacle stopping the EU from reaching its full potential. This 
included issues such as a lack of consensus amongst Member States due to the dominance 





Not a real hard power
Internal divisions
Reasons why the EU lacks credibility
FIGURE 24 - REASONS WHY THE EU LACKS CREDIBILITY Source: Researcher’s own data 
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of national interests as well as a lack of political will. When interviewed during and after 
participating in a CSDP training course, numerous security practitioners confirmed earlier 
comments by maintaining that the EU did not yet constitute a global security actor due to a 
lack of consensus among Member States. This was illustrated by a statement from a military 
officer-recruit from Italy: “The EU has now not a real security role. Because every nation 
takes its own measures, for example France decides to bombard Syria, without Italy, 
without Germany. We need unification because we cannot act everybody on their own.” 
(Interviewee 54, Italy). 
Furthermore, many recognised that the EU was facing troubling times externally, as well as 
internally. A participant from the Netherlands remarked that  
it used to be very safe and prosperous, but in the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen 
something different. It's not as safe as we want it to be. I see the EU filling this gap.  
But we shouldn't just look inside our borders. Outside, there is also limited things 
outside. I don't see the EU as a global actor, only in the wider European area. 
(Interviewee 49, Dutch) 
 Recent issues such as the refugee crisis and Russia’s invasion of Crimea were used as 
examples of the EU’s unpreparedness, suggesting that the EU needed to deal with internal 
problems and security threats. Unbeknownst to the majority of training participants at the 
time, this inward-looking shift was also to become one of the key developments in the EUGS 
which was published a few months later, thus clearly reflecting the EU security community’s 
sentiments.  
Participants also felt that the EU lacked the necessary capabilities, mainly referring to 
insufficient funding as well as a lack of a ‘common army’. In this regard, they also frequently 
266 
 
mentioned that while “the EU is credible as a global donor of humanitarian aid”, it does not 
yet represent a “real hard power” (Survey respondent, Swedish). Furthermore, on several 
occasions, it was pointed out that the EU was still too dependent on other security actors or 
that their efforts were overlapping, namely with the United States, NATO and the UN. Many 
thus felt that it was unnecessary for the EU to get involved in military missions: “In my 
opinion, NATO / its members’ armed forces is enough for military defence of European 
territory and for missions abroad also” (Survey respondent, Romanian). Another survey 
respondent commented that NATO remained the “main pillar of security even for Europe, 
with the strongest assets, providing constant support in military actions, it has created a 
strong partnership” (Survey respondent, Romanian). This suggests that there was a level of 
competition between the EU’s narrative around the necessity of EU military capabilities and 
arguably longer established narratives at national levels regarding NATO. It was the 
understanding that NATO was Europe’s main security actor which seemed to continue to 
shape security practitioners’ views on the role of the CSDP.  
Participants not only felt that decision-making processes remained too complex and 
complicated. Another key reason for the EU’s perceived lack of credibility was a general lack 
of knowledge about EU security and defence both within the EU as well as externally. 
When respondents felt that the EU was a credible global security actor, explanations were 
often quite basic, simply stating that they were doing a decent job and had a good track 
record in crisis management. One aspect that was mentioned most frequently was that the 
EU had a great range of tools available to tackle current security threats: “It has a large 
portfolio of strategies and possible instruments to enhance security regionally and globally” 
(Survey respondent, German). Some participants also stated that the mere fact that the EU 
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included so many major countries and the size of their combined economies gave it 
credibility.  
Yet, even those who were more positive about the EU’s role clearly outlined a narrower 
focus for the EU when interviewed:  
I think the role of the EU is underestimated. The EU is able and willing in a way to act 
as a security provider in its neighbourhood but not with the tools and means you 
would normally associate with security. The EU is very much engaged in the field of 
human security, with development aid and other financial instruments. They are 
even doing a lot of crisis management, but not with significant numbers. 
(Interviewee 34, German)  
This vision of a mainly civilian role is frequently supported by other training participants 
such as a member of the German Bundeswehr who remarked: “I don't think the EU is a 
global actor. Smaller missions, in a limited neighbourhood with limited mandates are 
possible” (Interviewee 51, German). 
Overall, it can be said that while respondents recognised the EU’s potential to be a global 
security actor, they felt that internal frictions were the main obstacle to achieving this. It is 
also evident that many would like to see the EU developing a more independent security 
role with more military power and better (financial) resources to deal with security threats 




Security Priorities and Threat Perceptions amongst European Security 
Practitioners 
One of the key obstacles to better cooperation within the EU and with external partners 
were the significant differences across Europe when it came to security priorities.  While the 
ESS alluded to tackling ‘common threats’, the EUGS emphasised the need to defend 
‘common interests’. Both suggested that establishing a more joined-up approach to 
analysing and understanding threats was a key step in fostering better cooperation.  
With regards to security practitioners’ views on security priorities for the EU, these were 










Figure 25 above shows that multilateralism was given the highest mean score, followed by 
using primarily civilian measures to implement its foreign policy and providing humanitarian 
FIGURE 25 - ROLE OF THE EU Source: Researcher’s own data 
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assistance. Using military capabilities to protect EU citizens and their interests scored 
considerably lower than the other statements. These results suggest that survey 
respondents perceived the EU as a predominantly civilian power whose focus was on 
humanitarian assistance rather than traditional military defence matters. The importance of 
multilateralism, on the one hand, indicated a strong emphasis on the need for legitimacy 
through international cooperation while at the same time highlighting security practitioners’ 
awareness of the need of the EU’s reliance on cooperation to successfully tackle security 
threats.  
However, when it comes to defining priorities for security provision across Europe, the 
interview data revealed less consensus. While the topic of key priorities and threats came 
up naturally during some interviews, other interviewees shared their views in the context of 
discussing the EU’s role as a security provider, and at times, a prompt regarding these was 
given. Whenever threats were discussed, there was a clear link between respondents’ own 
geographical location and the type of threats and priorities mentioned. Furthermore, 
numerous interviewees remarked that due to different geographical locations and the sheer 
size of the EU, security priorities could never be the same across Europe. An interviewee 
from Finland stated that “It is clear that different Member States have different interests, 
they have different threats and contexts. There are so many different kinds of Member 
States. It would be great if we all had the same understanding, priorities. But I don't see that 
happening” (Interviewee 44). While interviewees from Western Europe named terrorism, 
and the war in Syria as the main threats, Scandinavian and Eastern European respondents 
stated that Russia and the refugee crisis were the biggest threats to their countries. An 
interviewee from Sweden observed that “the threat as we perceive it from Russia is 
increasing, we are starting to get more introvert or thinking more about our national 
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defence” (Interviewee 1). Furthermore, there seemed to be an escalation of threat 
perceptions regarding the unfolding refugee crisis during the data collection period 
(2015/16) which meant that while views at the beginning were mostly sympathetic towards 
refugees, dealing with such large numbers of refugees had turned into a problem and even 
a security threat towards the end of the study.  
To summarise, interviews showed that while security practitioners were generally of the 
opinion that they shared overarching security interests such as protection from terrorism 
and cyber-attacks, any more specific priorities continued to be defined by national interests: 
“Of course we have different priorities. When it comes to CSDP, I hope that we will see 
some day a more common approach. That's far away at this point” (Interviewee 4, Finnish). 
 
EU security cooperation as the way forward in a complex security environment?  
 
 A survey question which investigated security practitioners’ views on EU security 
cooperation as the way forward in an ever more complex global security sphere was asked 
indirectly during the online survey by assessing whether respondents felt EU security 
cooperation was beneficial to their country. Survey participants displayed a strongly positive 




One interviewee summed up many practitioners’ views as follows: 
Many colleagues see security and defence policy in a very national light. That’s not 
wrong, because it has always been a national responsibility, nation-states are the 
main actors and it's one of the main reasons for the existence of nation-states. But 
to solve complex problems, new security threats, globalisation, humanitarian crises, 
doing your own thing doesn’t get you very far. (Interviewee 14, Germany) 
Another interviewee suggested that EU cooperation on security and defence matters was 
especially beneficial to smaller EU countries and newer Member States (Interviewee 52, 
German). Only 9% of respondents felt that EU security cooperation did not have a positive 
impact on their country. Out of these, the majority were military staff from Eastern Europe 
or Scandinavia (73%). While no further explanation of these results was sought, one 
interpretation may be that their threat perceptions regarding Russia and the importance of 







Do you think EU security cooperation is beneficial or 







FIGURE 26- THE IMPACT OF EU SECURITY COOPERATION Source: Researcher’s own data 
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When considering how these initial views of security practitioners regarding EU cooperation 
corresponded to the narratives communicated through the ESS and EUGS, it becomes 
apparent that respondents were aware of the changing security environment and the 
shifting nature of threats to include a much wider variety of issues. However, it also appears 
that many did not believe threat perceptions were shared among EU Member States. 
Instead, they believed that national interests prevailed and stopped the EU from being a 
truly efficient global security actor. Moreover, while the EU had shifted from being solely a 
soft power to having its own military capabilities, the EU’s role was still perceived as one 
that primarily used non-coercive measures. In fact, many respondents felt that the EU was 
not a real hard power and some argued that this wouldn’t be the case until it created its 
own military forces. While the latest security strategy did not go so far as to call for a 
‘European Army’ as such, it took a much more pragmatic approach to security and defence, 
including the continued pursuit of developing EU military capabilities.  
Despite this seeming immaturity of the EU as a security provider, a vast majority of 
respondents were of the opinion that EU security and defence cooperation was beneficial to 
their country and many wanted to see the EU become a more independent security actor. 
Yet, at the same time, they were aware that multilateral cooperation was vital for the 
protection of EU citizens and their interests. The EU’s focus on acting within a multilateral 
framework thus seemed to resonate with European security practitioners who believed that 
working with other international actors was a key aspect of security provision today. To sum 
up, it seems that the EU had not yet instilled a sense of common threat perceptions 
amongst security practitioners or created sufficient enthusiasm amongst the Member States 
to develop a more credible and well-defined military component to its security and defence 
approach. The new EUGS has set out to do so, but whether it has the capacity to generate 
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genuine progress regarding further cooperation in rather challenging times remains to be 
seen.    
 
Security Practitioners’ Perceptions of the CSDP after Participating in Training 
Having investigated the projection of CSDP narratives as well as study participants’ views 
and attitudes towards EU security cooperation and, in particular, the CSDP prior to taking 
part in ESDC-coordinated training, it is also crucial to consider if and how security 
practitioners received these narratives during the training courses. During the interview 
stage, a number of topics were therefore covered to further explore perceptions of EU 
security policy implementation. These included key messages that participants would take 
away from the course regarding the CSDP, views on the development of a common 
European security culture, the state of security and defence provision in Europe and visions 
for the future.  Furthermore, interviewees were asked about the quality of the training 
courses, the content, what they felt worked well/poorly, as well as the impact of 
participating in such multinational training.  
 
Towards a Common European Security Culture?  
The pursuit of a common security culture was first mentioned in the ESS and then became a 
major goal of the ESDC when it was established a few years later. While the EUGS did not 
explicitly refer to this concept, it continued to be pursued via the ESDC-coordinated training 
courses and acted as an overarching narrative tying together the ideas of fostering a 
comprehensive approach to security and defence as well as the EU’s goal of securing its 
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citizens interests and values. Interviewees were thus asked what the term ‘common 
European security culture’ meant to them and how they felt about the EU’s pursuit of its 
creation.  
The majority of training participants indicated that they were not familiar with the term and 
also found the word ‘culture’ challenging in the context of the CSDP. One security 
practitioner stated they didn’t know what the EU meant by it and therefore interpreted 
‘common security culture’ as being “about the common understanding of the security 
things. It's about having the same values and principles” (Interviewee 22, Moldovan) while 
another remarked that “the idea of a culture, I don't know if that's the right term I would 
use. I think an understanding of the way the EU deals with security issues is what needs to 
be appreciated” (Interviewee 37, Irish). This interpretation of a better understanding of EU 
security and defence was further expanded on by another training participant:  
For me, common European security culture means better understanding about 
defence issues. […] That means if I understand that, I will translate and transfer this 
understanding to my country, to my colleagues, because this is very useful and 
important to the EU as a global leader. (Interviewee 7, Bulgarian)  
Unlike the first comment about sharing common values and principles, and despite the term 
‘culture’ seemingly linking in with notions of identity, most security practitioners struggled 
to make sense of the expression in such a context and instead only interpreted the idea of 
creating a common security culture as a process of developing a common knowledge base 
regarding the CSDP amongst security practitioners, eventually leading to a common 
understanding of security threats and the means to tackle these. Such an interpretation of 
the concept suggests it is a policy narrative rather than an identity narrative.  
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Many acknowledged that a common approach or culture would be beneficial to making 
European security and defence more efficient, as expressed by this interview participant: 
“To solve complex problems, new security threats, globalisation, humanitarian crises, doing 
your own thing doesn’t get you very far. So you should at least try to cooperate and to 
standardise things to try and achieve the best results” (Interviewee 14, German).  Yet, not 
many thought the ambition of creating a common security culture was something that could 
be achieved in the near future. Interview participants perceived a lack of shared interests to 
be the main obstacle to having a common approach to security and defence – something 
that could only be developed over time and with the help of exchanges, training and 
learning from one another (ibid). Emphasis was placed on raising awareness of the level of 
interconnectedness in today’s world and how security threats no longer affected a single 
country, but the whole Union.  
Many course participants indicated that the CSDP brought together not only people from 
different countries, but also from different fields of security implementation and thus 
different working cultures. One officer in training pointed out that military cultures in 
Europe were rather similar, suggesting that the difficulty lay in attempting to combine 
military and civilian cultures at EU level:  
It is incredibly important that despite our different nationalities, we all share the 
same profession and the basic attitudes and opinions aren't that different. It is 
important to realise that we have more in common as soldiers than we have with 
civilians. (Interviewee 14, German) 
This divide between civilian and military security practitioners was also observed by civilian 
course participants (i.e. Interviewee 44, Finnish). One interviewee with a military 
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background made a telling observation regarding the differing approaches of civilian and 
military staff: “I think the EU diplomats think that once we have to use the military, we've 
lost the battle or the war” (Interviewee 36, Austria).  
However, most interviewees came to the conclusion that national interests posed the 
biggest and seemingly insurmountable hurdle to developing a common security culture, as 
explained by a course participant from Malta: “The EU has been trying to create a common 
European position on security and defence, […], there are so many different national 
interests. Yes, you want them to act with one voice, but at the end of the day, national 
interests take over everything else” (Interviewee 30).   
With regards to the practical steps involved in fostering a common security culture, many 
interview participants felt this would be a major challenge. On the one hand, some 
participants believed that the CSDP training courses failed to function as a platform for 
fostering a common security culture, such as this interviewee: “I think an understanding of 
the way the EU deals with security issues is what needs to be appreciated, but I am not 
getting that at this stage of the module. I am not getting that message” (Interviewee 37, 
Irish). On top of learning about the EU’s approach to security and defence, interviewees also 
believed developing a common culture was a bottom-up undertaking. One German member 
of the Armed Forces suggested that “you can't tell people to just have a common culture. It 
is something that has to develop.  It only works through far-reaching exchanges where you 
see the faces behind the flags and national borders. To be able to work people out properly, 
to meet them in real life” (Interviewee 14, German). Many security practitioners were thus 
of the opinion that it was the informal aspects of the training courses which had the most 
potential to facilitate the creation of a common security culture: “[the networking] I think is 
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essential, it is as important as the course itself” (Interviewee 12, Greek).  The main 
sentiment regarding a common security culture was however that it was merely a long-term 
ambition rather than a tangible goal.  
 
Creating a European Security Culture - The Idea of an EU Army 
Another idea that is periodically brought up by politicians and the media has been the 
prospect of creating a ‘European army’ (an actual definition of what this would look like is 
rarely provided). This was an especially interesting subject for this study as it was of direct 
concern to CSDP practitioners. In the survey, it was defined as an independent army not 
made up of contingents from different Member States, but individuals serving directly under 
an EU authority. While 17% of respondents did not know whether they were for or against 
the creation of such an armed force, a sizeable majority (60%) were in favour of establishing 
such a European army. There was no significant difference between military and civilian 
respondents’ views on this matter or between those who had been in their current 
profession for less than five years and those who had been in it longer. Results also did not 
vary significantly between members of older Member States and those from post-2004 
enlargement States.  
As the idea of a common European army was a widely discussed subject, this question was 
followed up with one of the few open-ended questions in the online survey asking 
respondents to explain their answer. The reasons against its creation can be summed up 
into the following trains of thought:  
• The EU is not ready for such a step – more integration is needed first/no strategic 
direction/ institutions not set up for this 
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• This should be done by NATO, not the EU 
• Financial concerns over different national defence budgets 
• National sovereignty and interests too important and different to pursue this 
• No unity amongst people, no real will to help each other in this way 
Several of those who were against the idea of creating such an army went on to explain that 
they neither thought that this was a feasible proposal at this point in time, nor something 
that was likely to happen in the longer-term. Furthermore, only one military participant (out 
of a total of 23 who rejected the idea) specifically indicated that they personally would not 
be willing to directly serve an institution other than their country: “I am a member of 
national armed forces and want to be sent on operations based on national parliamentarian 
decisions”. Overall, the main argument against the creation of a European army was that 
the EU was not ready for such a move due to institutional and structural shortcomings as 
well as a lack of commitment to further integration by Member States as a consequence of 
conflicting interests.  
Those in favour of creating a European army gave the following reasons for their choice:  
• It would greatly enhance the efficiency with which security is provided in Europe 
• It would make the EU a more credible and powerful global actor 
• It would be more cost-effective 
• It is the next step in pushing European integration forwards 
Participants alluded to the rising powers in the world as well as threats such as from Russia 
and so-called IS requiring the EU to project its power and credibility through a joint army. 
The arguments most frequently given, however, were of a practical nature - namely saving 
money and becoming more efficient. While practical considerations were prevalent, 
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comments also indicated that a significant number of CSDP practitioners believed in further 
EU integration irrespective of the contemporary rise of Euroscepticism. Approximately one 
in five participants who were in favour of creating a European army mentioned that they 
believed this to be a necessary step in the pursuit of further integration. Furthermore, seven 
respondents’ comments specifically alluded to a common army as a way of fostering a sense 
of identity and solidarity within the EU.  
These responses were further supported by comments made during interviews. While the 
idea of a common European army was not included in the interview guide, it was mentioned 
during some interviews. From participants’ responses it is clear that, practically speaking, 
many thought it would make sense to create a European army, but that there was still a lack 
of political will stopping such a move. A German training participant commented “I think on 
the one hand it is not yet possible to create a European army, but I think there is no way 
around this. […] It is vital that the armed forces work together and create new ways of 
cooperation, not only at the decision-making level, but also on a practical level. I think we 
won't be able to solve problems without a European army” (Interviewee 15, Germany). 
Other comments suggested that the ties between the armed forces and the nation-state 
remained key and at times prevented individuals from wanting to be part of such an army: 
“Most probably there will be a European army, but also national armies. I don't think there 
will be a pure European army” (Interviewee 31, Germany). Another interviewee stated that 
they could imagine there being a “European army, but only with my own uniform” 
(Interviewee 16, Lithuania).  
These results once more highlighted the ‘Catch 22’ situation that seemed to affect European 
integration, and CSDP implementation in particular. There was widespread agreement that 
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further cooperation or integration would significantly improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of security provision in Europe. However, at the same time individuals were 
very much aware of their country’s interests and often found these to be incompatible with 
further cooperation or indeed integration.  
 
The Future of European Security and Defence 
The last aspect of the interview data providing an insight into study participants’ views on 
the CSDP was comments relating to the future of security and defence in Europe.  
Many interviewees voiced their support for increased cooperation from a practical point of 
view, often along the lines of this statement made by a course participant from Germany: “I 
think all states have to save money and scale down and one of the first things that is scaled 
down is usually defence […] It is vital that the armed forces work together and create new 
ways of cooperation, not only at the decision-making level, but also on a practical level.” 
(Interviewee 15). However, they were also quick to point out that national governments, in 
particular France and the UK, wanted to retain control over their security, and therefore felt 
that there wouldn’t be any big changes (Interviewee 35, French; Interviewee 24, Finnish). 
One interviewee was especially sceptical of progress on CSDP implementation:  
When you have 28 Member States, sovereign states with national interests, they will 
never be able to give these up.  In order to reach some sort of integration, they 
would need to do this. I don't see that happening. I would rather see the other 
situation, slowly going back. The Schengen zone has unfortunately proved that it's 
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not really working. Slowly we would have to go back to national states. (Interviewee 
46, Slovakia)  
Others suggested that European security cooperation would continue to be approached via 
the smallest common denominator and thus be characterised by “smaller missions, in a 
limited neighbourhood with limited mandates”. The interviewee went on to argue that 
further integration was not desirable and could also not imagine working directly for the EU 
on security issues (Interviewee 51, German). Despite being confronted with the EU’s 
narratives regarding increased security and defence cooperation during the training course 
and in their day-today work, some interviewees seemed reluctant to adopt a more EU-
centric view of security and defence, either due to believing in its incompatibility with 
retaining national sovereignty or due to not believing in further integration of the EU on a 
personal level. 
Many respondents perceived the political and security climate to be a “make or break” 
situation for the EU (Interviewee 6, Finland). One interviewee stated that they felt Europe 
was  
almost at a crossroads. There are certain missions which will continue because they 
are at a level where there is consensus. Creating new missions where countries have 
to find funding or personnel which are often specialists, I can see how that can be a 
problem. If there were three or more Paris-like attacks, you could see how things 
could radically alter. There are threats that could stop things from progressing. 
(Interviewee 43)  
Another interviewee from Lithuania stated that “it depends on the problems now, like the 
refugees. Maybe in the near future all these countries will unite for one goal, to be one 
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country. The other way is that all countries return to within their own borders, like before 
Schengen” (Interviewee 18, Lithuanian). These perceived uncertainties led a number of 
interviewees to be unsure about the direction European security cooperation within the EU 
would take in the coming years.  
There is no doubt that these opinions regarding the fragility of the EU were more pessimistic 
than those the EU was trying to transmit through its strategic documents. However, they 
reflected an awareness amongst CSDP practitioners that cooperation on security and 
defence matters was critical, even if it required a move away from pursuing EU-wide 
cooperation and towards “cooperation amongst the willing and able” Member States as 
suggested in the latest Strategy (EUGS, p. 47). Furthermore, it mirrored the more inward-
looking stance taken in the EUGS, acknowledging that intra-European security was central to 
the survival of the EU and something that needed to be addressed in greater detail within 
the CSDP. Indeed, during informal conversations between course participants it was 
observed that the role of the EU in dealing with border issues as a result of the increase in 
refugees coming to Europe was one of the most frequently discussed topics. It was often 
debated whether the EU should be given powers to intervene in situations uninvited or 
whether securing borders ought to remain the sole responsibility of the Member States. 
Practitioners’ views most often matched their domestic narratives on the subject and thus 
varied significantly amongst participants.  
 
Perceived Key Messages Regarding the CSDP 
When security practitioners were asked what key messages they were taking away from 
their training course, a significant number of responses related to the CSDP and its 
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implementation. This was quite a broad and direct question aiming to investigate how any 
key narratives were received by their target audiences without steering the interviewees in 
a certain direction through prompting or probing. This question also helped establish which 
course content had the biggest impact on participants and determine the extent to which 
the EU’s strategic narratives were indeed perceived as key content and thus transmitted 
successfully.  
Due to the variety of different training courses that formed part of this study, it must be said 
that responses to this question varied significantly. Young officers-in-training participating in 
Common Modules saw these residential courses mainly as opportunities to gain language 
skills and practical experience rather than a means to widen their knowledge of EU-related 
security matters. This reflects the nature of the format of these modules. While a couple of 
exchange opportunities are specifically aimed at raising awareness and knowledge of CSDP 
(namely the CSDP Common Module and the CSDP Olympiad), the majority of joint courses 
on offer only promote a common European approach to security and defence indirectly, by 
providing young recruits with opportunities to learn and bond with their European 
counterparts, much like the Erasmus programme does for students.  
The goal of the CSDP Orientation Course and High-Level Module, which also formed part of 
this study, were however designed to directly communicate the CSDP and related strategic 
approaches to security practitioners. This approach would suggest that EU security and 
defence narratives should make up the core content of these courses.  
With regards to specific CSDP narratives, one of the key messages many practitioners took 
away from the training events was that the CSDP continued to be interpreted differently 
amongst EU Member States and its implementation thus hinged on political will as 
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illustrated by this comment: ”The key message is that although it is not written anywhere, 
national interests is above everything for security” (Interviewee 27, Spanish). This notion 
was reinforced by a fellow Italian participant who believed that “the key message is that 
CSDP is one of the tools of the EU that could be effective, but basically is a tool, an 
opportunity and it very much depends on political will” (Interviewee 3). Another 
practitioner indicated that they did not expect any key messages to be transmitted through 
the training course as “that would be quite difficult, because all Member States have their 
own views on CSDP, which they will follow up when they get back to Brussels” (Interviewee 
33, Irish). One participant felt one of the reasons that Member States approach the 
implementation of the CSDP so differently was because “there is a difference there between 
Germany and smaller countries. The bigger countries believe that if they give up power to 
the institutions, they will still have power, but the smaller countries are a bit afraid that the 
institutions are taking on power on behalf of the Member States” (Interviewee 38, Swedish). 
This complexity of national interests seemed to be highlighted during the training courses. A 
Dutch participant thus concluded that “to get them [the Member States] all in line and 
support an action, that is a challenge. I knew that before of course, but it is more 
emphasised now [after the course] (Interviewee 48, Dutch). 
There were however also a number of participants who felt that the course communicated 
the benefits of increased cooperation, not only across Member States, but also amongst the 
different civilian and military actors involved in the implementation of the CSDP. A training 
participant from Austria noted that they “keep telling people how the military does it 
instead of looking at how others do it.  […] The liberal approach to a problem is something 
that we, the military, could learn form. I take away to be much more interested in how they 
[non-military staff] do it instead of lecturing on how we do it” (Interviewee 36, Austrian). 
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The importance of increasing dialogue between different CSDP actors was also 
acknowledged by a fellow German practitioner (also military) who found that “the most 
important stuff is the networking. Meeting people from different countries and institutions. 
I am not so much interested in the content. It is a field where so much is changing and I am 
not so sure you can take any results form a course because of that” (Interviewee 34). These 
varied responses in relation to perceived key messages not only show that participants 
attend the training for very different reasons, but that these practitioners’ motivations and 
attitudes towards EU security cooperation prior to attending largely determine what they 
perceive to be the courses’ key messages. Only a small number of trainees took away key 
messages in line with the EU’s key CSDP narratives suggesting that the CSDP and increased 
security and defence cooperation and integration are the best way forward. Others had 
become (more) disillusioned about the EU’s approach to dealing with security and defence 
issues or were taking away personal benefits such as practical experience or language skills.   
 
CSDP – Lacking a Common Strategic Vision?  
However, in terms of content, many practitioners agreed that the courses provided them 
with a more detailed insight into the processes around putting the CSDP into action. This 
generally manifested itself in a realisation that the CSDP was still far from being fully 
implemented and very much dependent on political will in the individual Member States: 
“The CSDP can only be so much – depending on what extent the Member States are willing 
to go. If they have little political will then the policy cannot be very ambitious or effective” 
(Interviewee 53, Finnish). Another interviewee said that they had gained “awareness that 
CSDP decision-making is always very dependent on the opinions of Member States, trying to 
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get consensus what we should do. It was already clear before the course, but now it 
becomes even more clear” (Interviewee 49, Dutch).  Furthermore, one respondent indicated 
that the course had made them realise that it was specifically a lack of financial support with 
regards to military operations that impeded CSDP implementation and hindered the EU 
from achieving its security goals (Interviewee 50, Slovakia).  
While most interviewees felt that more political will and more pooling and sharing on the 
part of the Member States was needed in order achieve closer security cooperation, one 
security practitioner concluded from the training course that it was specifically creating a 
sense of community that was required as they thought that “every nation feels robbed of 
certain capabilities and they have to rely on other countries” due to increasing efforts 
towards pooling and sharing (Interviewee 15, German). In addition to becoming more aware 
of the difficulty of getting all Member States on board in an environment which requires fast 
decision-making, interviewees seemed to also take away from the courses that the EU still 
lacked a long-term strategic vision, which was summed up by one participant: “There is no 
real long-term thinking. The missions are short term and then get extended. There is no real 
vision” (Interviewee 38, Swedish). Another interviewee went into more detail stating that 
the EU wants to “go in as a fire brigade. We are not just the fire brigade; we are also the 
carpenter that restores the house. That's the different of approach, but the people don't see 
it that way” (Interviewee 48, Dutch).  
This perceived lack of strategic vision by the EU was reflected in the participants’ lack of 
awareness of the EU’s strategy documents and indicates that up to that point, the EU had 
not sufficiently communicated its strategic vision to those who were tasked with its 
implementation. In addition to a perceived lack of strategy, numerous CSDP practitioners 
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also took away from the course that the EU remained very much a soft power. While one 
participant observed that the “CSDP is very much geared towards soft power. Real conflict 
the EU cannot handle; you can see it with the refugee crisis” (Interviewee 16, Lithuania), 
others held on to the view that NATO was the key security actor: “As long as NATO exists, 
the focus should be on NATO […] European nations are part of NATO, it's a very strong 
organisation for defending Europe. I don't see it would be the Union's role” (Interviewee 48, 
Dutch). These sentiments voiced immediately after the CSDP training courses seem to 
suggest that the EU had a way to go if it wanted to challenge existing security policy 
narratives and provide a coherent and consistent alternative to a national or NATO-focused 
outlook on security and defence provision in Europe.  
 
Conclusion to Chapter 8 Section c) 
Whereas study participants’ overarching views on the role of the CSDP and EU security 
cooperation seemed positive and fairly compatible at first glance, it became obvious that 
significant differences existed in the interpretation of CSDP narratives. In summary, it can be 
said that many interviewees referred to recent crises, in particular the refugee crisis, as a 
defining moment for security and defence cooperation in Europe. Furthermore, while they 
displayed an understanding of practical considerations regarding security provision which 
would encourage increasing cooperation on security issues, study participants, who mainly 
worked for national governments, continued to make sense of security threats within a 
national context driven by their Member States’ interests.  
These attitudes indicate that further integration of EU security and defence through fully 
implementing the CSDP is not a dominant, and thus universally accepted strategic narrative 
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amongst security practitioners. While EU security cooperation provided one way of 
approaching security challenges, it was not (yet) considered a compelling and widely 
accepted sense-making framework for security and defence issues in Europe. Instead it 
acted as a supplementary narrative to existing ones based around national sovereignty and 
NATO cooperation. Moreover, the EU’s projection of CSDP narratives during training courses 
was often perceived as inconsistent and lacking coherence.   
289 
 
Conclusion to Chapter 8:  A Profile of Security Practitioners as Internal 
Receivers of CSDP-related Strategic Narratives 
The premise of this research was that focus should not just be placed on how elites receive 
the EU’s strategic narratives, but also how security practitioners at all levels respond. As 
such, study participants were recruited from all levels of seniority and from many different 
Member States as well as from both civilian and military backgrounds. While it is impossible 
and imprudent to make any generalisations about the participants as a whole, it is worth 
profiling a few to highlight some of the main findings concerning individuals’ notions of 
European identity and their views on European security and defence cooperation. When 
examining the interviewees’ responses regarding their attitudes towards Europe and the 
future of European security and defence, three main attitudes became apparent. The 
majority of interview participants (approximately 52%) seemed to take a ‘realist stance’ 
which saw the integration of European security and defence as necessary in order to best 
serve and protect national interests. Seventeen interviewees could be considered 
‘integrationist’ – they openly voiced their desire for closer security and defence cooperation 
and supported more integration within the EU. 20% of interviewees shared their 
‘scepticism’ regarding the European project. They were either disillusioned from personal 
experiences of working for the EU and gaining a deeper understanding of the way in which 
the EU works, or a more general negative attitude towards European integration stemming 
from a perceived lack of common interests and differing approaches to security and defence 
provision.  
 Three participants have been chosen to reflect this wide variety of opinions across the 
sample of security practitioners and their responses to several key questions will be 
highlighted below.  
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1) The ‘Realist’: Security Practitioner new to CSDP – Participant in a CSDP Orientation 
Course 
 
CSDP Orientation Courses are aimed at mid-level staff who may have previous 
security policy experience but are relatively new to CSDP. This participant from an 
Eastern European country would have first experienced being a EU citizen as a 
teenager.  
Despite their appreciation of the personal benefits of being a European citizen, the 
participant did not believe that further European integration was the way forward. 
Instead, they felt that national interests were the only determining factor on security 
and defence matters.  
Moreover, the participant’s understanding of European identity was rather realist 
and limited to personal experiences:  
Well, I think it's our homeland and because we, the younger generation, we 
are already used to moving around without borders. We have our national 
identity, but we also have a European identity, maybe without realising. 
What is then the platform for a common identity? I think there is none. There 
are so many national positions. […] A European identity really is just 
something that needs to come with really young people who travel. The older 
generation don't feel like that. They don't see any positive side. Things like 
human trafficking, drugs, and so on, we didn't have before. But the younger 
generation like travelling and studying abroad, finding a job abroad. 
European identity exists, but we only turn into its direction when it suits us.  
With regards to the future of European integration, they said that they were  
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very, very sceptical. When you have 28 Member states, sovereign states with 
national interests, they will never be able to give these up.  […] I would rather 
see the other situation, slowly going back. The Schengen zone has 
unfortunately proved that it's not really working.  
The future of European security and defence was also hanging in the balance due to 
seemingly incompatible interests:  
There are so many national positions. With 28 states, it is so difficult to come 
to any decision on issues. Slovakia for example, many people in Slovakia don't 
even know where the countries are that the EU wants to send missions to. 
So, we will never be able to share the same interests. There is no motivation 
to do so. Or when you look at the migrant crisis. I think it's another split in 
the EU. It started with quotas, but then in Eastern Europe we never 
participated in operations which count as the roots of the crisis. So now we 
are asking why we should deal with the aftermath now?  
They also had “a bit of a problem” with the idea of a common European security 
culture as they didn’t feel the “environment was right” in their country and the EU 
lacked a road map for reaching consensus among all Member States.  
Despite being a relatively young security practitioner who appreciated the personal 
benefits of being an EU citizen, she had not developed a European integration 
identity. Rather, she believed that European integration had gone as far as it could, 
and if anything, should be reversed. For her, national interests remained the sole 
driving force behind security policy decision-making and there seemed to be no 




This attitude towards Europe, appreciating the freedoms of being an EU citizen, but 
not really displaying any sense of going beyond the national level when it comes to 
security and defence was fairly common amongst younger security practitioners. 
Many expressed little interest in taking a European perspective. More experienced 
staff often fell into one of two categories: through experience, many appreciated the 
complexities of today’s security threats and the need for cooperation and integration 
at European level in order to provide adequate levels of security. Others seemed 
somewhat disillusioned with the EU as a security provider and the pursuit of further 
integration as a result of their work with or for the EU. Both of these views are 
explored in the profiles below.  
 
2) ‘The integrationist’: Experienced Security Practitioner - Participant in a High-Level 
Course Module 
Participants in the High-Level Course are considered to be senior experts in leadership 
positions or with leadership potential. Many participants like this one have often worked 
substantially in a European environment and gained experience of dealing with security 
and defence issues at EU level prior to participation in the training courses.  
This military participant from a Western European country had a strong sense of 
European integration identity and believed that further cooperation and integration was 
the only way forward to make the EU a safer place:  
The challenges are much bigger than nations or states can deal with, not even the 
biggest ones. I am not just talking about military challenges, the environment, 
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climate challenge is not something that one country can deal with. […] The EU is still 
way too complicated. We need to let go of national sovereignty and thereby we will 
create a stronger Europe.  
Despite this conviction that further integration is necessary, the practitioner was aware 
of current internal struggles potentially having the power to undermine any further 
integration: “We could see the EU developing in a completely different direction with 
nationality taking over again. And therefore […] we have to work on it, forcefully and 
confront all those who are hindering it and slowing it down. This is the solution of the 
problem.”  
While they displayed a strong sense of European integration identity, this was also 
coupled with the conviction that NATO should play a central role in European security 
and defence as the EU’s “defence ministry” and provider of a security culture that is 
currently missing: “We have a common culture in the military that is created by NATO. 
We all learn our standards from NATO and then we apply it in the EU. I am embarrassed 
to see we have no common culture between the police and the military”.  
In addition to displaying a strong European integration identity, they also felt that a 
more general, but less tangible European identity existed:  
It is rather difficult because we are rather well developed and national pride and 
sovereignty matter, but when you look at it from a distance, it's good to see that 
there is a European identity when you go shopping in Milano, in Vienna, in Helsinki 
[…]. Or you look at security policy. You just need to read the European security 
strategy and the American strategy. You see the identity. We do it comprehensively. 
We do not speak of forcing our will on anybody, or pre-emptive strikes. We talk of 
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local ownership.  Yes, there is a European identity. It's not listed in a way that every 
politician, every actor could name it, but it's certainly there. A vision.   
Having experienced working to implement the CSDP first-hand, this interviewee felt 
strongly about further integrating security and defence at EU level (and extending 
cooperation with NATO). 
 
3) ‘The sceptic’: Experienced Security Practitioner - Participant in a High-Level Course 
Module 
While some experienced security practitioners have clearly developed a sense of 
European integration identity, others have become disillusioned with the EU. One 
practitioner went so far as to say: “My views on Europe on the EU have possibly become 
hardened because I actually know more and I came with an open mind but it's every 
turn, every single turn I get to understand how inept Europe as an organisation is”. They 
go on to state that they believe the work they carry out makes a difference  
in spite of the EU institutions, not because of, in spite of them because there are so 
many different voices. You never go to a meeting with one voice, you undermine 
each other rather than support each other […]. All Member States look after their 
national interests first and foremost. We've seen that with the migration crisis. It 
comes down to strategy. We don't have a unified strategy. […] They have very 
different threat perceptions. The Western European countries have not been 
listening to the Eastern European countries. Do we look to self-interests before 
anything else? Absolutely. The Greek debt crisis is a good example.  
295 
 
As a result, they believe that a common European security culture is far from being a 
reality because “when it comes to implementing anything around common security is 
that we fall to the lowest common denominator instead of raising best European 
standard”.  
They also conclude that a shared European identity does not exist: “There are a number 
of people, members of Member States who think it exists, but the UK certainly doesn't 
think there is one. I personally don't think there is one. […] I don't see myself as a 
European. There are so many different cultures within Europe […]”.  
This practitioners’ views show that despite working on European security and defence, 
they have not developed any sense of European identity through secondments to 
Eastern Europe. Instead, they discovered how approaches to security and defence differ 
between Eastern and Western European Member States and how a seeming lack of 
understanding of these makes a common identity and security culture nigh impossible. 
Combined with no sense of a European identity based around personal benefits, it 
becomes evident that the interviewee does not display a sense of European integration 
identity.  
While this may seem like a rather negative example, a number of interviewees revealed 
that they, too, had become disillusioned with the way EU institutions functioned as a 
result of their work and showed little signs of a European identity connected to EU 
institutions. This disillusionment seems to reinforce the prevalent sentiments of 
dissatisfaction with EU bureaucracy amongst the European public.  
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Overall, it can be said that only a small number of study participants displayed a 
European integration identity. This could however not be specifically attributed to being 








CHAPTER 9: Reflections 
This chapter provides a summary of the main findings of this thesis and situates these within 
a wider theoretical as well as practical context. Furthermore, it reflects on the research 
process, points out the limitations of the study and makes suggestions for possible future 
research.  
This thesis set out to investigate notions of European identity amongst European security 
practitioners and their views of EU security and defence cooperation under the CSDP. A 
content analysis of the two European Security Strategies was used to assess the EU’s efforts 
to communicate a sense of European identity to security practitioners. In order to capture 
individuals’ views and determine whether a sense of ‘European integration identity’ is 
emerging amongst EU practitioners, an online survey was carried out prior to their 
participation in ESDC-coordinated training courses and EMILYO modules, and interviews 
with participants were conducted at six different courses.  
The data collected from CSDP training participants included 195 online questionnaires as 
well as 60 in-depth interviews that took place during or straight after ESDC-coordinated 
training courses and involved 3 CSDP Orientation Courses, a CSDP High Level Course module 
and two EMILYO training courses, thus covering a wide range of security practitioners (both 
in seniority, nationality and areas of work). By combining these two research methods an 
insight into security practitioners' opinions could be gained and followed up with more in-
depth data regarding the impact of EU-level strategic communication of security narratives 
on individuals' understandings of the EU.  
This study was carried out to answer the following research questions:  
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1. In what way are CSDP training courses contributing to the creation of a common 
European identity amongst European security practitioners? To what extent is the 
EU an effective projector of strategic narratives on an intra-European level? 
2. In how far is a common security culture emerging amongst those implementing the 
CSDP?  
3. To what extent do security practitioners support greater cooperation/ further 
integration of European security and defence?  
 
The research was based around the hypothesis that despite increasing efforts to integrate 
CSDP training to create cohesion and a sense of common identity amongst CSDP 
practitioners, notions of national identity and interests continue to prevail and determine 
CSDP implementation. However, it was also believed that while national considerations may 
continue to dominate, working on EU policy implementation, and in particular participating 
in EU-level training would, over time, facilitate the emergence of a common security culture 
and a certain 'we-feeling' amongst CSDP practitioners based on cultural as well as civic 
identity components, thus resulting in the creation of a European integration identity 
defined as “a sense of belonging to a group of citizens who share values and a vision of the 
future and believe that the EU is the best tool for achieving the group’s goals” as defined in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis.  Furthermore, it was hypothesised that the networking and 
socialisation aspects of the training activities would play an important role in this process 
alongside the formal communication of EU security and defence narratives.  
While a detailed response to each of the research questions can be found below, the main 
findings of this thesis can be summed up as follows: national interests and a sense of 
national identity prevail amongst the majority of security practitioners and determine their 
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views on EU security and defence. While the training courses manage to raise some much 
needed awareness regarding the CSDP and create opportunities for participants to learn 
about different European perspectives, they fail to clearly project European identity 
narratives in a security and defence context. This is largely due to the structure of the 
training courses and also the EU’s failure to clearly communicate its strategic vision (at least 
prior to the release of the EUGS). Most training participants felt uncomfortable and/or 
confused by the term ‘common European security culture’ and often interpreted it as a 
‘common understanding’ of security. There was consensus that this was a long-term goal 
which was far from being a reality. Almost all practitioners agreed that the complexity of 
security threats required European cooperation (as long as it served national interests), but 
many saw the EU’s role as a soft power complementary to the hard power provided by 
NATO. Each research question is addressed in more detail below.  
 
Research Question 1: Is a Common European Identity Emerging and 
What Role Does CSDP Training Play?  
In response to Research Question 1, it can be said that national interests remain the key 
driver behind cooperation at EU level. While there seemed to be a certain level of 
identification with the EU and its values that could be considered part of an emergent 
European integration identity, this was restrained by national considerations, especially in a 
security and defence context. Only a very small number of practitioners displayed a ‘strong’ 
European identity in line with Kantner’s definition. The surveys showed that CSDP 
practitioners believed one of the key aspects of ‘being a citizen of the EU’ was having 
common ideals and they generally felt their own values matched what they perceived to be 
ones representing the EU (Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law). Interviews also 
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revealed that course participants deemed they shared values with fellow Europeans, often 
citing that similarities became apparent when comparing them to other, non-European 
ones.  
Despite this, it became evident that the creation of a European integration identity or a 
European security culture through the EU’s security strategies and joint training 
programmes is a long-term objective rather than a short-term reality. The majority of study 
participants recognise the complexities of security threats and acknowledge the need to 
cooperate (further) on security and defence matters, but only as long as this coincides with 
their national interests.  When contemporary and ongoing issues such as the irregular 
migration crisis were discussed, it was particularly obvious that many individuals felt that 
values in different parts of Europe were diverging. Rather than mentioning common values 
with fellow Europeans, interviewees frequently stated that they appreciated the personal 
benefits that came with being an EU citizen, such as freedom of movement and the ability to 
work abroad which enabled them to easily experience other cultures and feel ‘at home’ in 
all of Europe.  
That is not to say that the EU’s strategic documents and common training initiatives have no 
impact on security practitioners. This thesis has shown that there is still little knowledge of 
the EU’s role as a security provider and its vision for the future amongst many practitioners. 
The EU’s projection of EU security narratives makes a considerable contribution to raising 




Situating Security Practitioners’ Notions of European Identity within a Wider 
Theoretical Context 
This thesis contributes to European identity theory in a number of ways. Firstly, to research 
notions of identity empirically, it uses Kantner and Bruter’s models of European identity to 
produce a definition of ‘European integration identity’. This narrows down an otherwise 
largely fluid and vast field of European identity studies and makes it relevant to the context 
of European security and defence integration: “individuals’ recognition not only of being 
part of an EU we₂ commercium, a community that facilitates the pursuit of individual 
nation’s desires and purposes, but this is accompanied by a sense of belonging to a group of 
citizens who share values and a vision of the future and believe that the EU is the best tool 
for achieving the group’s goals” (see Chapter 3). This thesis acknowledges that there is a 
difference between ‘feeling European’ and supporting the integration of policy-making 
(such as security and defence) at EU level. However, it suggests that a combination of 
cultural aspects (such as peace, harmony, the fading of historical divisions and co-operation 
between similar people and cultures) and civic components (such as borderlessness, 
circulation of citizens, prosperity) (Bruter, 2004, p. 36) need to be taken into consideration 
when examining European security practitioners. This is because EU practitioners are in a 
unique position where they not only experience the civic aspects of being European. 
Through having a common European Security Strategy which sets out European values and 
interests and working with fellow European practitioners they are also exposed to the 
cultural components of European identity.  
Secondly, this thesis has determined that amongst CSDP practitioners notions of European 
identity currently only play a very minor role in their professional capacities. Instead, 
national interests prevail and a sense of European identity mostly manifests itself as feeling 
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European through enjoying personal benefits such as democracy, free travel and work 
mobility. This reflects findings from Bruter’s 2003 study in which he determined that notions 
of a ‘civic European identity’ were a lot more common amongst individuals than ones based 
around cultural components (ibid).  
Moreover, this study amongst security practitioners has shown that Kantner’s analysis 
regarding the state of a European identity from 2006 is still largely valid ten years later. 
Security practitioners largely seem to find themselves in a ‘we ₂ commercium’ group where 
“everyone follows their own idiosyncratic desires and purposes” and sees the group as “a 
club or neighbourhood” rather than “a family” (which she calls ‘we₂ communio’) (Kantner, 
2006, p. 8).  Furthermore, cooperation at EU level is perceived to be beneficial for achieving 
personal goals rather than as a manifestation of a shared self-understanding (ibid, p. 512).  
However, it should be acknowledged that the timing of the data collection may have had an 
impact on potential progress from a ‘we ₂ commercium’ to a ‘we₂ communio’ group.  Not 
only was the preparation of the EUGS in its final stages, the data collection took place only a 
few months after David Cameron won the UK General Election having promised a 
referendum on EU membership.  Informal discussions largely evolved around the possibility 
of the first Member State leaving the EU. Furthermore, this coincided with the height of the 
irregular migration crisis and the decision by some Member States to close their borders. 
Opposing views on how to deal with the situation were not only much discussed in the 
media, but also featured heavily during the training courses. These developments seemed 
to create a palpable atmosphere of uncertainty, insecurity and a certain level of division 
amongst participants, which was further amplified by the terror attacks in Paris taking place 
during one of the training courses.  Instead of the Euro crisis, the irregular migration crisis 
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and the Brexit referendum being perceived as collective European experiences (and thereby 
creating a ‘we₂ communio’ group amongst Europeans according to Kantner), these events 
led to a reinforced sense of national identity amongst participants. 
Parallel Eurobarometer results regarding respondents’ optimism about the future of the EU 
from the end of 2015 and 2016 reflect these sentiments somewhat, as they show a dip in 
optimism to one of the lowest points since the first time this question was asked in 2007 
(45% fairly optimistic compared to 44% at the end of 2011). However, this pessimism seems 
to have been short-lived as by the end of 2018 the public’s outlook had improved again to 
52% being fairly optimistic (Standard Eurobarometer 89).  
However, follow-up research is needed to further investigate the short-term and enduring 
impact of major events major historical event “either catastrophic or fortunate” (Kantner, 
2006, p. 513) on European identity and the extent to which these can reinforce a sense of 
national identity instead. This would also contribute further insights into the possibility of a 
‘we₂ communio’ group emerging amongst EU practitioners in the future.  
 
Research Question 2: Is a Common Security Culture Emerging Amongst 
Practitioners?  
With regards to Research Question 2, it can be said that the EU’s endeavour to foster a 
common European security culture was frequently discussed as it was part of the ESDC’s 
rhetoric on regarding the purpose of CSDP training. Not only did training participants often 
have no concept of what this meant, most also felt it was far from being a reality despite 
acknowledging that the complexity of security threats required a common approach. Many 
interpreted it simply as a common understanding of security and defence issues. While the 
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training course seemed to create awareness of the CSDP (which judging from interview 
remarks wasn’t extensive previously), individuals often felt the way the training courses 
were run, but also the interactions between participants highlighted the different 
national/regional approaches to security and defence in Europe. Almost all study 
participants were of the opinion that a common European security culture was at least a 
few decades away from existing. One aspect that the majority of practitioners agreed upon 
was an acknowledgement that security issues are too complex for individual nations to deal 
with on their own and that multilateral cooperation was the only way forward. 
Furthermore, the EU’s comprehensive approach was recognised by most practitioners as 
the best way to confront security issues and more cooperation between civilian and military 
staff was deemed essential for an effective EU foreign policy. 
 
The Effectiveness of the EU’s Internal Projection of Strategic Narratives 
With regards to the EU’s communication of strategic narratives through its security 
strategies and CSDP-related training courses, there are three key findings.  Firstly, up until 
the release of the EUGS, the EU struggled to communicate clear and coherent messages 
regarding its strategic vision that had the power to compel Member States to fully 
implement the CSDP. While the EUGS was less vague and there has been some renewed 
impetus to advance European security and defence cooperation, it remains to be seen 
whether this trend continues.  
Secondly, the nature of ESDC courses fittingly reflects the (intergovernmental) nature of the 
EU, but also makes consistent and cohesive communication difficult. Its virtual character 
and network structure reflect the character of the EU well – voluntary participation and 
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consensus are key attributes and ensure that all members are able to shape the content of 
training courses in a democratic manner. Despite their largely standardised curricula, 
courses are hosted and delivered by the ESDC Member Organisations rather than ESDC staff 
themselves. This means the hosts and the speakers they select have a significant amount of 
freedom regarding the actual content of the individual training sessions. As observed in this 
study this, at times, leads to interpretations focusing too much on national interests and 
content lacking coherence, resulting in the EU appearing to speak with too many voices 
instead of having a clear EU-centric narrative. The residential nature of the courses, 
however, is quite efficient at bringing together CSDP practitioners from all over Europe that 
may not otherwise meet. This not only makes a community that is arguably too large to 
imagine more tangible, but the networking components have the potential to reinforce the 
notion of ‘sitting in the same boat and sailing in the same direction’ as well as bridging the 
civilian-military divide, thus facilitating a more ‘comprehensive approach’. 
Thirdly, the informal aspects of the residential training courses are by many considered the 
most important aspect as they provide crucial networking opportunities which have the 
potential not only to create bonds between Europeans, but also to foster a truly 
comprehensive approach by bringing together civilian and military practitioners.  
 
What do These Findings Mean for the Creation of a Common Security Culture 
through CSDP Training?  
While many practitioners stated that a common security culture was a long-term goal rather 
than ruling out the prospect of its emergence altogether, the prevalence of serving and 
protecting national interests amongst practitioners seemed a considerable obstacle to any 
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such efforts. Furthermore, while practitioners displayed certain notions of European identity 
(mainly linked to personal benefits of being part of the EU), they did not seem to develop a 
‘European integration identity’ through their work. This would suggest that rather than only 
focussing on a common European security culture at this stage, emphasis should also be 
placed on ‘Europeanising’ national outlooks on security and defence. This would mean 
creating greater awareness of the impact of being part of the EU on national security 
matters. On the one hand, this requires continuing and strengthening efforts to raise 
awareness of CSDP through the training courses. The EU’s communication of its strategic 
narratives could be improved by going one step beyond developing standardised curricula. 
By delivering course content centrally and solely by EU representatives rather than national 
experts the ESDC would ensure that messages are communicated clearly and coherently and 
national framing was presented in a balanced way. On the other hand, more knowledge of 
European integration is required. While the majority of practitioners realise that their 
country cannot deal with security issues on their own, more awareness could be created 
regarding the implications of current levels of European integration and their impact on 
security and defence issues at a national level. One way of achieving this would be through 
more training courses taking place in Brussels and including familiarisation activities with 
other EU institutions. By gaining a better understanding of the EU as a whole, practitioners 
will develop greater awareness of the interconnectedness of national and EU policy-making.   
 
View of the EU as a Security Provider 
Prior to CSDP training, the majority of security practitioners indicated that they believed 
they had a good understanding of the CSDP and deemed their knowledge of the ESS to be 
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fair. While participants felt their knowledge of CSDP to be better than of EU political 
processes in general, they were most comfortable with the role of NATO. While these 
results suggest that CSDP practitioners had a decent knowledge of EU security and defence 
overall, they also indicate that participants were much more familiar with NATO as a 
security provider. Based on this knowledge, they rated the EU as a ‘somewhat credible’ 
security provider. Furthermore, subsequent ranking of perceived priorities for the EU 
indicate that multilateral cooperation with NATO, the UN, and others, and the use of non-
coercive force were key to security practitioners. The view of the EU being (and remaining) a 
soft power was widespread. The in-depth interviews that followed revealed one of the most 
surprising findings of this thesis – the actual lack of knowledge about the CSDP amongst 
interviewees. Despite over 40% of survey respondents indicating that their knowledge of 
the CSDP was ‘good’ (and a further 34% rating it as ‘fair’), many interviewees indicated they 
had very little or no knowledge of (the existence of) the CSDP. Furthermore, many voiced 
confusion over the role of the EU in relation to NATO. The EU’s recognition of this issue was 
reflected in the 2016 EUGS, which was subsequently released. It outlines more clearly the 
relationship the EU envisages with NATO, thus acknowledging and addressing the confusion 
that seems to exist amongst the public and security practitioners regarding their respective 
remits.  This is evidence of the EU’s ‘listening process’ that accompanied the drafting of the 
EUGS and highlights the reciprocal relationship between the projection, reception and 




Research Question 3: How do Security Practitioners View the Future of 
European Security and Defence? 
The main findings in relation to Research Question 3 are that there were three different 
camps amongst training participants. A small number of participants were great supporters 
of the European project and further integration of European security and defence. Yet, the 
majority of practitioners took a realist stance centred on protecting the interests of their 
national governments. Further integration was seen positively as long as it aided national 
interests. A small number of study participants were against further integration and indeed 
voiced a preference for matters of security and defence to be dealt with solely at the 
national level.  
It is often argued that the feeling of ‘going in the same direction’ is a crucial aspect of a 
shared sense of identity and when asked about the future of European security and 
defence, it became obvious that many individuals believed there was a lack of common 
vision. While the majority of survey participants indicated that their own countries’ 
priorities largely matched those of the EU, it was during the interviews that reservations 
about further integration were voiced. Many suggested that the biggest obstacles to 
creating a truly common vision were the Member States’ differing threat perceptions and 
the supremacy of national interests. They thus concluded that cooperation often had to be 
based on finding the smallest common denominator and regional or selective cooperation 
and integration amongst EU Member States was usually favoured over an approach 
encompassing all 28. These views mirror the sentiments widely observed prior to the 




Situating EU Security Practitioners’ Views within a Wider Context  
No other data exists that would allow direct comparisons of attitudes and views amongst 
security practitioners. However, the above findings are largely in line with more general 
views expressed in the Eurobarometer survey conducted with members of the general 
European public at the same time (Standard Eurobarometer 84, November 2015). 
Participants stipulated a decent general knowledge of the EU’s processes and an 
appreciation of the need for European security and defence cooperation and integration. In 
the Standard Eurobarometer Survey, survey respondents rated their knowledge of how the 
EU works at a record high (55% indicated they understood how the EU works, compared to 
42% who didn’t and 3% who expressed no opinion) (EB84.3, p. 120). Furthermore, support 
for having the CSDP remained high (it has been above 70% ever since the question was first 
asked in 1999 and in 2018 sat at 75%) (ibid.). While a large majority of security practitioners 
acknowledged the benefits of European security cooperation and integration in principle, 
they indicated that national interests very much remained at the forefront of their work, 
and often resulted in support for cooperation efforts being restricted to the ‘smallest 
common denominator’ rather than pursuing a truly common approach. These views 
suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that those involved in the implementation of the CSDP are not 
necessarily as enthusiastic about it as the general public.   
Furthermore, this study amongst CSDP practitioners suggests that while they recognised the 
need for cooperation at EU level, they stopped short of seeing the EU as a fully-fledged 




European Security and Defence since the Launch of the EUGS 
Security and defence cooperation has seen a number of significant developments since the 
release of the EUGS. The interview with Tocci conducted as part of this thesis gave a 
valuable insight into the EU’s strategic vision and the consultation process behind it. In 
addition to giving fresh impetus due to its more pragmatic, somewhat less vague approach 
to European security and defence cooperation, the EUGS, to a large extent, reflects 
practitioners’ visions for security and defence cooperation. Through the creation of the 
European Defence Fund for example, which offers funding to enable collaborations between 
at least three Member States, the EU is encouraging smaller scale cooperation on defence 
matters. The MPCC, the newly created counterpart to the Civilian Planning and CPCC on the 
other hand seeks to make non-executive military missions more coherent and efficient and 
by closely working with the CPCC, further develop the EU’s comprehensive approach, 
streamlining its structures to make it more attractive externally as well as more appealing to 
utilise by Member States.  
In addition to renewed calls for a ‘European army’ by various politicians including Macron 
and Merkel in 2018 and 2019, there have also been changes within some Member States. 
After decades of spending cuts and force reductions, Germany and France have announced 
that their military budgets will see a significant increase over the next few years (to reflect 
1.5% and 2% of their GDPs respectively by 2025) and Germany is also looking to recruit 
another 21,000 soldiers by 2025 (that would signify an increase of more than 15% since the 
release of the EUGS). Furthermore, Germany’s Army General Inspector has also suggested 
that the Bundeswehr may consider a ‘Europeanisation’ of its staff by allowing the 
recruitment EU citizens into military positions. While these developments have only just 
been set into motion, they reflect a changing atmosphere in the international security 
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environment. This is largely driven by Trump and his demands for EU countries to meet the 
NATO defence budget target, the US pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
treaty and increased aggression from Russia. It is further aggravated by the uncertain future 
cooperation with the UK after its departure from the EU amongst other factors. 
Forthcoming 2019 EU Parliamentary elections and the subsequent appointment of new EU 
Commissioners and the High Representative will also have an impact on the immediate 
future of security and defence cooperation in Europe. Furthermore, it is clear that this 
interplay between external factors and internal developments will have a significant impact 
on the CSDP not only in the short-term, but also in its overall long-term direction.  
 
The Usefulness of the Strategic Narrative Framework for Analysing 
Notions of European Identity amongst Security Practitioners 
This thesis employed a strategic narrative framework exploring the internal communication 
and reception of EU security and defence narratives to European security practitioners 
participating in CSDP training courses. Using this framework enabled the researcher to 
evaluate the EU's discourse on the CSDP and its effectiveness at narrating this, as well as to 
investigate the importance of personal experiences on the notion of European identity. 
While strategic narrative research typically looks at the bigger picture, i.e. international 
actors' behaviour as a whole, this study chose to focus on individuals' attitudes towards EU 
policy implementation and the European integration project.  
Overall, the concept of strategic narrative communication proved a useful analytical 
framework for assessing the emergence of a European integration identity amongst CSDP 
practitioners. Looking at how and why narratives are formed, how they are projected and in 
turn received highlighted the reciprocity between the EU decision-makers and practitioners. 
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Findings from analysing strategic documents and the data collected from surveys and 
interviews confirmed that identity formation is not simply a top-down undertaking but is 
very much influenced by individuals. However, analysing the projection of security 
narratives in a training environment also underlined the importance of other identity-
building processes that occur simultaneously. The informal interaction with fellow 
Europeans and experiencing Europe through residential courses, thus going beyond the 
‘imagined community’ was considered by participants to be one of the most positive aspects 
and represents a vital aspect of identity-building amongst security practitioners.  
The Security Strategies set out a vision for European cooperation on security and defence 
matters. They are a response to long-term trends in security threats, but rather than being 
purely reactive they take a proactive approach to security provision. However, during the 
data collection phase, whenever security-related events occurred, such as terrorist attacks, 
the refugee crisis and the impending Brexit referendum, it seemed paradoxically to 
somewhat interfere with the strategic narrative communication process. These issues were 
frequently discussed by course participants, revealing notable differences in opinion 
between individuals, often reflecting how events had been framed in national media. While 
some agreed that joint efforts were required to tackle these security crises, many remarked 
how such events highlighted the differences between the different Member States and their 
approaches to security provision. These observations suggest that in times of crisis, a certain 
framing of events (often national in character) becomes prevalent and influences not only 
how European strategic narratives are received by individuals, but also how individuals 
perceive a sense of ‘we-ness’ with fellow Europeans. Moreover, they emphasise the need to 
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take a holistic approach to strategic narrative analysis that looks at the context in which 
strategic narrative communication takes place.  
Employing the concept of strategic narratives to investigate the emergence of a sense of 
European integration identity amongst security practitioners has served to highlight the 
challenge the EU faces in trying to develop a more unified voice. Competing with national 
narratives projected in a domestic media setting is difficult and while security and defence 
narratives largely resonate with practitioners, national interests play a significant role in 
determining the extent to which they are adopted. Using a concept that focuses on 
communication processes was vital when analysing a concept as complex as identity. The 
notion of a European identity is fluid, often interpreted in different ways and used in 
different contexts. Honing in on a specific aspect of European identity, the impact of 
strategic security narratives on supporting European integration as a manifestation of 
sharing values and visions with fellow Europeans rendered a somewhat abstract concept 
more tangible.  
One aspect that proved somewhat difficult to investigate due to the chosen policy area was 
the three different levels of narrative: international system, identity and issue/policy-
specific narratives. In this case it was difficult to differentiate between them as this thesis 
investigated narratives regarding the CSDP which is a policy area closely interlinked with and 
connected to views of the international system. It is often argued, however, that overlap 
between the different narrative levels is common and serves to demonstrate the 
importance of interconnectedness between narratives in order to be perceived as coherent 
and comprehensive. Indeed, the majority of study participants were of the opinion that the 
complexity of security issues requires a joint response, making the CSDP an attractive tool 
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for security provision. But many stopped short of adopting the view that further 
cooperation and integration of EU defence was more important that pursuing their national 
interests. 
 
The Importance of Personal Experiences for the Reception of Strategic 
Narratives 
 
The concept of strategic narratives was useful for exploring emerging notions of European 
integration identity amongst security practitioners. However, it was also hypothesised that 
when looking at how notions of identity are shaped at the level of the individual, it is 
important to include another consideration when studying the reception of strategic 
narratives – personal filters such as previous exchange experiences, frequency of 
interactions with fellow Europeans, and the importance of informal networking 
opportunities were all touched upon in this study. While this is not an exhaustive list of 
potential influencing factors, they enabled a basic assessment of the role that personal 
experiences play in the reception of narratives. However, the data collected as part of this 
study showed that individuals linked positive personal experiences relating to the EU, such 
as freedom of movement, being able to experience other cultures and better standards of 
living to a greater appreciation of the EU, indicating that these experiences may also 
contribute towards a sense of European identity. These connections were frequently made 
during interviews. However, results from the online survey indicate that the only experience 
having an impact on respondents was previous exchange experiences. Frequent interactions 
with fellow European security practitioners did not result in a more pro-European outlook.    
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The results from the survey would suggest that somewhat surprisingly and with potentially 
important implications, survey participants had not acquired a more pronounced 
identification with Europe through regular interactions with European colleagues and there 
was no indication that they were developing any notions of a ‘European integration identity’ 
as a result of these.  The in-depth interviews, however, offered a counter-balance and 
revealed that connecting with fellow European practitioners was for many a key aspect of 
the CSDP training courses. Interviewees reported that they had gained more awareness and 
understanding of different European perspectives. While for some this meant they noticed 
commonalities, others had started noticing rifts. Some interview participants reported that 
they felt views diverged when talking to colleagues from other regions of Europe (i.e. South 
vs. North, East vs. West). Ideally this thesis would have included an analysis of data 
according to these parameters (potentially also a comparison between old and new 
Member States). This would have required a more careful sample selection to achieve an 
acceptable geographical spread of nationalities and added significant time onto the data 
collection and analysis phase, something which was not feasible due to the constraints of 
this thesis. However, examining notions of European identity amongst practitioners 
according to these variations is an interesting project for postdoctoral research. At the same 
time, further research is required into whether there really is neither a positive nor a 
negative impact on notions of European identity amongst practitioners who had very 
frequent contact with fellow Europeans (despite many interview participants stating that 
the interaction with fellow Europeans was the most important aspect of the CSDP training 
courses). Due to the scope of this thesis, the survey and interview questions were merely 
able to provide a small insight into this. Yet, a comparison of security practitioners working 
for an EU institution with those working for national bodies may indicate whether 
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supranational decision-making is required for the emergence of a sense of European 
integration identity and a common security culture.  
While it is difficult to measure the impact of ‘personal frames’ on the reception of strategic 
narratives especially in a quantitative way, it is important to acknowledge their existence 
and consider their potential implications when investigating individuals’ roles in the 
narrative communication process.  
 
Reflections on the Research Process – Limitations and Ideas for Future 
Research 
This thesis has made a rare contribution to the study of Strategic Narratives as it provided 
an empirical application of the framework, generating a substantial amount of data in 
relation to the EU’s internal communication processes which served to highlight the 
reciprocal relationship between the formation, projection and reception of strategic 
narratives and the role of the individuals involved in this process. Analysing two EU strategy 
documents and assessing how their content had been changed and adapted over time 
provided a detailed insight into the formation of narratives. By pairing this with interviews 
and surveys with practitioners in-between the release of the two documents, this research 
was able to highlight practitioners’ contributions to the formation of narratives. While some 
researcher observations from the training courses were included in this study, thus 
providing additional insights into the projection of narratives, this research method did not 
constitute a formal part of the data collection. Time constraints did not allow the researcher 
to observe all training courses in a systematic manner as interviews were at times scheduled 
to clash with some sessions. Furthermore, adding another set of data to the study would 
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have gone beyond its scope.  This meant that observations were anecdotal rather than 
empirically rigorous, but still provided an insight into the EU’s projection of strategic 
narratives in practice. While many courses had standardised curricula, at times the actual 
content of individual sessions varied somewhat from what was promised on paper. Thus, 
future research into the communication of strategic narratives during training courses 
would benefit from a more detailed analysis of the actual course content.   
Nevertheless, choosing to conduct research at CSDP training courses served as a unique 
platform for investigating the projection and reception of narratives. Many studies focus on 
elites or senior decision-making staff as the group of people who determine the 
implementation of policies. However, gathering data from all levels of seniority gave a 
holistic insight into security practitioners’ views towards cooperation and integration, thus 
not only providing a snapshot of those at the top, but everyone involved, as well as 
presenting an indication of how potential future leaders’ opinions are shaped by the EU’s 
strategic narratives.  
While it was surprising how unaware some security practitioners were of the CSDP in 
general and more specifically the ESS, no detailed probing into their actual knowledge was 
undertaken due to the limited scope of this study. Further research into practitioners’ 
familiarity with EU strategy would thus be useful, as it would not only test the EU’s internal 
strategic communication further, it would also shed more light on the relationship between 
strategy makers and practitioners in more detail.  
Research into security practitioners’ feelings towards the EU and security and defence 
cooperation is scarce despite the EU’s continued efforts to create a sense of European 
identity for security and defence cooperation. Prior to the data collection phase, it was 
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envisaged that follow-up research would be carried out approximately six to nine months 
after the initial surveys and interviews were conducted. The purpose of such a follow-up 
would have been two-fold: first, data would have been gathered regarding practitioners’ 
awareness and knowledge of CSDP matters. This would have enabled direct comparisons 
pre- and post CSDP training and may have indicated any progression that had occurred 
through work or training activities. Attitudes towards the EUGS could also have been 
recorded. Second, follow-up research could have investigated whether the networking and 
bonding between European security practitioners and across the civil-military spectrum had 
had a lasting impact and whether it had contributed to the emergence of a common security 
culture.  
By continuing in this way, more robust data on the notion of an emergent European 
integration identity could have been collected. While the scope of this thesis did not allow 
such an extensive second data collection phase, this research could still be carried out 




The main focus of this thesis was to consider whether the EU’s strategic narratives were 
successful at fostering a European integration identity, defined as “a sense of belonging to a 
group of citizens who share values and a vision of the future and believe that the EU is the 
best tool for achieving the group’s goals” (Chapter 2). This thesis produced a rare and 
unique set of data, which found that while practitioners displayed notions of European 
identity, these were not a ‘European integration identity’ as they did not manifest 
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themselves through their professional opinions. Rather, the pursuit of national interests 
defined individuals’ views regarding EU security cooperation and integration. Furthermore, 
it applied strategic narrative theory in an internal communication context in order to trace 
the EU’s efforts at creating a common security culture through standardised CSDP training 
courses.  
The data collection took place at a time of significant changes. While the new EUGS was 
already taking shape, the full strategy had not yet been released. Subsequently, its impact 
on the implementation of the CSDP could not be foreseen and its reception by security 
practitioners could not be measured. However, some significant progress has since been 
made in terms of further integrating European security and defence through tools such as 
the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund. Subsequent 
research regarding the reception of the EUGS and the new mechanisms created to facilitate 
further integration is thus required to reassess practitioner views on the EU being the best 
tool to achieve common goals. This study has established a benchmark against which the 
impact of these new CSDP initiatives can be fruitfully measured.  
In addition, the EU’s internal identity struggles have deepened due to the continuing 
irregular migrant crisis, the impending Brexit and an increase in nationalist/anti-EU 
movements in several Member States. While the influx of refugees peaked during the data 
collection phase, there is still significant discord regarding the treatment of migrants. 
Furthermore, elections in a number of European countries have resulted in more right-wing, 
more Eurosceptic governments. This widespread sense of ‘re-nationalisation’ seems to be a 
strong counter-narrative to any notions of a common European identity amongst 
Europeans. Moreover, during the data collection, Brexit was only discussed as a potential 
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and seemingly unlikely outcome of the impending referendum. And while it is still unclear 
what role the UK will play in CSDP implementation post-Brexit, there is no doubt that its 
leaving the EU will have an impact on practitioners’ notions of European (integration) 
identity. On the one hand, it may question the likeliness of further security cooperation and 
integration at a time when the EU has to grapple with internal cohesion and reassert the 
primacy of a NATO framework in the minds of the military. On the other hand, it may 
reinforce a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongst the remaining EU Member States after the 
departure of one of the EU’s largest military powers. These complex developments will have 
a significant impact on the implementation of the CSDP and the extent to which the EUGS is 
put into action by the Member States. They have the potential to reinforce a trend towards 
European security and defence being limited to like-minded Member States cooperating 
when common goals are identified rather than pursuing integration and action through 
consensus by all Member States.  
Furthermore, they are closely connected to notions of identity and highlight the struggle 
between general acceptance of the need to cooperate at EU level in order to deal with the 
complexity of problems facing Europe and the perceived need to protect national interests 
and preserve a sense of national identity. Investigating the extent to which notions of 
European and national identity are warring or complementary continues to be crucial. This 
is especially so amongst practitioners involved in implementing EU policies as they are 







Asseburg, M. and Kempin, R. (eds.) (2009). The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and 
Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations. SWP Research Paper, 
14.  
Aggestam, L. (1999). Role Conceptions and the Poltics of Identity in Foreign Policy. Arena Papers(8).  
Aggestam, L., & Hyde-Price, A. (2000). Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Alyson, J. K. B. (2008). The EU and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and 
Defence Policy? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 84(1), 
115-130. 
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism: 
Verso. 
Antoniades, A., Miskimmon, A. and O'Loughlin, B. (2010). Great Power Politics and Strategic 
Narratives. University of Sussex. Centre for Global Political Economy.  
Armingeon, K., & Ceka, B. (2013). The Loss of Trust in the European Union during the Great 
Recession since 2007: The Role of Heuristics from the National Political System. European 
Union Politics, 15(1), 82-107.  
Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (2001). Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy: 
RAND Corporation. 
Barber, T. (2010). The Appointments of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 48(s1), 55-67.  
Barros-García, X. (2007). Effective Multilateralism and the EU as a Military Power: The Worldview of 
Javier Solana.  
Barth, F. (1998). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference: 
Waveland Press. 
Bátora, J. (2009). European Defence Agency: A Flashpoint of Institutional Logics. West European 
Politics, 32(6), 1075-1098. 
Benson-Rea, M., & Shore, C. (2012). Representing Europe: The Emerging ‘Culture’ of EU Diplomacy. 
Public Administration, 90(2), 480-496.  
Berdún, M. M. G. i. (2007). The Identity of Nations: Polity. 
Berenskoetter, F., & Williams, M. J. (2007). Power in World Politics: Routledge. 
Berg, L.-A. (2011). The EU's Experience with Security Sector Governance. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12244 (Accessed on 22 April 2015).  
Bicchi, F., & Carta, C. (2012). The COREU Network and the Circulation of Information Within EU 
Foreign Policy. Journal of European Integration, 34(5), 465-484. 
322 
 
Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism: SAGE. 
Biscop, S. (2009). The Value of Power, the Power of Values: a Call for an EU Grand Strategy (Egmont 
Paper 33): Egmont, the Royal Institute for International Relations. 
Biscop, S. (2016). The EU Global Strategy: : Realpolitik with European characteristics. Egmont 
Security Policy Brief No. 75, Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06638 
(Accessed on 23 January 2017).  
Biscop, S., & Andersson, J. J. (2008). The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global 
Europe: Routledge. 
Biscop, S., & Coelmont, J. (2010). A strategy for CSDP - Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security 
Provider. Egmont Paper No. 37, October 2010. 
Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An 
Empirical Test With Representative Data. Political Psychology, 24(2), 289-312.  
Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond "Identity". Theory and Society, 29(1), 1-47.  
Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Bruter, M. (2008). Legitimacy, Euroscepticism & Identity in the European Union – Problems of 
Measurement, Modelling & Paradoxical Patterns of Influence. Journal of Contemporary 
European Research(4), 273-285.   
Bruter, M. (2009). Time Bomb?: The Dynamic Effect of News and Symbols on the Political Identity of 
European Citizens. Comparative Political Studies, 42(12), 1498-1536.  
Bryman, A., & Bryman (2003). Quantity and Quality in Social Research: Taylor & Francis. 
Caforio, G. (2003). Handbook of the Sociology of the Military: Springer US. 
Caforio, G., & Nuciari, M. (1994). The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type. Current Sociology, 42(3), 33-56.  
Campbell, D. (1998). Writing Security United States Foreign Policy: Katz Group. 
Cerutti, F., & Lucarelli, S. (2008). The search for a European identity: Values, policies and legitimacy 
of the European Union: Routledge. 
Chaban, N., & Holland, M. (2008). The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, Public and Elite 
Perceptions of the EU: Taylor & Francis. 
Chappell, L. (2009). Differing Member State Approaches to the Development of the EU Battlegroup 
Concept: Implications for CSDP. European Security, 18(4), 417-439.  
Chappell, L., Mawdsley, J., & Petrov, P. (2016). The EU, Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and 
Strategic Challenges: Taylor & Francis. 
Checkel, J. T. (1999). Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe. 
International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), 84-114.  
323 
 
Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International 
Organization, 55(03), 553-588.  
Clarke, M. (ed.) (1993). New Perspectives on Security: Brassey's. 
Coelmont, J. (2012). An EU Security Strategy - An Attractive Narrative. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06586 (Accessed on 3 September 2017).  
Coelmont, J. (2016). The EUGS: Realistic, but Not Too Modest, Please. The International Spectator, 
51(3), 9-11.  
Colley, L. (1992). Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837: Yale University Press. 
Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2003). Business Research: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Conley, H. A. (2016). The Birth of a Global Strategy amid Deep Crisis. The International Spectator, 
51(3), 12-14.  
Converse, J. M., & Schuman, H. (1974). Conversations at Random: Survey Research as Interviewers 
See It: Wiley. 
Council of the European Union (2003). European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe In A Better 
World. Brussels. 
Council of the European Union (2005) Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP.  
Council of the European Union (2008). Council Conclusion 15396/08. 
Council of the European Union (2013) Council Decision 2013/189/CFSP. 
Creswell, J. W., & Clark, V. L. P. (2011). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research: SAGE 
Publications. 
Cross, M. (2011). Security Integration in Europe - How Knowledge-based Networks Are Transforming 
the European Union: University of Michigan Press. 
Dandeker, C., & Gow, J. (1999). Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping. Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 10(2), 58-79. 
Dassù, M., & Menotti, R. (2005). Europe and America in the Age of Bush. Survival, 47(1), 105-122. 
De Neve, A. (2010). L'Agence Européenne de Défense et la Coopération dans le Domaine Capacitaire: 
Editions L'Harmattan. 
Delibašić, I. (2013). The Need for a New European Identity? European View, 12(2), 299-306.  
Deutsch, J. A. (1953). A New Type of Behaviour Theory. British Journal of Psychology. General 
Section, 44(4), 304-317.  
Deutsch, K. W. (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in 
the Light of Historical Experience: Princeton University Press. 
Dimitriu, G., & Graaf, B. (2014). Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Narratives, Elite Responsiveness, 
and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan, 2006–2010. Foreign Policy Analysis (12), 2-23.  
324 
 
Donaldson, S. I., & Grant-Vallone, E. J. (2002). Understanding Self-Report Bias in Organizational 
Behavior Research. Journal of Business and Psychology, 17(2), 245-260.  
Duchesne, S. (2013). Citizens’ Reactions to European Integration Compared: Springer 
Duchesne, S., & Frognier, A.-P. (2008). National and European Identifications: A Dual Relationship. 
Comparative European Politics, 6(2), 143-168.  
Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life: Books on Demand. 
European Union (2016), Shared Vision and Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy 
for   the   European   Union’s   Foreign   and   Security  Policy Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (Accessed on   
1 August 2016) 
Egeberg, M. (1999). Transcending intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National 
Officials in EU Decision-Making. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3), 456-474.  
Fehige, C., & Wessels, U. (1998). Introduction to Possible Preferences. Berlin: de Gruyter.  
Ferry, J. M., & Thibaud, P. (1992). Discussion sur l'Europe: Calmann-Lévy. 
Follesdal, A. (2002). Citizenship: European and Global. Global Citizenship: A Critical Reader, 71-83.  
Fouberg, E. H. (2002). Understanding Space, Understanding Citizenship. Journal of Geography, 
101(2), 81-85.  
Frank, R. E. (2004). Les Identités Européennes au XXe siècle: Diversités, Convergences et Solidarités. 
Paris. 
Freedman, L. (2006). Networks, Culture and Narratives. The Adelphi Papers, 45(379), 11-26.  
Freedman, L. (2006). The Transformation of Strategic Affairs: Routledge for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Frith, H., & Kitzinger, C. (1998). `Emotion Work' as a Participant Resource: A Feminist Analysis of 
Young Women's Talk-in-Interaction. Sociology, 32(2), 299-320.  
Fulbrook, M. (1999). German National Identity after the Holocaust: Wiley. 
Fursdon, E. (1980). The European Defence Community: A History: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
GarcÍa, S.(1993). European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy: Pinter Publishers for the Eleni 
Nakou Foundation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 
Gariup, M. (2009). European Security Culture: Language, Theory, Policy: Ashgate Pub. 
Garton-Ash, T. (2007). Europe's True Stories. Prospects(131).  
Gillis, J. R. (1996). Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity: Princeton University Press. 
Ginsberg, R., & Penksa, S. (2012). The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
325 
 
Goldmann, K., & Gilland, K. (2001). Nationality versus Europeanisation: the National View of the 
Nation in Four EU Countries: Dept. of Political Science, Stockholm University. 
Gould, A. C., & Messina, A. M. (2014). Europe's Contending Identities: Supranationalism, 
Ethnoregionalism, Religion, and New Nationalism: Cambridge University Press. 
Grevi, G. (2016). A Global Strategy for a Soul-Searching European Union. EPC Discussion Paper.  
Guisan, C. (2012). A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration: Memory and Policies: 
Routledge. 
Guttman, R. J. (2001). Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Haas, E. B. (1968). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957: Stanford 
University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and the Evolution of Society: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. (2001). Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review(11), 5-26.  
Hall, S. (1993). Culture, Community, Nation. Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (3), 349-363. 
Hanshew, K. (2008). EU=Europe? Euroskepticism and European Identity. forost(45).  
Hanssen, M. (2010). Civil-Military Interaction in the European Union. Applying a Comprehensive 
Approach to CSDP Operations. Hg. v. Swedish Defence Research Agency. Stockholm.  
Hardwick, S., & Mansfield, G. (2009). Discourse, Identity, and “Homeland as Other” at the 
Borderlands. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99 (2), 383-405.  
Heisbourg, F. (2000). Europe's Strategic Ambitions: the Limits of Ambiguity. Survival, 42(2), 5-15.  
Herrmann, R. K., Risse-Kappen, T., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Transnational Identities: Becoming 
European in the EU: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Hill, C. (1996). The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy: Routledge. 
Hix, S., & Hoyland, B. (2011). The Political System of the European Union: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Holland, M. (2005). Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years 2nd Edition: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Hooghe, L. (1999). Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the Orientations 
of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration. Comparative Political Studies, 
32(4), 435-463.  
Howorth, J. (2002). The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture. Politique Européenne, 
8(4), 88-109. 
Howorth, J. (2014). Security and Defence Policy in the European Union: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hurrell, U., Hurrell, A. (2007). On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society: OUP Oxford. 
326 
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2006). ‘Normative’ Power Europe: a Realist Critique. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 13(2), 217-234.  
Jegen, M., & Mérand, F. (2014). Constructive Ambiguity: Comparing the EU’s Energy and Defence 
Policies. West European Politics, 37(1), 182-203.  
Johnston, R. J. (2000). The Dictionary of Human Geography. Oxford. 
Jones, S. G. (2007). The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Jørgensen, K. E. (2009). The European Union and International Organizations: Taylor & Francis. 
Fowler, F. J. (2002). Survey Research Methods: SAGE Publications. 
Juncker, J.-C. (2017). Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security 
Conference Prague: In defence of Europe [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm (Accessed on 15 June 2017). 
Juncos, A. E., & Pomorska, K. (2014). Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European 
External Action Service. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(2), 302-319.  
Kaina, V., & Karolewski, I. P. (2013). EU Governance and European Identity. Living Reviews in 
European Governance, 8.  
Kaina, V., Karolewski, I. P., & Kuhn, S. (2015). European Identity Revisited: New Approaches and 
Recent Empirical Evidence: Taylor & Francis. 
Kaldor, M., Martin, M., & Selchow, S. (2007). Human Security: a New Strategic Narrative for Europe. 
International Affairs, 83(2), 273-288.  
Kantner, C. (2006). Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding The Case of the Emerging 
European Identity. European Journal of Social Theory, 9(4), 501-523.  
Karolewski, I. P., & Kaina, V. (2006). European Identity: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Insights: Lit. 
Kassarjian, H. H. (1977). Content Analysis in Consumer Research. Journal of Consumer Research, 4(1), 
8-18.  
Kassim, H., Peters, G., & Wright, V. (2000). The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic 
Level: OUP Oxford. 
Katzenstein, P. J., Peace, S. (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics: Columbia University Press. 
Keohane, D. (2011). Lessons from EU Peace Operations. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15(1-
2), 200-217. 
Kernic, F., Callaghan, J., & Manigart, P. (2002). Public Opinion on European Security and Defense: a 
Survey of European Trends and Public Attitudes toward CFSP and ESDP: Peter Lang. 
Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Palgrave Macmillan. 
327 
 
Kirchner, E. (2013). Common Security and Defence Policy Peace Operations in the Western Balkans: 
Impact and Lessons learned. European Security, 22(1), 36-54.  
Kirchner, E. J., & Sperling, J. (2010). National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance: Taylor 
& Francis. 
Kissack, R. (2010). Pursuing Effective Multilateralism: The European Union, International 
Organisations and the Politics of Decision Making: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Knill, C., & Lenschow, A. (2001). “Seek and Ye Shall Find!”: Linking Different Perspectives on 
Institutional Change. Comparative Political Studies, 34(2), 187-215.  
Kohli, M. (2000). The Battlegrounds of European Identity. European Societies, 2(2), 113-137.  
Koops, J. A. (2011). The European Union as an Integrative Power: Assessing the EU's 'Effective 
Multilateralism' with NATO and the United Nations: VUB Press. 
Krause, K., & Williams, M. C. (2002). Critical Security Studies: Concepts And Strategies: Taylor & 
Francis. 
Krosnick, J. A. (1999). Survey Research. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 537-567.  
Kumm, M. (2007). Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism. I•CON, Volume 6, 
Number 1, pp. 117–136. 
Kurowska, X., & Breuer, F. (2011). Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in 
Action: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lacroix, J. (2002). For a European Constitutional Patriotism. Political Studies, 50(5), 944-958.  
Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1), 69-88.  
Laffan, B. (1998). The European Union: a Distinctive Model of Internationalization. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 5(2), 235-253.  
Larsen, H. (2013). Discourses of State Identity and Post-Lisbon National Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Denmark. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(3), 368-385.  
Lehne, S. (2016). The EU Global Strategy, a Triumph of Hope Over Experience. Carnegie Europe.  
Lewis, J. (2000). The Methods of Community in EU Decision-Making and Administrative Rivalry in the 
Council's Infrastructure. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(2), 261-289.  
Lindley-French, J. (2004). The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 
21st Century. European Security, 13(1-2), 1-15.  
Lindley–French, J. (2002). St Malo II: Rescuing European Defence? New Economy, 9(4), 217-223.  




Lurweg, M. (2011). Coherent Actor or Institution Wrangler? The European Union as a Development 
and Security Actor in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. African Security, 4(2), 100-
126.  
Mann, S. J. (1992). Telling a Life Story: Issues for Research. Management Education and 
Development, 23(3), 271-280. 
Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40 (2), 235-258. 
Maronick, T. J. (2009). The Role of the Internet in Survey Research: Guidelines for Researchers and 
Experts. Journal of Global Business & Technology, 5(1), 18-31.  
Martin, M. (2007). Human Security: Does Normative Europe Need a New Strategic Narrative? Paper 
presented at the European Union Studies Association Conference, Montreal.  
Mattelaer, A. (2013). The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations: 
Planning, Friction, Strategy: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
McDonagh, K. (2014). ‘Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk’: Understanding the EU's Security 
Identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (3), 627-641.   
Menon, A. (2011). European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya. Survival, 53(3), 75-90.  
Meyer, C. O. (2005). Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist 
Framework for Explaining Changing Norms. European Journal of International Relations, 
11(4), 523-549.  
Milzow, K. (2012). National Interests and European Integration: Discourse and Politics of Blair, Chirac 
and Schröder: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2012). Working Paper: Forging the World: Strategic 
Narratives and International Relations. Royal Holloway 
Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2014). Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and 
the New World Order: Taylor & Francis. 
Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., and Roselle, L. (eds.) (2017). Forging the World Strategic Narratives 
and International Relations: University of Michigan Press. 
Moes, J. (2012). European Identity in Crisis: A Methodological Framework. Conference Paper.  
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht: Cornell University Press. 
Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The Content Analysis Guidebook: SAGE Publications. 
Noutcheva, G. (2009). Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: the Limits of the EU's Normative 
Power in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(7), 1065-1084.  
Nuttall, S. J. (1992). European Political Co-operation: Clarendon Press. 
Nye, J. S. (2011). The Future of Power: PublicAffairs. 
329 
 
Ojanen, H. (2006). The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy. Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 44(1), 57-76.  
Owens, T. J., Robinson, D. T., & Smith-Lovin, L. (2010). Three Faces of Identity. Sociology, 36(1), 477.  
Pape, R. A. (2005). Soft Balancing against the United States. International Security, 30(1), 7-45.  
Paul, T. V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy. International Security, 30(1), 46-71.  
Payan, T. (2006). Cops, Soldiers, and Diplomats: Explaining Agency Behavior in the War on Drugs: 
Lexington Books. 
Pennycook, A., & Tollefson, J. W. (1995). English in the World/the World in English. 
Peterson, J., & Shackleton, M. (2012). The Institutions of the European Union: OUP Oxford. 
Posen, B. R. (2006). European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity? Security 
Studies, 15(2), 149-186.  
Rayroux, A. (2014). Speaking EU Defence at Home: Contentious Discourses and Constructive 
Ambiguity. Cooperation and Conflict, 49(3), 386-405.  
Reips, U.-D., & Bosnjak, M. (eds.) (2001). Dimensions of Internet Science. Lengerich: Pabst 
Richardson, J. (2012). Constructing a Policy-Making State?: Policy Dynamics in the EU. OUP Oxford.  
Ringsmose, J., & Børgesen, B. K. (2011). Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military 
Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives. European Security, 20(4), 
505-528.  
Risse, T. (2006). Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration: 
Routledge. 
Risse, T. (2014). European Public Spheres: Politics Is Back: Cambridge University Press. 
Rogers, J. (2009). From ‘Civilian Power’ to ‘Global Power’: Explicating the European Union's ‘Grand 
Strategy’ Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory. Journal of Common Market Studies, 
47(4), 831-862.  
Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand 
Soft Power. Media, War & Conflict, 7(1), 70-84.  
Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. 1978. New York: Vintage  
Sandawi, P. a. (2009). Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective? . Documenti 
IAI 
Seale, C. (1998). Researching Society and Culture: SAGE Publications. 
Serricchio, F., Tsakatika, M., & Quaglia, L. (2013). Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(1), 51-64.  
Skuse, A., Gillespie, M., & Power, G. (2011). Drama for Development: Cultural Translation and Social 
Change: SAGE Publications. 
330 
 
Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity: University of Nevada Press. 
Smith, A. D. (1992). National identity and the idea of European unity. International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 55-76.  
Smith, M. (2003). The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern 
Policy Framework? Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), 556-575.  
Soler, L. (2011). The New EU Diplomacy: EUI RSCAS(5).  
Stemler, S. (ed.) (2001). An Introduction to Content Analysis: ERIC Clearinghouse.  
Tashakkori, A., Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches: SAGE Publications. 
Therborn, G. (1995). European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-
2000: SAGE Publications. 
Tocci, N. (2016). The making of the EU Global Strategy. Contemporary Security Policy, 37(3), 461-472.  
Tocci, N. (2018). Towards a European Security and Defence Union: Was 2017 a Watershed? Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 56(S1), 131-141.  
Todorov, T. (1977). The Poetics of Prose: Cornell University Press. 
Trondal, J. (2002). Beyond the EU Membership-non-Membership Dichotomy? Supranational 
Identities among National EU Decision-makers. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3), 468-
487.  
Udrea, G. (2014). European Identity in Intercultural Context: Insights from Erasmus Students’ 
Experiences. (PhD), Bucharest.  
Ulgen. (2016). EU Global Strategy Expert Opinion No.17. Retrieved from 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-global-strategy-expert-opinion-no17-%E2%80%93-
sinan-ulgen (Accessed on 5 December 2016).  
van der Dussen, J., & Wilson, K. (1995). The History of the Idea of Europe: Taylor & Francis. 
Waldzus, S., & Mummendey, A. (2004). Inclusion in a Superordinate Category, In-group 
Prototypicality, and Attitudes towards Out-groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
40(4), 466-477. 
Wallace, W. (1991). Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom. International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 67(1), 65-80.  
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic Content Analysis: Sage. 
Wheeler, N. J. (2000). Saving Strangers : Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press USA - OSO. 
Whitman, R. G. (2013). The Neo-normative Turn in Theorising the EU’s International Presence. 
Cooperation and Conflict, 48(2), 171-193.  
331 
 
Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997). The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979–92: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK. 
Youngs, R. (2004). Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity. Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 42(2), 415-435. 
Zalman, A. (2011). The Definition of Strategic Narrative: an Evolving Concept in International Affairs.  
Retrieved from http://strategicnarrativeinstitute.com/the-definition-of-strategic-narrative-





Appendix 1: University of Canterbury Human Ethics Approval 
 
HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE   
  
Secretary, Lynda Griffioen  
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz   
  
Ref:  HEC 2015/74   
23 July 2015  
Katharina Stirland  
National Centre for Research on Europe  
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY  
 
  
Dear Katharina   
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Warring Identities - An 
investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union's expanding role as security 
provider and ever-evolving notions of identity amongst security practitioners - what part 
does CSDP training play?” has been considered and approved.    
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 22 July 2015.  
Best wishes for your project.  
Yours sincerely  
 
  
Lindsey MacDonald  
Chair University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee  
   
   
333 
 
Appendix 2: Research Proposal for the European Security and 
Defence College 
 
Mrs Katharina Stirland MPhil, BA (Hons)  
National Centre for Research on Europe 






Information Sheet for the Executive Academic Board of  
the European Security and Defence College 
Warring Identities: An investigation of the impact of CSDP training on notions of 
(European) identity amongst military staff. 
 
I am studying towards a PhD in European Studies at the National Centre for Research on 
Europe, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. I have previously completed a Bachelor of 
Arts degree in Culture, Society and Communication (Europe), and a Master of Philosophy 
degree in Modern European Cultures, both at the University of Birmingham, United 
Kingdom. Throughout my studies I have strongly focussed on notions of identity amongst 
European military staff: I wrote a dissertation for my Bachelor of Arts degree on the British 
military’s attempts to maintain a strong national identity amongst staff based on foreign 
territory, and my Master’s thesis analysed the use of notions of national identity in military 
recruitment campaigns in the UK and Germany. 
For my PhD thesis I would like to analyse how CSDP-related training affects notions of 
identity amongst participating European military personnel. In particular, I would like to 
investigate the extent to which it builds or reinforces a sense of European identity and 
334 
 
whether it is effective in fostering a ‘common strategic culture’. I am therefore seeking your 
approval to undertake the following research: 
 
 An online survey for personnel who are planning or scheduled to undertake CSDP 
training. 
 A small number of interviews with staff involved in delivering training 
 Semi-structured interviews with participants either during or immediately after a 
CSDP-related training course. 
 A follow-up survey and/or interviews with participants approximately six months 
after the completion of their CSDP training course. 
 
I aim to survey approximately 400 individuals and interview between 50 and 60 from across 
Europe. 
If you agree to my research, I would wish for my survey to be sent to participants as soon as 
they register for the training, preferably by email and perhaps amongst other pre-training 
information that the European Security and Defence College sends to them. This is because 
its aim is to capture views and attitudes prior to participation in training courses. I will then 
use the survey itself to identify individuals willing to participate in interviews and the follow-
up survey, although I would also be grateful if the European Security and Defence College 
could send out reminders to their training participants periodically. 
All participation in my study is voluntary and as such there will be no obligation to complete 
the initial survey or participate in the interviews and follow-up survey. Furthermore, 
individual participants and the European Security and Defence College have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time and to have any data collected from them removed from 
the study and destroyed. 
335 
 
All participation is also anonymous and confidential. All data collected during the study will 
be securely stored on password-protected computers and locked storage at the University of 
Canterbury. No information by which an individual could be identified will be published. 
Copies of the completed thesis will be provided to the European Security and Defence 
College, as will the anonymous data, upon request. 
All research that involves human participants has to be approved by the University of 
Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee in order to ensure that all work is conducted with 
appropriate regard for ethical standards and cultural values. This approval is currently being 
obtained for this study.  
Should you require further information in order to make your decision, please contact me via 
the details given above. Any complaints about myself or the study should be sent to Professor 
Martin Holland (martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz), Director of the National Centre for 
Research on Europe and my PhD supervisor. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank you for the help that the European Security and Defence 
College has already provided me. I look forward to hearing back from you and hopefully to 










Warring Identities: An investigation of the impact of CSDP training on notions of 
(European) identity amongst security practitioners.  
This thesis seeks to investigate the relationship between the EU’s efforts to implement its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the role of notions of European identity 
amongst staff engaged in this process. In particular, this research aims to determine the 
extent to which training initiatives, introduced to increase awareness and understanding of 
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Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been a highly contested subject. The first EU mission 
was launched in 2003; since then over 30 operations have taken place, most of them being 
civilian. While that might seem like a considerable number, these missions vary significantly 
in size with the smallest involving only a handful of personnel and the biggest deploying 
close to 7000 staff (EUFOR Althea). Moreover, they are regularly overshadowed by claims of 
the EU’s failure to act (efficiently). In fact, the EU is often criticised for punching below its 
weight with regards to making use of its security and defence capabilities (e.g. Kantner, 
2006, p.5040).  
A large amount of research has been carried out into what role the EU is to play in the 
international sphere, i.e. whether its foreign policy merely constitutes another tool to 
promote the interests of its most powerful member states or if its unique structure allows 
the European Union to make a “distinctive contribution to international politics” (Bickerton, 
C., 2011, p.186). This has led to many studies assessing the EU’s external identity and the 
efficiency of operational mechanisms put in place by EU decision-makers. Yet there is no 
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supranational decision-making body, which means that whilst intergovernmental 
cooperation is sought, member states retain sovereignty over security and defence matters.  
Michael E. Smith therefore discerns that one of the main reasons for the EU’s 
underperformance in the security arena is its lack of a common security culture, or in other 
words, the insufficient development of a ‘shared value system’ (in Richardson, J., 2012, p.7). 
His statement highlights a key question which is rather more inward-looking than many 
previous studies and deserves further attention: Is it possible for the EU to speak with ‘one 
voice’ in security and defence matters, i.e. how do you create a security culture which is 
centred around the interests of Europe as a whole rather than the sole promotion of 
national interests?  
The importance of identity in the European integration process is highlighted by Anthony 
Smith who believes that “until the great majority of Europeans, the great mass of the middle 
and lower classes, are ready to imbibe these European messages in a similar manner and to 
feel inspired by them to common action and community, the edifice of “Europe” at the 
political level will remain shaky” (1992, p.73, also see Bruter, 2005, Kumm, 2007, Michalski 
et al., 2004, Hermann, et al., 2004). 
This shaky foundation that Smith alludes to is reflected in the EU’s much criticised 
democratic deficit and its perceived lack of legitimacy (e.g. Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 
2007, Lord, 2001, Schmitter, 2003, p.83). In fact, Sifft et al. agree with Smith and argue that 
in order to legitimise EU institutions, a “common European discourse and some sense of 
belonging to a common community” need to emerge (2007, p. 128). This is further 
supported by Kaina et al., who believe that a ‘sense of community’ amongst Europeans has 
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the potential to overcome the increasing polarisation of attitudes towards the EU (2013, 
p.5).  
While CSDP staff only represent a small number of Europeans who actively participate in the 
implementation of European integration, they also represent a majority of Europeans who 
experience the effects of decisions taken at EU level in their daily lives.  
A substantial volume of research has been undertaken into how key decision-makers, i.e. 
senior national officials, deal with conceding some of their sovereignty in favour of 
intergovernmental and supranational processes and how this affects their identity. 
However, as Adler-Nissen points out, traditional approaches to studying European 
integration often neglect to consider the experiences of individuals whose daily lives are 
affected by European institutions. Yet, their practices are “crucial for the performance of 
European integration” (2014). This is further supported by Bruter who argues that mass 
identities emerge through an “evolution of individuals’ identities over time” (2005, p. 56) 
Security practitioners constitute an especially interesting case study, as CSDP missions are 
organised ad-hoc and staff are drafted from national armed forces/ or often national 
governments, rather than from an existing European contingent (while ‘European 
battlegroups’ exist on paper, they are yet to be deployed). Putting the CSDP into action 
remains an intergovernmental process in which member states retain control over 
participation in missions. This means that although staff might be aware of the possibility of 
being deployed on an EU-led operation (or under the auspices of NATO), the majority are 
unlikely to have chosen their profession due to this European dimension. While there is 
much less focus on ‘duty’ being a motivation for joining the military, in many countries 
joining the armed forces remains inextricably linked to a strong sense of identification with 
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the nation-state (Mileham in Anderson and Seitz, 2006, p. 37). Therefore, some military staff 
involved in the implementation of the CSDP are like many other Europeans in that they are 
confronted with European integration somewhat involuntarily whereas many civilian CSDP 
personnel actively seek to work for the EU. This makes for interesting research in terms of 
their differing attitudes and opinions. 
In 2005, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was founded, one of its main 
aims being the development of such a ‘European security culture’ through increasingly 
integrated training. This thesis aims to assess the feasibility of a common security culture by 
examining the extent to which socialisation of CSDP agents occurs through training, and 
whether a sense of collective European identity is instilled in individuals implementing the 
CSDP.  
An examination of existing literature regarding the impact of socialisation and norm 
diffusion on creating support for the European integration process will be carried out. 
Furthermore, existing knowledge regarding the role of identity in facilitating European 
unification to enable an evaluation of the viability of a common European security culture 
will be reviewed. These will inform empirical research into the extent to which CSDP-related 
training shapes perceptions of and identification with the EU and European integration 
amongst participating staff. The impact of the EU’s training initiatives on the development 
of a sense of ‘belonging together’ amongst participants will be discussed and whether such 
a collective identity enables the construction of a more robust supranational security culture 
in Europe. Furthermore, if it is shown that notions of a collective European identity are 
emerging amongst staff involved in implementing the CSDP, an attempt will be made to 
trace the processes that bring about such a (partial) shift of loyalties.  
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This research hypothesises that multinational training on CSDP has the potential to alter 
notions of identity amongst military and civilian staff, but that more ‘pooling and sharing’ in 
terms of training is needed to ensure it has a lasting effect. It also proposes that while 
training is initiated by the EU and largely consists of structured teaching, it is the initiatives 
that foster informal social interaction amongst fellow Europeans that are most successful at 
creating a sense of European identity. The combination of greater knowledge of the EU’s 
foreign policy and personal experiences of working with other Europeans will make 
cooperation on security and defence matters more efficient.  
Yet it is expected that while identification with fellow Europeans might develop alongside 
pre-existing national/regional identities, they might remain secondary altogether, or be 
situation-specific. This means individuals might not apply a more Eurocentric approach to all 
aspects of their life, but instead employ it only in a security and defence policy-related 
context, thus highlighting the potential emergence of pan-European institutional or role-
specific identity.  
In order to corroborate these hypotheses, the main research question is as follows:  
To what extent does the EU construct notions of European identity amongst military staff 
involved in the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy?  
The following sub-questions will also be addressed:  
• Does CSDP training create a sense of European identity amongst military staff that 
goes beyond basic support for the EU and includes a shared value system?  
• If so, what does this sense of European identity look like?  
• Do those involved in implementing the CSDP develop an allegiance to Europe in 




• Do notions of a collective (European) identity go hand in hand with the creation of a 
more robust European security culture?  
This study will not only provide insights into whether involvement in EU policy 
implementation triggers a more profound identification with the EU, but it will also shed 
some light on the underlying processes that bring about such a shift in loyalty.  
The aim is not to focus on analysing the socialisation and identification of elites, but special 
attention will be given to identity formation amongst those individuals whose job it is to 
implement decisions taken at the top. Such an approach endorses Juncos’ view that while 
high-ranking politicians are in charge of executing the CSDP, ‘implementing agents’ largely 
determine the outcomes (2011, p.84). Focusing on how non-decision-making individuals in 
an institutional context respond to the EU’s attempts at norm diffusion will provide a novel 
approach to assessing the efficiency of its strategy for overcoming both its ‘knowledge and 
democratic deficit’ (McCormick, 2014) and also further highlight how identity formation is 
reciprocal – often instigated by elites, but also shaped from the bottom-up.  
Research Methodology 
This study will use a sequential mixed method approach to generate a data set as rich and 
comprehensive as possible within the scope of this project. The question of if and how 
European identity formation takes place amongst members of the armed forces will be 
approached by employing the concept of strategic narratives, which has been developed by 
Miskimmon et al. (2012). For its operationalisation, a number of theoretical constructs 
underpin the research questions to be examined.  
While Miskimmon et al. discuss three different, yet mutually constitutive processes – those 
of strategic narrative formation, projection and reception, the focus of this study will be on 
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the projection and reception of strategic narratives around the EU’s security and defence 
policy.  
They define strategic narratives as tools for constructing “a shared meaning of international 
politics” and shaping “interests, values and aspirations” which ultimately affect an actor’s 
behaviour and enhance its political legitimacy (p.1, 2011, Working paper). Furthermore, 
they distinguish between three different levels of narratives – system, identity and policy 
(see below for more details).  
This study will examine CSDP training as a platform for narrative projection and reception 
and will assess the different, yet inextricably linked levels of narrative that are being 
communicated. It will investigate whether there is a clash between ‘national’ and EU 
narratives and to what extent these are coherent across Europe.  
Empirical research will include:  
• content analyses of training materials provided by the individual member states as 
well as at EU level 
•  interviews with elites providing CSDP training (target: 15 interviews) 
•  Ongoing online surveys with participants prior to training (target: 400 responses) 
• interviews with trainees during/after training (target: 50-60 interviews) 
• follow-up skype interviews or online surveys with interviewees 
 
The strategic narrative framework will be operationalised in the same way across all the 
different research methods in order to achieve holistic and consistent findings. This will be 
achieved through investigating the same theoretical constructs throughout the research 
process.  
In this CSDP training context, system narratives, which attempt to set out “what kind of 
order we want” (Miskimmon et al., 2012, p.3), will be explored. In particular, concepts such 
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as transatlanticism, eurocentrism, cosmopolitanism and normative power Europe will be 
investigated, both in terms of projection and reception. This means attention will be paid to 
what kind of narratives regarding world order are being communicated, but also what 
system narratives had been appropriated by respondents prior to CSDP training. 
Furthermore, data will be collected with regards to CSDP training being a source for clashes 
between narratives.  
In terms of identity narratives, the following ideas will be explored: is there a coherent 
European identity that is being communicated either by individual member states or by the 
EU itself? How is such a European identity defined? Bruter’s notion of civic and cultural 
European identity will be investigated as well as Kantner’s distinction between weak and 
strong European identity. A large number of scholars argue that national identities and 
European identity are not mutually exclusive, but in fact correlate, meaning that those who 
have a strong sense of national identity are more likely to have a European identity 
(Mummendey and Waldzus, 2004, Breakwell, 2004, Duchesne and Frognier, 1995, Risse, 
Bruter 2009). Whether clashes between identities occur and what their impact is will be 
examined as well as the role of ‘othering’ in communicating identity narratives both 
internally and externally.  
At the most specific level, the ‘policy’ level, this study focuses on narratives concerning 
security provision. A number of different theories will be assessed, including the notion of 
role identity and in particular how perceptions regarding the role of the security provider 
have changed over time; Job motivation is another issue closely related to role. Recent 
studies of military officers’ motivations to join the armed forces have shown that the 
traditional sense of ‘national duty’ and an ‘esprit de corps’ that goes hand in hand with 
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strong military values, no longer represent the predominant reasons for joining the military. 
Instead, the notion of the professional security provider, who chooses their job for self-
fulfilment reasons rather than to serve a greater good, has increasingly attracted new 
recruits. The importance of this change in attitude will be measured throughout this study 
and compared to those of their civilian colleagues. 
Content Analysis  
Initially, a content analysis of CSDP training materials will be carried out. Focusing on the 
“systematic, objective and quantitative analysis of message characteristics (Neuendorf, 
2002, p.1), its goal is to capture attitudes, interests and values of population groups 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p.46). Furthermore, language is not only a communication tool, but 
instead a means to actively shape our knowledge of the world, [...] and through which social 
meanings are “created, reproduced and social identities are formed” (Seale, 1998, p.246). 
This analysis will consist of examining a number of different official documents that form 
the basis of the CSDP and thus also determine the content of CSDP training, such as the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) and the CSDP Handbooks. This will provide a basic 
framework of the EU’s notion of European identity/norms and values that is likely to be 
promoted during CSDP training. This may then be used for coding subsequent research into 
the feasibility of constructing ‘Europeanness’ and collective identity through processes such 
as norm diffusion and social interaction.  
A number of different scope conditions for identity formation have been derived from 
similar previous studies. These are:  
• Formal teaching vs. informal social interactions 
• New recruits vs. more experienced ones 
• The type of training  
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• National influences on conceptions of European identity 
Online survey 
One of the ways to test these and assess the extent to which training activities instil in 
participants a European identity as well as their main objective, which is a “European 
security and defence culture” (Weisserth, in Paile, 2014, p.4), quantitative online 
questionnaires will be conducted with staff before they commence CSDP-related training. 
This study will capture initial awareness of the CSDP and pre-existing notions of identity and 
be the starting point for capturing changes in attitudes that might occur as a result of the 
training. While this method will not be able to provide detailed insights into people’s 
identifications and its rigid structure might at times “disguise important variations in 
peoples’ responses” (Deacon, et al, 1999, p.77), it will produce a snapshot of notions of 
identity. In order to maximise the validity of findings within the parameters of this study, a 
sample size of four hundred will be aimed for.  
The questions that form part of the online survey have been informed by a number of 
previous studies covering notions of identity as well as officer education. The triangulation 
of primary research with existing studies will increase the validity of the findings and enable 
some direct comparisons with existing data or allow the verification of models developed in 
those studies. For example, Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year and include 
questions regarding people’s identity. Some questions will be identical to those asked in the 
survey in order to determine whether training participants closely represent the ‘average 
European citizen’ or whether they represent an ‘epistemic community’ whose attitudes are 
different from the general public. Dr Michael Bruter from the London School of Economics 
has also conducted a large European identity study. Some of the questions used in his study 
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have been developed to apply in a military context. Caforio et al. conducted a large study 
into military officer education. A model was developed to identify different types of officer. 
This convergent/divergent model has been used to develop questions regarding 
participants’ motivations and role conceptions.  
Semi-structured interviews 
Employing a sequential research design enables the researcher to develop interview 
questions based on preliminary findings from the online survey. Qualitative interviews with 
staff during (or straight after) their participation in a variety of training initiatives will 
explore individuals’ conceptions of identity in more detail.  
While coverage of as many member states as possible will be sought, it has to be noted that 
participation in EU-level training varies considerably from country to country. Cumulative 
data on training participation by member states might in itself provide a cause for analysis. 
Furthermore, sample selection will be somewhat determined by the limitations of this 
study, i.e. the majority of interviews being conducted during training proceedings that fall 
within the field research period. 
The interviews will cover topics such as:  
• More detailed questions regarding participants’ notions of identity 
• Their ideas of European identity and how these fit with pre-existing notions of 
identity as well as with the identity the EU is trying to promote 
• Usefulness of the training (increase in knowledge, networking, language skills, etc.) 
• Participants’ understanding of a ‘common strategic culture’ and how it applies to 
them/ their work 
• Participants’ views on (future) EU security and defence cooperation 
Whereas interviewing training participants will certainly provide an insight into the 
reception of narratives, it is also important to investigate how what is being received might 
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differ from the intended messages. Therefore, depth interviews will also be carried out with 
a number of staff delivering the training.  
In both cases semi-structured interviews will be used to obtain comparable data. Having a 
certain level of flexibility in terms of conducting the interviews will not only provide a less 
formal and forced interview situation (Wodak, 1999, p. 146), it will also facilitate the 
exploration and elaboration of individuals’ notions of identity (May, 2001).  
The triangulation of quantitative and qualitative research methods will avoid overreliance 
on any one method (Punch, 1998, p.241) and at the same time attempt to bridge the divide 
between positivist and constructivist approaches to performing research, thus striving for a 
balanced analysis of identity formation and its influence on the implementation of the CSDP 
(Silverman, 2000, p.98).  
The Organisational Aspects of the Study 
All research involving human participants requires ethical approval from the University of 
Canterbury. Ethical approval has been obtained for this study.   
The research to be carried out will comply with the University’s data management and data 
protection procedures. This means that all documents and data will be stored securely in 
password-protected computer files or in locked storage units at the University of 
Canterbury. Any data that may be used to identify participants in the study will not be 
published or shared with third parties in any way. The completed PhD thesis, plus 
anonymous data collected during the course of the research, will be shared on request with 
any EU institutions that participate. All participation in the study will be on a voluntary basis 
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and any individuals or institutions that withdraw their cooperation will have the right to ask 
that their data be removed and destroyed.  
















Appendix 3: Study Information Sheet – CSDP 
Training Experts 
Warring Identities: An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity - what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Information Sheet: Interview with CSDP training experts 
My name is Katharina Stirland and I am a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand. This study investigates the relationship between the EU’s efforts to implement its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the role of notions of (European) identity 
amongst staff engaged in this process. In particular, this research aims to determine the extent to 
which training initiatives, introduced to increase awareness and understanding of the CSDP and 
making its implementation more efficient, are successful at also fostering a sense of ‘European 
identity’. 
 This research project has been approved by the ESDC Executive Academic Board. As you 
are one of the experts involved in CSDP-related training, your participation in a 30 to 45 minute 
interview would be much appreciated. The purpose of these interviews is to gain a detailed insight 
into the content of CSDP training activities and to obtain an understanding of the rationale behind 
the content and format of training. An online survey of training participants prior to training and 
semi-structured interviews with trainees after the completion of training will also form part of this 
study. 
Participation is voluntary and you will be given the opportunity to withdraw from this 
study at the end of the interview. If you choose to opt out at this point, all your interview data will 
be removed.  
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public without 
your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, de-identification will be carried out 
according to the University's Human Ethics Council guidelines. This means that you will be 
assigned a code that will be used on all the data you provide.  
Furthermore, research participants’ identifying data will be stored separately from the de-
identified data on locked hard drives and in password-protected electronic form. This means that 
only the researcher will be able to link you to the data and no identification will be disclosed. The 
de-identified data will be accessible only to the researcher, Katharina Stirland, and her direct 
supervisors, Dr. Natalia Chaban and Professor Martin Holland. All data will be stored for a period 
of 10 years after the completion of the PhD study and will then be destroyed. A thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library.  
The project is being carried out by Katharina Stirland under the supervision of Professor 
Martin Holland, who can be contacted at martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and will be undertaken according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. 
Participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
 
National Centre for Research on Europe 




25 June 2015 
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Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
You are required to sign the Interview Consent Form before the interview can take place.  
Thank you very much for your participation, 




Appendix 4: Consent Form - Experts 
National Centre for Research on 




25 June 2015 
 
Warring Identities - An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity – what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Consent Form for Interviews with CSDP-related training experts 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time during the interview. You 
will be provided with a transcript of your interview answers. You will be given 14 days to review 
the transcript. After this time it will not be possible to withdraw your interview data.  
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher 
and her supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.   
I understand that only the researcher is able to personally link me to the data as a de-identification 
process will take place and no identification will be disclosed.  
I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library.  
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and in 
password- protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years. 
 
I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study at the conclusion of the 
project. Please provide an email address that the report can be sent to:  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher, Katharina Stirland 
(katharina.stirland@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor, Martin Holland 
(martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. The research will be undertaken 
according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
(human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 
By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 










Warring Identities: An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity - what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Information Sheet: Interview with CSDP- related training participants 
My name is Katharina Stirland and I am a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand. This study investigates the relationship between the EU’s efforts to implement its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the role of notions of (European) identity 
amongst staff engaged in this process. In particular, this research aims to determine the extent to 
which training initiatives, introduced to increase awareness and understanding of the CSDP and 
making its implementation more efficient, are successful at also fostering a sense of ‘European 
identity’. 
This research project is divided into three stages. You are invited to participate in the 
second stage which consists of a semi-structured interview with training participants who have 
volunteered to take part in follow-up research after completing the online survey and participating 
in the training course. Interviews should take between 30 minutes and 45 minutes. 
Participation is voluntary and participation in the interview does not commit you to take 
part in subsequent stages. At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to 
withdraw from this stage of the study. If you choose to opt out at this point, all your interview data 
will be removed. However, as you have already submitted your online survey, it will not be 
possible to withdraw the online survey data.  
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public without 
your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, de-identification will be carried out 
according to the University's Human Ethics Council guidelines. This means that you have been 
assigned a code that will be used on all the data you provide.  
Furthermore, research participants’ identifying data will be stored separately from the de-
identified data on locked hard drives and in password-protected electronic form. This means that 
only the researcher will be able to link you to the data and no identification will be disclosed. The 
de-identified data will be accessible only to the researcher, Katharina Stirland, and her direct 
supervisors, Dr. Natalia Chaban and Professor Martin Holland. All data will be stored for a period 
of 10 years after the completion of the PhD study and will then be destroyed. A thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library.  
The project is being carried out by Katharina Stirland under the supervision of Professor 
Martin Holland, who can be contacted at martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and will be undertaken according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. 
Participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
You are required to sign the Interview Consent Form before the interview can take place.  
Thank you very much for your participation, 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
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Appendix 6: Consent Form – Interview Participants   
National Centre for Research on 
Europe Telephone: +64 3 364 3120 
Email: 
katharina.stirland@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
25 June 2015 
 
Warring Identities - An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity – what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Consent Form for Interviews with CSDP-related training participants 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research.\ 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time during the interview. You 
will be provided with a transcript of your interview answers. You will be given 14 days to review 
the transcript. After this time it will not be possible to withdraw your interview data.  
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher 
and her supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.   
I understand that only the researcher is able to personally link me to the data as a de-identification 
process will take place and no identification will be disclosed.  
I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library.  
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and in 
password- protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years. 
 
I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study at the conclusion of the 
project. Please provide an email address that the report can be sent to:  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher, Katharina Stirland 
(katharina.stirland@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor, Martin Holland 
(martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. The research will be undertaken 
according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
(human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 
By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
  Name      Signature    Date  
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Appendix 7: Study Information Sheet –Participant Survey 
 
Warring Identities: An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity - what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Information Sheet: Online Survey for CSDP- related training participants 
My name is Katharina Stirland and I am a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand. This study investigates the relationship between the EU’s efforts to implement its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the role of notions of (European) identity 
amongst staff engaged in this process. In particular, this research aims to determine the extent to 
which training initiatives, introduced to increase awareness and understanding of the CSDP and 
making its implementation more efficient, are successful at also fostering a sense of ‘European 
identity’. 
This research project is divided into three stages. You are invited to participate in the first 
stage, which consists of an online survey of military and civilian personnel prior to participation in 
CSDP-related training courses. The survey should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Participation is voluntary and participation in the online survey does not commit you to 
take part in subsequent stages. At the end of the online survey, you will be given the opportunity 
to withdraw from the study. If you choose to opt out at this point, all your data will be removed. 
However, once you have submitted your survey, it will not be possible to withdraw the data.  
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public without 
your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, de-identification will be carried out 
according to the University's Human Ethics Council guidelines. This means that you will be 
assigned a code that will be used on all the data you provide.  
 
Furthermore, research participants’ identifying data will be stored separately from the de-
identified data on locked hard drives and in password-protected electronic form. This means that 
only the researcher will be able to link you to the data and no identification will be disclosed. The 
de-identified data will be accessible only to the researcher, Katharina Stirland, and her direct 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
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supervisors, Dr. Natalia Chaban and Professor Martin Holland. All data will be stored for a period 
of 10 years after the completion of the PhD study and will then be destroyed. A thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library.  
 
The project is being carried out by Katharina Stirland under the supervision of Professor 
Martin Holland, who can be contacted at martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and will be undertaken according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. 
Participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
You will be asked to agree to participate in this study at the beginning of the online survey 
and again before you submit the data.  
 




Appendix 8: Consent Form – Survey Participants 
National Centre for Research on 




 25 June 2015 
 
Warring Identities - An investigation of the reciprocity between the European Union’s 
expanding role as a security provider and ever-evolving notions of identity – what part does 
CSDP training play? 
Consent Form for Online Survey with CSDP-related training participants 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
 
I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time during the online survey. 
You will be given another option to opt out before submitting your survey answers. Withdrawal of 
participation will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should this remain 
practically achievable. After you have submitted the online survey, it will not be possible to remove 
your data from the study.  
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher 
and her supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.  I 
understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library.  
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and in 
password- protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years. 
 
I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study at the conclusion of the 
project. Please provide an email address that the report can be sent to here:  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher, Katharina Stirland 
(katharina.stirland@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor, Martin Holland 
(martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. The research will be undertaken 
according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
(human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 




Appendix 9: Online Survey 





 Participation in this study 
  
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
  
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. 
  
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher and her supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the 
participants.  I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through 
the University of Canterbury Library. 
   
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities 
and in password- protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years. 
  
I understand that I can contact the researcher, Katharina Stirland 
(katharina.stirland@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or supervisor, Martin Holland 
(martin.holland@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. The research will be undertaken 
according to research ethics stipulated in New Zealand Law. If I have any complaints, I can 
contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 
4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
  
 I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time during the online 
survey. You will be given another option to opt out before submitting your survey answers. 
Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any information provided 
should this remain practically achievable. After you have submitted the online survey, it will 
not be possible to remove your data from the study. 
   
▢ I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study at the 
conclusion of the project. If you would like to receive a copy, please provide an email 
address that the report can be sent to here:  (12) 
________________________________________________ 






Q2 Which training course coordinated by the European Security and Defence College have 
you registered for? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q3 How did you find out about [insert training course specified in Q2]? 
o Through a trainer/teacher in my workplace  (1)  
o Through a colleague who previously participated in one of the courses  (2)  
o I looked for opportunities to participate in multinational training  (3)  
o Other (please specify):  (4) ________________________________________________ 




Q4 Are you a member of the Armed Forces? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: Q9 If Q4 = Yes 
 
 









Q7 How long have you been employed by [insert response from Q6]? 
o less than 3 months  (1)  
o between 3 and 12 months  (2)  
o between 1 and 5 years  (3)  
o between 5 and 10 years  (4)  




Q8 Since starting work for [insert response from Q6], have you taken part in multinational 
training? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: Q15 If Q8 = No 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q4 = Yes 
 
Q9 How long have you been in the Armed Forces? 
o less than 3 months  (1)  
o between 3 and 12 months  (2)  
o between 1 and 5 years  (3)  
o between 5 and 10 years  (4)  
o more than 10 years  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Q5 Which service of the Armed Forces do you belong to? 
o Army  (1)  
o Air Force  (2)  
o Navy  (3)  
o Gendarmerie  (4)  
o Reserves  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q4 = Yes 
 
Q10 Since joining the military, have you taken part in multinational training? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: Q15 If Q10 = No 
 
 
Q11 How many training courses have you participated in? 
o 1 to 3 courses  (1)  
o 4 to 6 courses  (2)  




Q12 Please specify the type of training you participated in. 
 


















Q15 Have you ever taken part in an exchange with another European country? 
  
 This could be activities such as (Erasmus) exchanges at university, high school or a 
language course. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: End of Block If Q15 = No 
 
 
Q16 Please indicate what year the exchange took place in. 
 





Q17 Please indicate how long the exchange lasted. 
o Less than one month  (1)  
o Between one and three months  (2)  
o Between three and six months  (3)  
o Between six and twelve months  (4)  
o  More than a year  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section A  
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Start of Block: Section B 
 
Q18 In your current position, how frequently do you interact with European colleagues in 
other EU member states? 
o On a daily basis  (1)  
o On a weekly basis  (2)  
o On a monthly basis  (3)  
o On an irregular basis (not more than a few times a year)  (4)  




Q19 Overall, how would you rate your understanding of... 
 Very 
Good 





the EU's political processes? () 
 
the Common Security and Defence 
Policy? ()  
the most recent European Security 
Strategy document? ()  



















Increase my knowledge of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy ()  
Increase my knowledge of how the EU 
works ()  
Enable me to build lasting networks with 
European colleagues in other EU member 
states () 
 
Make me more aware of what it means to 
be a European Union citizen ()  
Not have much impact on my views and 
















Developing your skills and expertise 
further through more training ()  
Participating in a mission that protects 
your country's interests ()  
Participating in a humanitarian mission 
abroad ()  
Taking up a position with a good work/life 
balance ()  
Exercising leadership () 
 
Working with international colleagues on 
providing security ()  
If any of your main priorities are not listed, 





Display This Question: 
If Q4 = Yes 
 
















Attractive education and training 
opportunities ()  
I wanted to serve my nation () 
 
I was looking for an adventure () 
 
I liked the values of the military () 
 
Better job prospects and/or pay than in 
civilian jobs ()  
I liked the discipline and order of the 
military ()  
If any of your main reasons are not listed, 





Display This Question: 
If Q4 = No 
 











Q24 How would you describe the sense of community in your place of work? 
o There is a strong sense of camaraderie  (1)  
o I have a close group of colleagues, but do not feel part of a larger community  (2)  
o There is no sense of community  (3)  
o  A sense of community in the workplace is not important to me  (4)  
















Protects its inhabitants and their interests 
using military force ()  
Uses primarily non-coercive means to 
achieve peaceful relations with other 
states () 
 
Provides humanitarian assistance to the 
weak and vulnerable internationally ()  
Cooperates with other states through 
international organisations such as the 






















Protects its inhabitants and their interests 
using military force ()  
Uses primarily non-coercive means to 
achieve peaceful relations with other 
states () 
 
Provides humanitarian assistance to the 
weak and vulnerable internationally ()  
Cooperates with other states through 
international organisations such as the UN 






















































End of Block: Section B  
Start of Block: Section 3 
 
Q30 To what extent do you personally identify with... 











your region (within your country) () 
 




being a citizen of the world () 
 









Q31 What does 'being a citizen of the European Union' mean to you? 











Having a shared European heritage () 
 
Having the right to vote in European 
elections ()  
Having common institutions () 
 
Having a common European history () 
 
Having a common European flag, anthem 
and passport ()  
Having the right to travel to another EU 
country without passing through customs 
() 
 
Having the right to travel to another EU 
country without having to show your 
passport/ID () 
 
Having some common ideals () 
 






Q58 Would you say your views of European integration have changed since taking on a role 
that involves implementing the CSDP? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Don't know  (3)  
 
 
Display This Question: 














Q32 Do you think a common European identity currently exists? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Partially  (4)  
o Don't know  (3)  
 
Skip To: Q34 If Q32 = No 




Q33 In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that make 




 Please choose up to two.  
 
▢ Common history  (1)  
▢ Geography  (2)  
▢ Democratic values   (3)  
▢ High level of social protection   (4)  
▢ Common culture  (5)  
▢ Common religious heritage  (6)  
▢ None - there is no European identity   (7)  
▢ Single currency, the Euro   (8)  
▢ Symbols: flag, anthem and motto (Unity in Diversity)  (9)  
▢ Don't know  (10)  







Q34 In the following list, which are the three most important values for you personally? 
  
 Please select three.  
▢ Democracy  (1)  
▢ Equality   (2)  
▢ Human rights   (3)  
▢ Individual freedom   (4)  
▢ Peace   (5)  
▢ Religion   (6)  
▢ Respect for human life  (7)  
▢ Respect for other cultures   (8)  
▢ Self-fulfillment   (9)  
▢ Solidarity   (10)  
▢ Support for others   (11)  
▢ The Rule of Law    (12)  
▢ Tolerance  (13)  








Q35  And which three of the following values best represent the European Union? 
  
 Please select three.  
▢ Democracy  (1)  
▢ Equality   (2)  
▢ Human rights   (3)  
▢ Individual freedom   (4)  
▢ Peace   (5)  
▢ Religion   (6)  
▢ Respect for human life  (7)  
▢ Respect for other cultures   (8)  
▢ Self-fulfillment   (9)  
▢ Solidarity   (10)  
▢ Support for others   (11)  
▢ The Rule of Law    (12)  
▢ Tolerance  (13)  








Q36 Since the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 2003, the military 
uniforms of those deployed on CSDP missions have had the European Union logo as well as 
national logos on them. How do you feel about this? 

























Q37 Periodically, European politicians mention the idea of a "European Army". What would 
be your opinion regarding the creation of a European Army, that is a stand-alone armed 
force that is not drawn from individual member states and is under the authority of the EU? 
o I would support the idea  (1)  
o I would reject the idea  (2)  
o Don't know  (3)  
 
Skip To: End of Block If Q37 = Don't know 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q37 = I would reject the idea 
 








Display This Question: 











End of Block: Section 3  
Start of Block: Section D 
 
Q40 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Prefer not to say  (3)  






Q41 What is your (primary) nationality? 
o Austrian   (1)  
o Belgian   (2)  
o British  (3)  
o Bulgarian   (4)  
o Croatian   (5)  
o Cypriot   (6)  
o Czech  (7)  
o Danish  (8)  
o Dutch   (9)  
o Estonian   (10)  
o Finnish  (11)  
o French   (12)  
o German   (13)  
o Greek  (14)  
o Hungarian  (15)  
o Italian   (16)  
o Irish   (17)  
o Latvian   (18)  
o Lithuanian   (19)  
o Luxembourgish  (20)  
o Maltese  (21)  
o Polish   (22)  
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o Portuguese   (23)  
o Romanian   (24)  
o Slovakian   (25)  
o Slovenian   (26)  
o Spanish   (27)  
o Swedish  (28)  




Q42 What is your highest level of education (or equivalent)? 
o Secondary school   (1)  
o Secondary school fulfilling university entry requirements   (2)  
o Tertiary diploma/certificate  (3)  
o Undergraduate degree (e.g. Bachelor)   (4)  
o Postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters)   (5)  
o Doctoral degree  (6)  
o Other (please specify):  (7) ________________________________________________ 
o Prefer not to say  (8)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Q43 Please indicate your equivalent rank according to the following list. 
o Officer cadet/ midshipman   (1)  
o Second Lieutenant/ Pilot officer/ Ensign   (2)  
o Lieutenant/ Flying Officer/ Sub-Lieutenant   (3)  
o Captain/ Flight Lieutenant/ Lieutenant   (4)  
o Major/ Squadron Leader/ Lieutenant Commander    (5)  
o Lieutenant Colonel/ Wing Commander/ Commander    (6)  
o Colonel/ Group Captain/ Captain   (7)  
o Brigadier/ Air Commodore/ Commodore   (8)  
o Major General/ Air Vice-Marshal/ Rear Admiral  (9)  
o Lieutenant General/ Air Marshal/ Vice Admiral   (10)  
o General/ Air Chief Marshal/ Admiral   (11)  
o Field Marshal/ Marshal of the Air Force/ Admiral of the Fleet  (12)  
o Other (please specify):   (13)  
o Prefer not to say  (14)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Q4 = No 
 







Q45 Would you be willing to participate in follow-up research related to this subject once you 
have completed the course? This would be in the form of a short interview at the end of the 
training course you registered for. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o Maybe ( I would need further details first)  (3)  
 
Skip To: Q47 If Q45 = No 
 
 
Q46 Please provide an email address you can be contacted at regarding follow-up research. 
Your details will be kept confidential and will not be passed on to third parties. You will only 















Q48 Once you have submitted your survey, it will not be possible to remove your answers 
from the study. Please tick the box below to confirm your participation 
▢ I agree to participate in this study  (1)  
 




Appendix 10: Interview Guide – CSDP Training Participants 
 
Section 1: Questions about the course in general 
1. How have you found the course so far?  
Prompts:  -      What aspects have you enjoyed the most/least? 
- What aspects have you found the most/least useful? 
- Why? 
2. If you have taken part in training at national level previously, how would you say this 
ESDC-coordinated training course has differed from those arranged only for 
nationals of your country?  
3. What are your reasons for participating in the course? 
4. Tell me about how it was doing the course with people from other European 
countries.  
Prompts:  -      Have you networked much/ Do you think you will stay in 
touch         with any of them?  
- What were the group dynamics?  
- Was there a sense of community? 
- Do you think it’s important? Why? 
5. What are the key messages (about the EU) that you are taking away from this 
training course? 
6. How do you think this course is going to impact on you?  
Prompts: -      On you personally 
- On the work you do? 
7. If you could change anything about the training course, what would it be? Why?  
8. The ESDC aims to help create a ‘common European security culture’. What does that 
mean to you? Do you think it’s important? Why? 
9. In your opinion, what is the best way of creating such a culture? Why? 
Section 2: Questions about your role and security provision today 
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10. What are the first things that spring to mind when you think about….your 
institution? 
11. In the past, being in the armed forces/involved in security and defence was 
commonly associated with serving your nation, or even referred to as ‘the ultimate 
sacrifice’ one could make for one’s country. What do those associations mean to you 
personally?  
Prompt: -       Does it matter who you risk your life for? 
12. Describe to me what you think the role of you as a security provider is in today’s 
world.  
Prompt: What do you think are key security threats for Europeans? 
13. Describe to me what you think the EU’s role as a global actor is.  
14. Where do you see the future of Europe’s security and defence?  
Prompts: -      Do you think there ought to be more 
integration/collaboration? -      Why? 
- Are there tings the EU should not get involved in? 
Section 3: Questions relating to identity 
15. Could you imagine working directly for the EU rather than for the EU through your 
home country? Why? 
16. What does ‘Europe’ mean to you? 
17. Would you say there is a ‘European way’ to approaching your work? If so, what does 
it look like? 
18. Do you think there is a sense of community and shared values and interests at your 
work/in general?  
19. Do you think a sense of community amongst Europeans is important?  
20. Has (the potential of) working with and for fellow Europeans (had) any impact on 
how you feel about the EU? How so? 





Appendix 11: Interview Guide – CSDP Experts 
 
1. Is the EU a credible global actor? Why/why not?  
2. Where do you see the future of the EU regarding security and defence? 
3. Describe to me what a ‘common European security culture’ means to you? 
4. Do you think this is important? Why/why not? 
5. Have you seen any evidence of this emerging amongst European security 
practitioners? 
6. What do you think is the best way to help create a common security culture? 
7. What are the biggest challenges to creating such a culture?  
Prompts: -  Are there differences between civilian and military 
attitudes? 
- Do you think there are differences in attitude between 
personnel from the different EU member states? 
- Is a common security culture necessary at all levels, or 
is it enough for decision-makers to develop a 
‘European approach’ to security and defence? 
Why/why not? 
8. Can you tell me a bit about your experience of working with the ESDC and running 
training courses relating to CSDP? 
9. How do you select your speakers/presenters? 
10. What are the key messages regarding the EU as a security provider/global actor and 
the CSDP that is communicated through training?  
11. From your own experience, what aspects of ESDC-coordinated training courses are 
most useful to participants?  
12. Do you think there is currently coherence in training on CSDP across Europe? 
Why/why not? 
13. In terms of resources and support, how do you feel member states approach this? 
14. Do you think there is a shared European identity? 
Prompts:  -      Is there a shared European identity amongst those 
involved in implementing the CSDP? 
- If there is one:  
o What does it look like?  
o Does it serve any purpose? 
- Do you think European security practitioners develop a 
more European mindset/ a sense of European identity 
through their work? 
 
